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Thesis Abstract  
This dissertation examines the Turkish Cypriot community in the period from 1918 to 1931, 
that is, during the time that the ethnogenesis of the community took place. The thesis argues 
that this process took place within that period under the influence of three factors: the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism in mainland Turkey, the Greek Cypriot Enosis movement 
and the intransigence of the colonial government. Furthermore, I argue that the consolidation 
of nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots caused the emergence of a nationalist elite. This 
elite, which was not controlled by the colonial government, entered into a debate with the 
traditional elite about the control of the religious institutions and the transformation into a 
Turkish-Kemalist entity according to the principles set by Kemal Atatürk. I used newspaper 
articles and archival sources, part of which had not been used in the past, in order to reassess 
the process of the ethnogenesis of the Turkish Cypriot community. By doing so, I attempted 
to disassociate the issue of the ethnic transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community from 
the narration of the later stages of Turkish Cypriot history. In this way, the thesis moves away 
from the deterministic narration of classic Cypriot historiography. Furthermore, the thesis 
examines the role of the Turkish Cypriot press in the ethnic transformation of the Turkish 
Cypriot community. By rereading the press of the conservative and the nationalist elite, I 
attempt to deconstruct their image and analyze them under the light of social and political 
events. I attempt, thus, to present them not as two elites that were divided by ideology. 
Instead, I try to portray them as two groups that used ideology as a means to retain their 
position, in the case of the traditional elite, or in order to come to power, in the case of the 
nationalist elite.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
  
The object of inquiry 
 Fikret Halil Alasya, one of the most prominent Turkish Cypriot historians, wrote on 
the 20th of September 1963 an article entitled “Cyprus and love for Atatürk” (Kıbrıs ve 
Atatürk Sevgisi). In it we read:  
The Turks of Cyprus accepted and applied day by day without any legal 
obligation all the reforms that the great Atatürk initiated in Turkey. Even 
if the local government practically obstructed some of the reforms, their 
principles were implemented and a struggle was undertaken in order to 
convince the local government to apply them. The alphabet reform, the 
dress reform, the shutting down of the dervish lodges and secularism 
were implemented immediately. Even the elderly Turkish women 
removed their headscarves while the men immediately wore hats and 
started praying in Turkish and there was a struggle for the 
implementation of the civil code. This struggle lasted until the 1950s. 
[…] This demonstrates that the Turks of Cyprus with their culture, 
mentality, behaviour, in a few words with their being, have safeguarded 
their existence as an inseparable part of the Turkishness of the 
motherland. The Turks of Cyprus sincerely accepted the Atatürk reforms 
and it is possible to understand their loyalty to Atatürk from the sparkle in 
the eyes of the young and the elderly alike. The Turks of Cyprus are born, 
raised and die with love for Atatürk.1  
 Almost the whole of Turkish Cypriot historiography agrees that the Turkish Cypriots 
adopted the Kemalist reforms and embraced Turkish nationalism already from the beginning 
of the Kemalist revolution. This narration served two purposes: first, it answered the Greek 
Cypriot argument that the Turkish Cypriots were Islamized Christians and therefore Turkish 
claims on Cyprus were groundless. Second, it was an appeal to the Turkish government to 
support a population that was always loyal to the principles of Turkish nationalism. Instead of 
examining the Turkishness of the Turkish Cypriots, this thesis will try to answer the following 
questions: Under what conditions did the Turkish Cypriots embrace Turkish nationalism? 
What was the nature of Turkish Cypriot Kemalism? Were the secularist reforms unanimously 
accepted? Did the social and ideological transformation of the community create a new elite? 
                                                          
1Halil Fikret Alasya, Kalemden Damlalar Cilt 1 (Lefkoşa, 1977), p.77.  
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How did the old ruling class experience this transformation? Finally, what is the nature of the 
conflict between the old and the new elite?  
 The scope of this thesis covers the period from 1918 until 1931. Without disregarding 
the years that preceded and followed this period, I argue that the events that took place in 
1918 and 1931 were crucial for the Turkish Cypriot national struggle and therefore limit the 
scope of this research. Turkish nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots was active already 
from the late 19th century. I argue, however, that it was the collapse of the Empire and the 
launch of the Kemalist revolution that provided the framework for Turkish nationalism. The 
establishment of the Turkish Republic and the institutionalization of Turkish nationalism, 
primarily through education but also through an organized state apparatus made possible the 
spread of Turkish nationalism first among the Turks in Anatolia and then among the Turkish 
populations that had remained outside the boundaries of modern Turkey. The Kemalist 
version of Turkish nationalism had incorporated elements of the ideological currents of the 
late 19th and early 20th century, namely the ideas of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism but due to 
the novelties it introduced, with secularism being the most important, it was an innovation for 
a society that was defined until then along religious lines. After 1918 but mainly after 1922, 
with the consolidation of the Kemalist rule, the Turkish Cypriots entered the era of modernity. 
What was the procedure of the modernization of the community? Did they embrace the 
Kemalist principles unanimously and wholeheartedly, as Alasya described in his article? Was 
there any opposition to the reforms and how was it treated by the nationalists? How long did 
the modernization process last? How did the Turkish Cypriots see themselves within the 
transformed public sphere? The answer to these questions will be provided in the core 
chapters of the thesis.  
 I decided to limit the scope of the research to 1931. The procedure of consolidation of 
Turkish nationalism in Cyprus did not end in 1931; it continued until the 1940s. I argue, 
however, that the autocratic measures that were imposed by the colonial government in 1931 
as a response to the Greek Cypriot riots that took place in October of the same year ended the 
constitutional experiment in Cyprus and removed the opportunity from both communities to 
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use the representative bodies in order to promote their agenda. After that and until the end of 
colonial rule the nationalists were obliged to use other means in order to promote their ideas. 
By 1931 a younger generation of Turkish Cypriots that had been educated in accordance to 
the principles of Kemalism had already embraced the ideals of Turkish nationalism and it is 
for this reason that I limit the research to 1931.  
 Within these thirteen years we witness the transformation of the Turkish Cypriots 
from a religious to an ethnic communıty. I‟m interested in the procedure of this 
transformation and the implications it had for the Turkish Cypriots. It was a procedure that 
caused a debate between the conservative elite of the religious notables that remained loyal to 
the colonial government and the nationalist elite that struggled to secure the implementation 
of the Kemalist reforms and make sure that the Turkish Cypriots embraced Turkish 
nationalism. I argue that the Turkish Cypriot society during that period did not react in a 
monolithic way towards the changes that were imported from mainland Turkey. The 
community and its elite consisted of arduous supporters of the Kemalist revolution and people 
who were skeptical of the reforms. This distinction does not mean that the latter rejected a 
Turkish identity, as this was now put forward in Kemalist ideology. There were many reasons 
for this distinction, but I focus mainly on two: The politics of power and the economy. Hence, 
I approach this debate not as one between the supporters and the adversaries of Kemalism. By 
looking at other factors such as British colonialism and Greek Cypriot irredentism, I argue 
that it was not only an ideological debate; it was rather a struggle for power. In that sense, the 
two elites did not differentiate as much in the sense that they both sought to protect the 
religious identity of the community. For a community in transition, Islamic identity still 
played quite an important role.  
 In examining the ideological transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community the 
press offers invaluable insight into the thoughts and ideas of the elites. Both parties used the 
press as the main vehicle of dissemination of their ideas. Quite often the newspaper columns 
were transformed into the space where the editors and the columnists engaged in a harsh 
debate in their attempt to establish themselves as the only guardians of the community‟s 
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interests. I attempt to analyze the discourse of the press in order to demonstrate the 
differences and also the similarities between the two elites. By doing this I also highlight the 
role of the press in the transformation of the community.  
 
 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot historiography  
 Like almost every other aspect of Cypriot life the Cyprus issue has affected Cypriot 
historiography too. The division of the two communities along ethnic lines meant that, even 
now, Cypriot historiography has been unable to produce a common modern history of Cyprus. 
Undoubtedly, the ethnic origin of the researcher, be that a historian, a political scientist or 
even an economist, defined the outcome of one‟s research. In Cyprus, like elsewhere in the 
Balkans and the Middle East historians cannot decide on the nature of the Ottoman era. For 
most Greek and Greek Cypriot historians, the Ottoman past is described as a dark age for the 
Greek people. On the contrary, for Turkish Cypriot historians, the Ottoman administration is 
presented as a golden age for the Turks of Cyprus. As far as British rule is concerned, Turkish 
and Greek Cypriot historians appear united but for different reasons. For Turkish Cypriot 
historians, the colonial administration was regarded as the lesser evil, an obstacle to the Greek 
Cypriot plans to unite Cyprus with Greece. In the broader picture though, the British 
administration was portrayed as unfair and oppressive towards the Turkish Cypriots and 
favourable towards the Greek Cypriots. For most Greek Cypriot historians, the same period is 
presented as unfair and oppressive towards the Greek Cypriots because the colonial 
government did not allow the materialization of the Enosis plans.   
 Until recently Greek Cypriot historians produced excellent and analytical works on 
the history of Cyprus under the British, but in essence these works only narrated the history of 
the Greek Cypriots under the British. Little or no space was provided to the Turkish Cypriots. 
12 
 
The works of Georghallides are a notable exception.2 Georghallides examines the period from 
1918 to 1931 and, unlike other Greek Cypriot historians, refers to the developments within the 
Turkish Cypriot community. Nevertheless he does not analyze in detail the ideological debate 
that took place in the community. The social aspects of the history of Cyprus under British 
rule were neglected by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot researchers, each for different 
reasons. For example, mainstream Greek Cypriot historiography until recently neglected the 
role of the Communist Party of Cyprus, because its leadership chose to oppose the demand for 
Enosis. Hence, it did not fit in the nationalist historical framework that presented a united 
Greek Cypriot society mobilized to achieve the national goal.3 Again Georghallides and also 
Rolandos Katsiaounis are notable exceptions.4 Turkish Cypriot mainstream historiography, on 
the other hand, offers limited space to the Communist Party of Cyprus (later renamed AKEL) 
and Turkish Cypriot participation because the party was dominated by Greek Cypriots and 
mainstream analysis avoids references to cooperation between the two communities in pre-
1974 Cypriot history. On the contrary, there are works in Greek Cypriot historiography 
published after 1974 that focus on the peaceful coexistence and attempt to play down the 
intercommunal violence of the pre-1974 period in order to refute the Turkish Cypriot 
arguments that support the need for two different state entities in Cyprus.  
 Even British historians like C. W. Orr5 and George Hill6 pay more attention to the 
Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriot nationalism and the fact that the Greek Cypriots constituted 
the majority of the population may justify the need for a thorough study of the majority, yet 
the lack of interest in the Turkish Cypriot community continued until the 1950s. It was only 
after the 1974 war and the emancipation of the Turkish Cypriots that an increased interest in 
                                                          
2 G.S Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926 (Nicosia: Cyprus 
Research Centre, 1979); Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs (Nicosia: Cyprus Research 
Centre, 1985). 
3 Stavros Panteli, A History of Cyprus: From Foreign Domination to Troubled Independence (London 
and The Hague: East-West Publications, 2000).  
4 Ronaldos Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the 
Nineteenth Century (Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1996).  
5 C.W.J. Orr, Cyprus under British Rule (London: Zeno Publishers, 1972). 
6 George Hill, A History of Cyprus Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). 
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the history of the community was recorded. Among the various works by international 
scholars on the history of the community under the British, one can distinguish James 
McHenry‟s The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus,7 Hanz Richter‟s Geschichte der Insel Zypern 
1878-19498 and Rebecca Bryant‟s Imagining the Modern.9 McHenry‟s book offer a thorough 
analysis of the developments within the Turkish Cypriot community, but puts more emphasis 
on the impact of Anglo-British relations; Richter‟s book is one of the most detailed works on 
the history of Cyprus, but the period he covers is too long to be able to refer in detail to the 
1920s, the decade when Turkish Cypriot nationalism was consolidated. Finally, Bryant‟s 
work is one of the most thorough anthropological analyses of the rise of nationalism among 
both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. As Bryant is more interested in the origins of the 
Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island, her work puts less emphasis on the nature of 
the conflict between the nationalists and the pro-British.  
 On the latest stages of British rule, the works of Robert Holland, Britain and the 
Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959, and Diana Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957-1963 From Colonial 
Conflict to Constitutional Crisis, offer a detailed account of the events that led to the 
independence of Cyprus, although these years do not fall within the scope of this research.  
 As noted earlier, the Cyprus issue had an impact on the way Turkish historiography 
dealt with the history of the community. For most Turkish Cypriot historians, the era 
preceding the 1974 war is presented as a period of uncertainty for the community amidst a 
struggle to achieve national sovereignty. Hence various works appeared after 1974, often 
published by the Turkish Cypriot Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport, which 
present the Turkish Cypriot community as an ardent supporter of the Kemalist regime. 
Among the numerous works on the Kemalist reforms and the relations of the Turkish Cypriots 
                                                          
7James McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919-1939 (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1987). 
8Heinz Richter, Geschichte der Insel Zypern Teil I: 1878-1949 (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, 
2004).  
9Rebecca Bryant, Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus (London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 
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with Republican Turkey, Mustafa Haşim Altan‟s Atatürk Devrimlerinin Kıbrıs Türk 
Toplumuna Yansıması (The reflection of Atatürk‟s reforms on the Turkish Cypriot 
Community)10 and Sabahattin İsmail and Ergin Birinci‟s Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye-Kıbrıs 
İlişkileri (Turkish-Cypriot relations during the Atatürk era) stand out.11 There are of course 
works by researchers such as Ahmet An, Kıbrıs Türk Liderliğinin Oluşması (The Formation 
of Turkish Cypriot Leadership), and Nazım Beratlı, Kıbrıslı Türklerin Tarihi (The History of 
the Turkish Cypriots), which offer a more detailed but very analytical view of the history of 
the Turkish Cypriots under the British.12  Nevertheless, the relations between the Turkish 
Cypriots and the colonial government or the Greek Cypriot community cannot be analysed 
along the lines of rivalry between Greek and Turkish nationalisms or as a struggle between 
pro- and anti-Kemalist forces. This analysis is too simplistic and ignores other aspects, such 
as the economy or social relations within the Turkish Cypriot community as well as between 
the two communities. Another aspect of these works is the adoption of a deterministic 
historical perception: the period that preceded the 1974 war is presented as a struggle for 
salvation and national emancipation.  
 As far as modern researchers are concerned, they have distanced themselves from this 
analysis. For example, various publications by Turkish Cypriot historian Niyazı Kızılyürek 
offered a new perspective on the history of the Turkish Cypriots, distinct from the 
nationalistic approach of the old guard.13 A new generation of historians has also produced 
comprehensive investigations. Among them, I would single out Altay Nevzat‟s doctoral thesis 
                                                          
10Mustafa Haşim Altan, Atatürk Devrimlerinin Kıbrıs Türk Toplumuna Yansıması (Ankara: KKTC 
Milli Eğitim, Kültür, Gençlik ve Spor Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1997). 
11Sabahattin İsmail and Ergin Birinci, Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye-Kıbrıs İlişkileri (Lefkoşa: Akdeniz 
Haber Ajansı Yayınları, 1989). 
12Ahmet An, Kıbrıs Türk Liderliğinin Oluşması (1900-1942) (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 1997); 
Nazım Beratlı, Kıbrıslı Türklerin Tarihi 3. Kitap (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 1999). 
13Niyazı Kızılyürek, Kıbrıs Sorununda İç ve Diş Etkenler (Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi Yayınları, 1983); 
Kipros: To Adieksodo ton Ethnikismon (Athens: Mavri Lista, 1993); Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs, 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002) 
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on the emergence of nationalism among the Turks of Cyprus,14 Eleni Bouleti‟s thesis on 
British policy towards the Turkish Cypriots and the emergence of national-Turkish identity15 
and Hüseyin Ağuiçenoğlu‟s monograph on the portrayal of the motherland in the Turkish 
Cypriot and the Dobrudja press.16 Nevzat‟s work is one of the most comprehensive studies of 
Turkish Cypriot history. He traces the origins of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in the late 
Ottoman and early British era. In his research, Nevzat has made extensive use of local 
archives, such as the Kardeş Ocağı records, the Turkish Cypriot Brethren Hearth, as well as 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot, Turkish, British and American archives. For this reason, I find 
Nevzat‟s contribution to the field invaluable. Nevzat covers a quite long period, which 
extends from the early 19th Century until after the end of the Second World War. His 
research offers a rich insight in the evolution of Turkish Cypriot nationalism following the 
evolution of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey. Being a Turkish 
Cypriot, Nevzat has a deep understanding of his own community‟s history. This thorough 
account of Turkish Cypriot history could include more extensive reference to the limited yet 
under-researched area of the anti-Kemalist Turkish Cypriots in the 1920s. As I will explain 
later on in the introduction, the limited yet existing reactions to the Kemalist reforms is an 
issue that required further analysis. Nevzat correctly notices that the black and white approach 
of some Turkish Cypriot historians does not allow us to see that some anti-Kemalist figures 
among the community, including Mehmet Münir, the leader of the pro-English elite, did not 
refuse his Turkish roots and “refuted charges that he was anti-Turkish”. 17  As will be 
demonstrated later, the same was the case with the Kemalist party. Worry for the state of the 
community‟s heritage, and discontent with the centralization of the community‟s religious 
                                                          
14Altay Nevzat, Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus (Unpublished doctoral thesis), (Oulu: 
University of Oulu, 2005).  
15Eleni Bouleti, I aggliki Politiki apenanti stin tourkokipriaki Kinotita 1879-1950. I Poria pros tin 
Ethnopiisi tis Mousoulmanikis-kipriakis Kinotitas (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis) (Athens: Panteio 
University, 2008). 
16Hüseyin Ağuiçenoğlu, Das “Mutterland” in der Presse der Dobrudscha und der türkischen 
Zyprioten in postosmanischer Zeit (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2012). 
17Nevzat, Nationalism, p. 287.  
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institutions, although it was central in the Kemalist agenda, proves that the two factions were 
not necessarily opposing.  
On the other hand, Bouleti‟s study is one of the few published in Greek. Bouleti did 
extensive research in the National Archives in London and her work offers a detailed account 
of the role of the Muslim religious endowments, the Evkâf, and the impact that their control 
by the colonial government had on the emergence of Turkish Cypriot identity throughout 
British rule. As we shall see, the issue of the control of the Evkâf is crucial for the prosperity 
of the community and Bouleti‟s research offers valuable insight into developments during the 
early British period that pave the way for the consolidation of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in 
the 1920s.  
Finally Ağuiçenoğlu‟s comparative study of the Turkish press in Cyprus and in 
Dobrudja is one of the few works on the role of the Turkish Cypriot press as an instrument for 
the consolidation of ties with the mainland Turkey. Although there have been book and 
journal articles on the Turkish Cypriot press, Ağuiçenoğlu‟s study is important because he 
attempts an in-depth analysis of the role of the press.  
 For the analysis of Greek nationalism I used the works of Elli Skopetea18 and Thanos 
Veremis.19 Since my research is not a comparative study of nationalism in Cyprus, I was 
interested in tracing the origins of Greek nationalism and the way this was conveyed in 
Cyprus. As far as Greek Cypriot nationalism is concerned, the articles of Kitromilides,20 
Choisi,21  Papageorgiou22 , Sia Anagnostopoulou‟s edited volume 23  and Kaesar Mavratsas‟ 
                                                          
18Elli Skopetea, To “Protipo Vasileio” kai i Megali Idea: Opseis tou Ethnikou Provlimatos stin Ellada 
(1830-1880), (Athens: Politipo, 1988). 
19John S. Koliopoulos & Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel, From 1821 to the Present, 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2004). 
20Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus, Middle Eastern Studies. 
Vol. 26, January 1990, 1. 
21Jeanette Choisi, “The Greek Cypriot Elite – Its Social Function and Legitimization”, The Cyprus 
Review, Vol. 7, Spring 1995, 1. 
22Stefanos P. Papageorgiou, “The Genesis of the Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyrus, 1878-1914: 
A Common march at a Different Pace”, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 9, Spring 1997, 1. 
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monograph 24  were very helpful in analyzing the conditions under which Greek Cypriot 
nationalism emerged and developed.  
  In examining Turkish nationalism, the edited volume on Nationalism in the Turkish-
language series Political Thought in Modern Turkey has been an invaluable tool.25 For a 
historical overview of Turkish nationalism, I used Bernard Lewis‟ The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey,26 Eric Jan Zürcher‟s Turkey, a Modern History27 and Hugh Poulton‟s Top Hat, Grey 
Wolf and Crescent.28  
 For an analysis of Turkish Cypriot society under the British, the work of Salih 
Egemen is one of the few that refer to the social and financial aspects of the quest for 
leadership among the Turkish Cypriots.29 I would also add Bülent Evre‟s book on the birth 
and evolution of Turkish Cypriot nationalism30 and the edited volume on Turkish Cypriot 
identity in literature.31 Finally, the biography of Mehmet Necati Özkan helps us understand 
the evolution of the most prominent Turkish Cypriot statesman and supporter of the Kemalist 
cause of the era.32  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
23Sia Anagnostopoulou (ed.), The Passage from The Ottoman Empire to the Nation States: A Long and 
Difficult Process: The Greek Case. (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2004). 
24Kaesar Mavratsas, Opseis tou Ellinikou Ethnikismou stin Kipro: Ideologikes Antiparatheseis kai I 
Kinoniki Kataskevi tis Ellinokipriakis Tautotitas 1974-1996, (Athens: Katarti, 1998). 
25Tanıl Bora (ed.), Modern Türkiye‟de Siyasî Düşünce: Milliyetçilik (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002). 
26 Bernand Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
27Eric Jan Zürcher, Turkey, a Modern History (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997). 
28Hough Pulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic 
(London: Hurst and Company, 1997). 
29Salih Egemen, Kıbrıslı Türkler Arasında Siyasal Liderlik (Lefkoşa: Ateş Matbaacılık, 2006). 
30Bülent Evre, Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçi: Oluşumu ve Gelişimi (Lefkoşa: İşik Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004).  
31Aydın Mehmet Ali (ed), Turkish Cypriot Identity in Literature (London: Fatal Publications, 1990). 
32 Ergin Birinci, M. Necati Özkan (Lefkoşa: Necati Özkan Vakfı Yayınları, 2001).  
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Overview of primary sources 
 
 Research for the thesis was conducted in the State Archive and the Public Record 
Office of the Republic Of Cyprus, the State Archive of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Ankara and the National Archives in London. The Turkish 
Cypriot press constitutes a pivotal part of my primary sources. Although the Turkish Cypriot 
press in the 1920s was quite active with two newspapers, Söz and Hakikat, covering the 
period examined by this research, not all editions of both newspapers are available to the 
public. The events of 1963-1974 had their toll on the local archives. For the study of the 
Turkish Cypriot Press, I used the works of Cemalettin Ünlü,33 Orhan Turan,34 Bekir Azgın35 
and Martin Strohmeier. 36  The first two are quite detailed and extensive accounts of the 
Turkish Cypriot press, although they both fall victim to the scarcity of sources on the anti-
Kemalist press. Indeed, the lack of sources on the owners and editors of Hakikat newspaper 
limits the possibilities of extensively analyzing the main pro-British newspaper while there 
are plenty of references on the main pro-Kemalist newspaper, Söz. 
 In certain cases, the Turkish Cypriot press completes the archival material since 
newspapers reproduced manifestos, speeches, petitions and appeals to the people that are 
sometimes difficult to find or never made their way into the archives.  
 At this point I would like to refer to the choice of sources in relation to the existing 
bibliography. As I mentioned earlier, within the period under research, Söz was the only 
Turkish Cypriot newspaper in continuous publication, from 1923 until 1942. Due to the fact 
that copies of the newspaper are available in archives, it has been used extensively as a 
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source. Also available are books and articles on its publisher and main columnist, Remzi 
Okan. Research has been also been done about other newspapers and their publishers such as 
Masum Millet (The Innocent Nation). 37  Yet one of the main newspapers of the period, 
Hakikat, has remained under-researched. There are practical reasons for that: it was published 
for ten years, from 1923 to 1933; not all of its editions survive in archives; and it continued 
using the Ottoman alphabet even until 1931. I believe that there is also an ideological reason. 
The newspaper adopted, as we shall see in chapters three and six, the newspaper adopted a 
rather cautious approach towards the Kemalist party. Although Hakikat articles appear in 
many works so far, the fact that its criticism of the Kemalist party in 1930 and 1931 did not 
support the nationalist narrative, has not received enough attention. In a similar way, Mehmet 
Münir, the delegate of the Evkâf and leading figure of the Turkish Cypriot community, is 
neglected by historians. His openly pro-English stance and the fact that he has been labeled 
Anglophile are the two main reasons that researchers have neglected him.  
 The main body of the archives of the colonial government is found in the State 
Archives of the Republic of Cyprus and the National Archives in London. They include the 
correspondence of colonial government officials with their superiors in London, memoranda 
and petitions submitted by Cypriots and newspaper extracts in their original language and in 
translation. For the analysis of the language of the press, I usedsociologist Jürgen Habermas‟s 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 38 , historian Eric Hobsbawm‟s The 
Invention of Tradition39 and Greek sociologist Kirkos Doxiadis‟s Nationalism, Ideology, Mass 
Media.40 I was interested in analyzing the language that was applied in the debate between the 
Kemalist and the pro-government newspapers. While the secular-nationalist rhetoric was 
imported from Turkey, the two parties cannot be clearly defined in national or religious terms. 
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As we shall see, both parties refer equally to the national and religious sentiment of the 
community in order to prevail.  
 
Methodological approach and issues 
 
 This thesis examines the transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community from a 
religious to an ethnic community. I argue that this transformation brought with it significant 
changes in the everyday life of the Turkish Cypriots, changes that nationalist historiography 
presents as universally and enthusiastically accepted. Due to the lack of primary sources, 
tracing the impact of this transformation among the ordinary Turkish Cypriot is not an easy 
task. Indeed the memoirs of members of the elite, such as Necati Özkan, and the memoirs of 
teachers reproduce the mainstream Kemalist narrative. In my attempt to reread the 
transformation process, I found Habermas‟ theory on the transformation of the public sphere 
quite useful. 41  I argue that, in Cyprus, there existed simultaneously three different but 
overlapping public spheres: the Ottoman, the British and the Cypriot. The Ottoman public 
sphere gradually gave way to the British public sphere with the centralization of the religious 
institutions. With the emergence of modern Turkey, the public sphere included notions like 
secularism, modernity and Westernization. The Muslim Cypriot was obliged to become a 
Turk and in order to do that he was obliged to abandon the characteristics that had until then 
made him part of the Ottoman domain: religion, dress code and language.  
 Yael Navaro Yashin claims that, with the foundation of the modern Turkish state, an 
attempt was made “to define what was culturally native to the new polity” that was 
“Turkey”.42 Since Westernization was one of the pillars of the new Turkish identity, a new 
culture, new patterns and new habits were imported from the West. Some of these were not 
new. There had been an attempt to replace the fez with the European hat and to Turkicize the 
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Ottoman language by removing Arab and Persian elements since the Young Turk era. In 
Turkey, a state apparatus undertook the responsibility to impose this new culture. Laws were 
passed, People‟s Houses (Halkevi) were opened for the education and the training of the rural 
masses in the new culture. The Kemalists in Cyprus lacked these means. They tried to 
propagate the Kemalist ideals through education and the press. To this end, they needed new 
symbols, new traditions. I use Eric Hobsbawm‟s “Invention of Tradition” and Benedict 
Anderson‟s “Imagined Communities” in order to explain the invention and reinvention of 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot identity.43  
In order to do that, I will first look at the content of the Kemalist revolution and the 
characteristics of Kemalist modernization and Westernization. The revolution first demanded 
the creation of a new identity, in juxtaposition to the existing, Ottoman identity. The vehicles 
of the new identity, the space, the language, the religious rituals, the history and/or the 
folklore had to differentiate themselves from the past. Second, the breaking of the ties to 
tradition and Islam and the attachment to Western civilization was one of the new regime‟s 
main targets. Third, the construction of a national identity as a representation of the Republic 
of Turkey was imminent. This new Turkish identity would take its place among the Western, 
civilized nations and would boost the new regime‟s Westernization policies. Finally, the 
forging of the idea of a citizen, more importantly of a citizen who was loyal to the principles 
of Turkishness, was necessary for the unity of the new nation. Apart from the idea of 
citizenship, other factors that could strengthen national unity were common history, the 
perception of a common geographical entity and a common language. 44 Further to that, I look 
at the position of modernization within Kemalism. Kemalism aimed at creating a modern state 
in Turkey. This would be achieved through the economic, cultural and judicial transformation 
of state and society. Without economic development through industrialization, and cultural 
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development in the form of the creation of rational society through education, the 
democratization of the political system was not possible. In order for these transformations to 
be realised, a certain extent of political authoritarianism was necessary. Once this aim had 
been achieved, transition to democracy was possible.45  
According to the Kemalist ideology, the Turkish Cypriots, like other Turkish 
communities in the Balkans, were part of the Turkish nation. The Kemalist ideology offered 
the necessary tools for the transformation of these communities alongside the Turks in 
Anatolia. Since Cyprus was administered by Britain, the elements of the Kemalist ideology 
that addressed the economy and the need for structural changes were not applicable to the 
Turkish Cypriot case. The secularization policies, though, were the most imminent since their 
implementation in Cyprus would tie the Turkish Cypriots to the new Turkey. As I have 
demonstrated, this was of utmost importance due to the insecurity caused by the Greek 
Cypriot demands. The secular reforms were accepted by the Turkish Cypriots without any 
state pressure, as was the case in mainland Turkey, for historical and political reasons. First, 
the British had attempted to modernize the state institutions in Cyprus, although, as we shall 
see, the modernization of the Muslim religious institutions caused reactions among the 
Turkish Cypriots. Second, coexistence with a more numerous and more prosperous Greek 
Cypriot community had instilled the necessity of modernization in the minds of the Turkish 
Cypriots.46  
The change, the transformation of the old to the new, was expressed more eloquently 
than perhaps anything else in the figure of the leader. That figure was the head of the nation, 
the “only man” (Tek adam) Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In mainland Turkey, soon after the 
establishment of the Republic, the idealization of Atatürk‟s charisma and authority paved the 
way for a cult of personality all across the country. 47 The authoritative nature of the Kemalist 
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regime and the omnipresence of the leader in the public sphere can explain this cult. 
Nevertheless, how was this possible in Cyprus too? In order to understand Kemal Atatürk‟s 
popularity among the Turkish Cypriots, we must first look at the social and economic 
conditions of the time. The average Turkish Cypriot was impoverished, indebted to usurers, 
more often in the case of craft workers and farmers, and worried about the future. Kemal 
Atatürk embodied hope for a better future for the Turkish Cypriots and, in the absence of a 
Turkish Cypriot leader, he was seen as the protector and the saviour of the community – not 
from an enemy, imaginary or real, but from economic and social hardships. Further to that, 
Atatürk incorporated the two basic motifs of the Kemalist revolution: faith in the new Turkey 
and commitment to modernization.  
The new regime was expressed through its symbols. These symbols dominated the 
public space: a new flag; a national anthem; and a leader whose portrait, together with those 
of the heroes of the Turkish War of Independence, could be seen in schools and coffee shops. 
They came to replace old symbols or were, in the case of the portraits, a novelty for a Muslim 
society. The Turkish Cypriot that belonged until then to the wider Muslim community, the 
ummah, now imagined himself as part of the Turkish nation. Any customs or habits that were 
considered unsuitable or even improper for the new culture had to be abolished. Söz explained 
why the Turkish Cypriots had to learn to wear the hat: “By wearing a hat we shall look alike 
with our brothers in Turkey as we have no particular difference to them anyway”. 48 For Söz, 
the Turkish Cypriots had to follow the path of Turkey‟s Turks. For the Turkish Cypriot 
nationalists, the incorporation of the community into the new Turkey was imminent. The 
Ottoman Empire had ceased to exist, therefore the Turkish Cypriot community had to follow 
the path of Republican Turkey, as this was envisaged by Atatürk. As we have seen, however, 
the pro-government, ruling elite used the same threat in order to convince the Turkish 
Cypriots to comply with the government‟s decisions in order to further reduce the 
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community‟s autonomy. The dilemma to the Turkish Cypriots was formulated almost in the 
same way: Do not betray your loyalty to the government or else the community‟s welfare may 
be jeopardized. 
 At the eve of the Kemalist revolution, the Turkish Cypriot elite continued to have 
good relations with the colonial government. There were two reasons for this. Good relations 
with the government eased the elite‟s worries that they would lose the privileges they had 
enjoyed during Ottoman rule. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis obliged the 
Turkish Cypriot elite to maintain good relations with the British in order not to suffer the fate 
of the Cretan Muslims who had to flee the island after its annexation to Greece. Despite 
discontent with the government‟s tight control over the community‟s institutions, the Turkish 
Cypriot elite did not question loyalty to the government. With the launch and gradual 
consolidation of the Kemalist revolution, the Turkish Cypriots began questioning loyalty to 
the government. As we shall see, this was manifested in the 1930 elections for the Legislative 
Council.  
 As was mentioned earlier, the Kemalist reforms were implemented with limited 
reactions, much more smoothly than in Turkey. Nevzat discusses the emergence of the 
Kemalist faction in great detail. There arises one question, though. How Kemalist were the 
Turkish Cypriot Kemalists? As mentioned earlier, the Turkish Cypriots embraced the 
Kemalist reforms that were easily applicable to the Cypriot case: the dress code, the language 
and the educational reforms. Since they did not rule the island, they did not have a say in 
economic policy and neither could they dictate judicial reforms. Therein lies a contradiction 
of the Kemalist experiment in Cyprus in the 1920s. In 1924, in mainland Turkey, the Evkâf 
was placed under the prime minister‟s office and a National Law Court Organization 
Regulation abolished the Şeriat courts.49 The Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
Müdürlüğü), also placed under the prime minister‟s office, was responsible for the election of 
the Mufti. Similar reforms were implemented in Cyprus by the colonial government, yet the 
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Kemalist faction expressed its strong opposition to these changes. The reason, of course, was 
that these curtailed the community‟s independence. As we shall see, the issue of the Mufti and 
the independence of the Evkâf were at the centre of the Turkish Cypriot Kemalist agenda. The 
Turkish Cypriot Kemalists were against the abolition of the religious institutions and their 
control by the colonial government. They used Kemalist ideology in order to safeguard the 
autonomy of the community, but in the same way they rejected one of the main Kemalist 
principles, that of the secularization of public life. In the same way, the attempt of Kemalist 
ideology to provide a new historical context, which placed limited importance on the Ottoman 
past, proved problematic for the Turkish Cypriots, because the legacy of the Ottoman 
conquest of Cyprus was at the centre of the Turkish Cypriot historical narrative. 
The Evkâfçılar on the other hand, were the conservative elite, who favoured close ties 
with the colonial government. They were not conservative in religious or social terms and 
they cannot be identified as an opposition to Kemalist reformers. As I have already explained, 
the Turkish Cypriots considered themselves part of the Turkish nation. The Kemalist reforms, 
though, threatened the leading position of the Evkâfçılar. The over-concentration of power in 
the hands of Mehmet Münir had caused resentment amongst ordinary Turkish Cypriots. Their 
close relations with the colonial government had secured their position among the Turkish 
Cypriots and the rising popularity of Kemalist ideas threatened their role. It is difficult to 
assess whether they were opposed to the reforms. The archives of the colonial government 
contain only one incident of protest against Kemal Atatürk, as we shall see in Chapter 5. 
While we cannot talk of opposition to Kemalism among the Turkish Cypriots, the 
conservative elite openly opposed the election of Necatı Özkan in the Legislative Council in 
1930 and the convening of a Turkish Cypriot national congress in the following year. 
Although it is difficult to estimate the popularity of the conservatives, their views were 
frequently published in the second-biggest Turkish Cypriot newspaper of the time, Hakikat, 
that according to the Cyprus Blue Book was selling on average a thousand copies per week. 
This is as much as the main pro-Kemalist Söz. The newspaper was accessible to the public 
mainly though coffee houses. While members of the Evkâfçılar used religious references in 
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order to attack the Kemalists, they did not oppose the abolition of the Turkish Cypriot 
religious institutions, although this constituted an anti-Islamic practice. We see again a 
contradiction between ideology and practice among the Evkâfçılar. This, I argue, goes to 
show that, despite the fact that Kemalist ideology had become popular among the Turkish 
Cypriots, it was a source of contradictions and discrepancies.  
 
 
 
 
The Complicated Story of Modernization  
 
The issue of modernization was central in Young Ottoman, Young Turk and Kemalist 
discourse. As we have seen, the Turkish Cypriot elites were also engaged in this discourse. At 
the centre of the modernization discourse lie Weber‟s ideas on rationalization. According to 
Weber, this would be “manifested in the growing calculability and systematic control over all 
aspects of human life on the basis of general rules and precepts which ruled out appeals to 
traditional norms or charismatic enthusiasm”. This obliged an increasing use of bureaucratic 
controls instead of traditional loyalties.50 Together with this idea comes the notion of the 
citizen in a modern nation state as opposed to the subject, at least until the early 20th century. 
Taking elements from both the French and the German conception of citizenship, that is the 
state-centered, assimilative concept versus the ethno-cultural one, the Turkish concept of 
citizenship required loyalty to the state, which was inseparable from its ideology, which in 
turn was imposed from above.51 In other words, Kemalist modernization prepared the loyal 
citizen who would serve the state and its ideology, freed from the influence of the religion 
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that the regime considered backward and reactionary. There is a rich bibliography on the issue 
of modernity and many scholars have attempted to analyse the “adventure” of Ottoman and 
Turkish modernization. Among others, I would distinguish Anthony Smith‟s “Nationalism 
and Modernism”52 and “Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era”.53 According to Smith, 
modern-day nations are based on ethnie. I find Smith‟s analysis of the ethnos as a pre-modern 
ethno-religious community “that possesses a common ancestry, myths and historical 
memories, a shared culture, a link to a historic territory and some measure of solidarity”54 
quite relevant to the case of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Based on this analysis, we can 
argue that Ottoman Turks entered modernity when the transformation from a religious 
community into an ethnic occurred. In other words, in the minds of the Kemalist reformists, 
the nation-state could be considered modern while the Ummah was pre-modern. This process, 
of course, was long and it was not completed with the abolition of the Caliphate and the 
implementation of secular reforms.  
It is necessary at this point to look at the aspirations of the Ottoman and Kemalist 
reformists. The quest for the reform of institutions or the outward appearance of people or the 
desire for “all things European” dominated the agenda of reform-oriented Ottomans, Young 
Turks and Kemalists alike.55 Yet the notion of modernity did not remain the same. The fez, 
which was abolished in 1925 by Kemal Atatürk for being “an emblem of ignorance, 
negligence and fanaticism”, had replaced the turban in 1829.56 It should be remembered that 
all these attempts to modernize Turkish society regarded a small number of bureaucrats and 
intellectuals, while ordinary Turks, especially in rural Anatolia, lived a crisis of identity, at 
least in the first years of the Kemalist regime.57 The ramifications of Kemalist modernization 
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policies for Turks and non-Turks are discussed in detail in Soner Cagaptay‟s work on Islam, 
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey.58 The replacement of religion with Kemalist 
ideology and nationalism as a connecting force shaped Turkish society for decades. Cagaptay 
and Yıldız59 have dealt extensively with the trials of nation-building. The issues facing the 
Turkish government though, regarding the assimilation of non-Turkish, non-Muslim citizens, 
are not applicable in Cyprus. In an attempt to adapt Cagaptay‟s question of “who is a Turk” in 
the case of the Turkish Cypriot, instead of asking “who is a Turkish Cypriot”, one could ask 
“what makes a Turkish Cypriot”, which is one of the questions this dissertation tries to 
answer. The presence of the Colonial Government and its policy of centralization of the 
Turkish Cypriot religious institutions meant that the community had already gone through a 
forced modernization process. By adopting the Kemalist reforms, they kept in step with the 
Turks of mainland Turkey – a course that would last for decades. If we try to examine how 
the Kemalist concept of Turkish citizenship was adopted in Cyprus, we can see that despite 
the lack of an authoritative state, as in Turkey, the notion of the Turkish citizen was 
successfully implemented there too. Education gradually instilled loyalty to the Turkish 
nation and Kemalist ideology in the minds of the younger Turkish Cypriots. Then Kemalist 
ideology transformed the Turkish Cypriot from a member of a pre-modern community to a 
member of a modern one, that is, from a member of the Ummah to a member of an ethnic 
community. Using Habermas‟s distinction between the community and society (Gemeinschaft 
vs Gesellschaft) the Turk/Turkish Cypriot did indeed enter modernity in terms of institutions 
or the dress code but not in terms of becoming an actual citizen of a modern society.60 The 
social and political conditions in Cyprus are to blame for this.  
We should not forget that, as in Turkey, religion was not totally ousted from the 
public sphere, since it never ceased to constitute part of the communal identity. While for 
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Turks in Turkey language was used to define who was a Turk in the early 1930s, by what is 
described as Kemalism par Excellence61, for the Turkish Cypriots this was not enough, since 
their identity was shaped through coexistence with a non-Muslim community. Hence, 
modernity for the Turkish Cypriots had two sources: the British Colonial Government on the 
one hand and Turkey on the other. And this, as we shall see, manifests the peculiarity of the 
Turkish Cypriot case. The community‟s religious institutions had already been centralized by 
the Colonial Government with the pretext of modernization. Yet, despite the zeal that the 
Turkish Cypriots demonstrated in implementing the secular reforms, they never ceased to 
demand that the government handed the administration of the institutions over to the 
community, since they were essential for its existence.  
Finally, reference should be made to the nature of Turkish Cypriot Islam. In the 
period under research, this topic has not been investigated thoroughly. In an article published 
in 1957, Charles Beckingham maintained that “Cypriot Islam [was] in general latidunarian” 
and that there was no “fanaticism”. 62  The insular character of Cyprus and the long 
coexistence with a Christian majority may have contributed to this end. Nevertheless, as we 
shall see later on, this cannot explain the high rate of approval of the secular reforms nor the 
mild attitude towards the Colonial Government.  
 
What’s in a name? Muslims of Cyprus or Turkish Cypriots? 
 
In referring to the Turkish Cypriot community in the period before the 1920s, the 
following question occurs: should one choose the term “Turkish Cypriots”, which defines the 
ethnicity of the community, or is it more appropriate to use the term “Turks of Cyprus”, 
which places more emphasis on the Turkish rather than the Cypriot origin of the community? 
Or should one use the term “Muslim community of Cyprus”, which was preferred by the 
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colonial government? The term “Turkish Cypriots” is a neologism. Its use in official 
documents is recorded in the late 1940s, when the debate about the future of the island began 
and the British government realized that it could no longer insist on defining the two 
communities using religious terms. The term was not used either in Turkish (Kıbrıslı Türk) or 
in Greek (Τοσρκοκύπριοι). The Turkish Cypriots used the term “Turks of Cyprus” (Kıbrıs 
Türkü) or “Turks” (Türkler) when referring to themselves. The term “Islamic community of 
Cyprus” (Kıbrıs Ahali İslamiyesi or Kıbrıs Cemiyet-i İslamiye) was also used by the 
nationalist and the pro-British elite alike. Nationalists, however, chose to use the ethnic term 
“Turkish Community of Cyprus” (Kıbrıs Türk Cemaaatı) in order to emphasize the ethnic 
rather than the religious character of the community, in accordance with the secularist reforms 
that had been initiated in Turkey. The colonial government, on the other hand, insisted on the 
use of the terms “Mohammedan” and “non-Mohammedan” when referring to the Turkish and 
the Greek Cypriots respectively. 63  The use of non-ethnic terms served the government‟s 
policy to define Turkish and Greek Cypriots as religious communities. I chose to use the term 
“Turkish Cypriots”, although it is an anachronism for the period of the research, because it 
avoids any identification with political or religious currents of thought regarding the 
community.  
In a similar way, the use of the term “minority” poses some methodological issues. In 
the period under research, the Turkish Cypriots were a minority in numerical terms, but they 
rejected their “minoritization”, as that could lead to a loss of rights and privileges inherited 
from the Ottoman era. In that sense, I prefer to use the term “community” instead of the term 
“minority” and, whenever the latter is used, I mean it in the numerical rather than the political 
sense.  
 Another issue occurs with the surnames of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish personalities 
who are mentioned in this study. According to the Surname Law that was introduced in 
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Turkey in 1935, Turkish Cypriots too, like all of Turkey‟s Turks, adopted surnames. This 
means that, in the period that I am researching, the titles bey and paşa (mister and general 
respectively) were still used. With the Surname Law, Mısırlızade Necati Bey adopted the 
surname Özkan, while Mustafa Kemal Paşa adopted the surname Atatürk. I chose to use the 
surnames as well for reasons of clarity. 
 Tha names of the opposing Turkish Cypriot elites is another issue that needs 
clarification. I tried to avoid the use of the terms “conservative” and “liberal” or “progressive” 
because, I argue, the Cypriot political system under the British was at the threshold of 
modernity and these terms are not applicable. Instead I chose the terms that were used in the 
press at the time. The pro-government elite around Münir Bey were named evkâfçılar 
(supporters of the Evkâf policy of the colonial government) and İngilizci (pro-English). On the 
other hand, the terms Muarızlar (opponents) and Halkçılar (populists) were used to refer to 
the nationalist elite. I use the terms Kemalists and Nationalists because, I argue, they are more 
representative than the Turkish terms.  
  
Chapter Organization 
 
 Τhis thesis consists of five main chapters alongside the introductory chapter and the 
concluding remarks. Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of Turkish Cypriot history until 
1918. This chapter also discusses the evolution of nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots 
and demonstrates the impact of Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the emergence of Turkish 
Cypriot identity. Chapter 3 explores the influence of the press on Turkish Cypriot politics and 
society through the comparison of two prominent newspapers, the nationalist Söz and the 
conservative Hakikat. Chapter 4 compares the cases of Necati Özkan, the leader of the 
nationalist party, and Münir Bey, the head of the Evkâf and unofficial leader of the Turkish 
Cypriots. Chapter 5 discusses the emergence of the Kemalist elite and its conflict with the 
conservative elite and the colonial government. The chapter deals with the issue of the 
Turkish Cypriot religious institutions and their control by the colonial government and 
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explains why this was a cause of discontent for the nationalists. Through this comparison, I 
will show the balance of power within the Turkish Cypriot elite and I will demonstrate the 
dimensions of the conflict between nationalists and the Evkâfçılar. This chapter also includes 
the first case study, the 1930 elections for the Legislative Council and their significance for 
the struggle for power among the elite. Chapter 6 will present the second case study, that of 
the conflict over the administration of the Lycée, the highest Turkish Cypriot educational 
institution. In order to achieve this, the chapter examines the characteristics of Turkish 
Cypriot education, its evolution under British rule and the reasons behind the struggle for 
control over the Lycée administration. This chapter will demonstrate how education was used 
for the dissemination of nationalism and how it shaped Turkish Cypriot national identity. 
Chapter seven deals with the final case study, that of the National Congress in 1931, which 
was organized by the nationalists. The chapter examines the significance that the Congress 
had for Turkish Cypriot nationalism through the writings of the Kemalist press and the 
reactions of the Evkâfçılar through the commentary of the conservative press. The National 
Congress was a demonstration of power on behalf of the Kemalist party – and a proof that the 
Kemalists had consolidated their power within the Turkish Cypriot community despite the 
fact that the resolutions adopted were disregarded by the colonial government. Furthermore, 
the chapter examines the impact of the October 1931 disturbances for the Kemalist 
movement. Although the 1931 disturbances form the chronological limit for this study, the 
chapter examines the aftermath of the revolt and the impact that the suspension of all political 
activity had on Turkish Cypriot politics. Finally, the chapter will briefly discuss the evolution 
of Turkish Cypriot nationalism after 1931, in order to demonstrate the importance of the 
1920s for the emergence of the national identity of the Turkish Cypriot community.  
 
Contribution to the field 
 
 While there is a rich bibliography on Cyprus, until recently, the inter-war period had 
been neglected by researchers. The existing works dedicate little space to the history of the 
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Turkish Cypriot community under the British. Hence, a comprehensive history of the Turkish 
Cypriot community under the British has yet to be written. As we have seen earlier in this 
chapter, Altay Nevzat‟s doctoral thesis is one of the few works that focus exclusively on the 
Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, there are plenty of works in Turkish, but most of them, 
as I explained in the literature review, approach the history of the community under colonial 
rule in a deterministic way. I argue, in other words, that these works present the 
transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community from an Ottoman Muslim community to an 
ethnic Turkish minority in the light of the events of 1960-1974. The adoption of the Kemalist 
reforms is presented as universal and their implementation by the community as smooth and 
unproblematic. By using newspaper articles and archival documents that have not been used 
before, I attempt to reread the history of the ideological transformation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community, looking not so much at the inevitability of this procedure but rather at the 
implications on a social and political level. I try to demonstrate that the Kemalist revolution 
created ideological debates within Turkish Cypriot society and that the dispute between the 
Kemalists and the pro-English was not only ideological. In the process of the research, the 
following questions arose: Why has the literature neglected certain political figures and 
newspaper titles of the period? What was the nature of the political factions that competed for 
the leadership of the community? What was the role of the economy in the shaping of the 
Turkish Cypriot opposition to the colonial government and the conservative elite?  
 As far as the press is concerned, it has been used by other studies too, but I examine 
the role of the press in ideological transformation. For this reason, I attempt a comparison 
between the two newspapers that support the two elites and a discourse analysis. Through the 
analysis of the editorials, I examine the political and ideological views of the two elites and 
their vision for the future of the community. By doing that, I prove that the division of the two 
parties along ideological lines is not accurate, as both had a lot in common and the essence of 
the debate was the control of the community. While examining the press, the following 
questions arose: Why did the pro-Kemalist press so keenly promote Turkish Cypriot 
migration to mainland Turkey? How was the conflict between the pro-Kemalist and the 
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conservative faction depicted in the press and to what extent was this an ideological struggle 
between members of the Turkish Cypriot elite? As a result of this analysis, relations between 
the elite and the Turkish Cypriot lower and middle classes are demonstrated too.  
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CHAPTER 2 – THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ELITE: ITS LEGITIMATION, ROLE AND 
LIMITATIONS  
The Turkish Cypriots and the colonial framework 
 This thesis examines aspects of the history of the Turkish Cypriot community under 
British rule. British rule in Cyprus began in 1878, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was 
losing territories in the Balkans and many Ottoman Turkish populations were coming under 
the administration of Christian nations as the once Ottoman provinces were incorporated into 
the newly independent Balkan states. With the exception of the Iraqi Turkmens, the Turkish 
Cypriots were the only Ottoman Turkish community that came under the administration of a 
colonial, Christian power. After 1923, Turkish communities in the Balkans remained outside 
the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, such as the Turks of Bulgaria or the Turks of 
Western Thrace in Greece. Yet they came under the rule of Christian nation states that had 
experienced Ottoman rule and these Turkish communities had now become minorities, having 
been the ruling element under the Ottomans. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriots constitute an 
exceptional case in the history of the Ottoman Turkish populations of the period between 
1878 and 1923 – in other words, from the beginning of the territorial shrinkage of the Empire 
until the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. In order to examine the colonial 
framework, I will look into another case of a Muslim community that came under British rule 
in that period, namely that of the Palestinians.  
 British administration of Cyprus can be divided into two periods: the first dates from 
the transfer of power by the Ottomans to the British in 1878 until 1914, when Britain annexed 
the island, while the second period dates from 1915 until 1960, with the end of British rule 
and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The first period is marked by the ambiguity 
of the status of the island. According to the first article of the 1878 convention signed by 
Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the island was “to be occupied and administered by 
England” in return for England‟s commitment to defend the Empire “if Batoum, Ardahan, 
Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia and if any attempt shall be made at any future 
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time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan 
in Asia”. In the seventh article, however, it was stated that “if Russia restores to Turkey Kars 
and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the island of Cyprus will 
be evacuated by England and the convention of the 4th of June 1878 will be at an end”.64 The 
island was ceded to Britain, but it was still Ottoman territory. For instance, Cypriot merchants 
continued to fly the Ottoman flag until 1912, which reflected the de jure status of the island.65 
Until the First World War, there were voices questioning the use of Cyprus for Britain.66 This 
ambivalent stance had a direct effect on the attitude of the Cypriots towards the British: on the 
one hand, the Greek Cypriots were happy to see Ottoman rule replaced by that of a European, 
Christian administration, but the British were only considered a step towards Enosis with 
Greece. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, saw this change as temporary and kept their 
allegiance to the Sultan. One thing was for sure: the locals, Muslims or Christians, had no 
identification with Britain.67 
 According to the second article of the convention, the British would preserve the Şer-i 
Mahkeme, the Religious Courts, while the Evkâf would be administered by a Turkish Cypriot 
and a delegate appointed by the British government. The British kept the Ottoman 
administrative frame intact. Their reluctance to disturb the status quo is displayed in the 
instructions given to the first High Commissioner, Garnet Wolseley, to “govern Cyprus along 
Turkish lines, as far as possible, and to make the Sultan and his pashas feel that in conceding 
us the privilege of governing any of the Asia Minor provinces, no violent disturbance of 
Turkish laws or customs would be attempted”.68 That Cyprus was still attached to the Porte 
was proven also by the payment of an annual tribute by the British to the Ottoman treasury. 
                                                          
64C.W.J Orr, Cyprus under British Rule (London: Zeno Publishers, 1972), pp. 36-38.  
65Diana Markides, “Cyprus 1878-1925: Ambiguities and Uncertainties” in Hubert Faustmann and 
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67Markides, “Cyprus”, p. 20. 
68Ibid., p. 24. 
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An annex to the convention required that Britain paid the Empire the excess of revenue over 
expenditure in Cyprus. In reality, this money was used to pay the shareholders of an Ottoman 
Loan of 1855, so actually it never reached Istanbul.69 Although the payment of the tribute was 
regarded by the Turkish Cypriots as a proof of the Empire‟s sovereignty over Cyprus, the fact 
that it was their taxes that paid the tribute was a source of discontent.  
 Cyprus was not declared a colony until 1925. Despite British hesitation, the island 
was gradually incorporated into the British colonial framework and, by the turn of the 
century, Ottoman sovereignty became only nominal. With the rise in power of a liberal 
government in Britain, legislation for proportional representation was introduced at an island 
and municipal level, increased funding was allocated to schools and the first newspapers 
appeared. Proportional representation put an end to Turkish Cypriots‟ status as the ruling 
element. The liberal reforms benefited the Greek Cypriots whose elite had already been 
exposed to Greek nationalism and who had the necessary financial means to publish 
newspapers and run schools. The reluctance of the British to impose tight control on the 
curriculum and the appointment of teachers played a crucial role in the rise of nationalism 
among Greek Cypriots and would later play such a role among Turkish Cypriots, as we shall 
see in chapter 6. This, too, can be attributed to British unwillingness to implement a policy of 
Anglicisation given the ambiguous status of the island.70 The gradual radicalization of Greek 
nationalism in Cyprus and the demand for Enosis was another factor that contributed to the 
peculiar character of Cyprus as a British colony.71 In all, the uncertainty regarding the status 
of the British administration, the demand of the majority of the population to unite with a 
neighbouring state and the skeptical attitude of the minority differentiated Cyprus not only 
from other insular colonies, but most importantly from other British colonies in the Middle 
East.  
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 As we shall see later on in this chapter, the impact of Islam and the nature of political 
currents in the Ottoman Empire, namely the theories of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism, 
delayed the emergence of Turkish nationalism. This explains the Turkish Cypriots‟ awkward 
reaction towards the British administration. The temporary character of British rule, together 
with Greek Cypriot irredentism, limited the reactions of the Turkish Cypriot elite. The 
Turkish Cypriot elite chose to side with the British administration in order to secure the fate 
of the community, especially as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated during and after the end of 
the First World War. A new, Kemalist-oriented elite emerged in the 1920s and questioned this 
alliance, but it failed to organize the nationalist powers under a political party. The first 
Turkish Cypriot political party was founded in 1943, under the name KATAK (Kıbrıs Adası 
Türk Azınlık Kurumu – Association of Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus).72 On the 
other hand, the first Greek Cypriot party, the Communist Party of Cyprus, was founded in 
1926. The late appearance of political parties in Cyprus was an outcome of the measures that 
were implemented by the colonial government after the 1931 riots.73  
 If we draw a parallel with Mandatory Palestine, another case of British colonialism in 
the region, we observe some interesting similarities. The British in Cyprus attempted to 
control the Turkish Cypriot community by centralizing the Muslim institutions and placing 
them under government supervision. 74  In Palestine, in 1921, the mandatory government 
established the Supreme Muslim Council, which was intended to manage religious affairs, the 
Muslim religious endowments and Islamic law.75 In Cyprus, the British converted the Office 
of Religious Endowments (Evkâf) into a government institution and approved the 
appointment of Münir Bey, a Turkish Cypriot lawyer who soon became indispensable to the 
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73 See Chapter 7.  
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colonial government.76 In Palestine, the British appointed as the president of the Supreme 
Muslim Council, a combination of the offices of the chief Mufti of Jerusalem and the 
president of the Shari‟ah Court of Appeals77, Amin al- Husayni, a younger brother of the 
recently deceased Mufti of Jerusalem. 78  Unlike Münir Bey, al Husayni was an Arab 
nationalist, but his appointment as president of the Council made him an employee of the 
British administration and brought his family, an influential family of Jerusalem, under direct 
British influence.79 
After his election to the Legislative Council of Cyprus, Mehmet Münir became the 
Turkish milletbaşı, the head of the community.80 At the time that Mehmet Münir‟s multiple 
posts had become a source of discontent among the community, Ronald Storrs had been 
appointed Governor of Cyprus.81 When he commented on al-Amin that he “regards himself as 
the elected millet-bashi of the Moslems of Palestine for all purposes” a few years earlier, he 
had done so as the governor of Jerusalem and Judea.82  
 In both Cyprus and Palestine, the local governments tried to control the Muslim 
populations and hinder the rise of nationalism by appointing respectable members of the 
communities to the Evkâf and the Supreme Muslim Council. This policy can be traced back 
through the history of British colonialism in India, Egypt and the Sudan. But it wasn‟t an 
issue that troubled only British colonial governments. The Russians, the Dutch and the 
Austrians in their respective colonies faced the issue of ruling Muslim populations.83 The 
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centralization or abolition of Muslim institutions shows that the British did not believe that 
these institutions could be successfully reformed or had no intention of interfering with the 
Religious Courts. Moreover in Palestine, as in Cyprus, they intervened in the Evkâf 
administration in order to stop financial abuse by the trustees.84 
 
The Development of nationalisms in Cyprus during late Ottoman and early British rule 
 
 Nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots appeared later than Greek nationalism 
among the Greek Cypriots. This can be attributed to the late emergence of Turkish 
nationalism due to the religious and social structure of the Ottoman Muslim communities. 
Turkish nationalism in Cyprus inevitably emerged as a response to Greek irredentism. In 
order to examine the nature of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, we shall look at the 
development and the characteristics of Greek and Turkish nationalisms and how they 
influenced Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms respectively.  
 
 
Greek Nationalism: From Megali Idea to the Greek–Turkish war of 1919-1922 and 
beyond 
 
 Greek historiography takes pride in the early emergence of Greek nationalism in the 
Ottoman domains. The Greeks may not have been the first to revolt against the Ottomans, 
since the Serbian uprising of 1804 preceded the Greek revolution of 1821. Nevertheless, the 
outcome of the Greek revolution was successful – with the support of Britain, France and 
Russia – in that it established an independent Greek state in the southern tip of the Balkan 
Peninsula in 1830. Despite the arduous work of Rhigas Feraios,85 a bright and energetic Greek 
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intellectual, to promote the idea of a Hellenic Republic in the territories controlled by the 
Ottoman Empire that would encompass all nations and religions under the auspices of the 
Greeks, the newly established Greek state was unable to promote this idea – not necessarily 
because of the nature of Greek nationalism, but also due to the fact that the other Balkan 
nationalisms did not envisage the replacement of the Ottoman Empire through a Greek state. 
Soon, Greek nationalism was strangled within the narrow limits of the Greek Kingdom. The 
coexistence of various national groups who spoke languages other than Greek and did not 
belong to the Christian Orthodox dogma (Albanians, Vlachs and Slavs to name a few) 
required a unifying factor, one that could deny some European arguments that modern Greeks 
had nothing to do with Ancient Greeks. Greek historians Paparrigopoulos and Zambelios 
presented a theory of the historical and cultural continuity of the Greek nation from antiquity 
until modern times.86 This theory became the cornerstone of Greek historiography for decades 
and the backbone of the Megali Idea, the great idea of Greek nationalism that envisaged the 
unification of all territories in the Balkans and in Anatolia that were inhabited by Greek-
speaking, Orthodox Christian populations.  
 The term Megali Idea can be attributed to Ioannis Kolettis, a Greek politician who 
served as prime minister twice and played an important role in the politics of the Greek 
Kingdom for almost two decades after its establishment.87 According to Elli Skopetea, author 
of one of the most comprehensive monographs on the issue, the Megali Idea went through 
three stages: during the first stage, Istanbul was considered the national centre and the vision 
was an Eastern or Greek Empire. In the second stage, which began with the incorporation of 
the Ionian Islands into Greece, Athens became the national centre and the aim was to increase 
the boundaries of the state while, in the third stage, towards the 1870s, there was an attempt to 
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compromise the impact of Athens and Istanbul with the theory of Helleno-Ottomanism88 
(Ελληνοοθωμανισμός) after the change in the status of the Greeks of the Empire.89  
 Megali Idea was a vague vision, the fulfillment of which was beyond the means of a 
small and impoverished state. Moreover, the social and political progress of the Greek state 
was hindered by the populist Megali Idea that had meanwhile been embraced by almost all 
political parties. Greece did expand territorially in 1864, as we have seen, and then in 1881 
when Thessaly was ceded by the Ottomans under the Treaty of Berlin. With the Balkan Wars 
and First World War, Greece expanded again, gaining Epirus, Macedonia, Crete and the 
Eastern Aegean Sea islands. With the Treaty of Sèvres, parts of western Anatolia were given 
to the Greek state to be administered until the population decided on the future status of the 
area in a referendum. The Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922 put an end to the Megali Idea, as 
the Greek state had to face the task of accommodating the refugees who arrived from Anatolia 
after an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey was decided at Lausanne. 
Hence, when Prime Minister Venizelos was asked by the Greek consul in Cyprus to support 
the Greek Cypriot elite against the British, he condemned the diplomat‟s activities and warned 
against the use of violence.90  
 
Nationalism among the Greek Cypriots – Enosis at any cost? 
 
 Like in other insular provinces of the Ottoman Empire, in Cyprus too the Millet 
system provided a safe environment for the flourishing of the Orthodox Church. Profiting 
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from the privileges granted by Istanbul, the Church of Cyprus grew to be one of the major 
land-owners on the island and the Archbishop became the leader of the Orthodox millet – 
Milletbaşı in Turkish, Ethnarch in Greek. The vision for the revival of the Byzantine Empire 
had remained alive through folk songs and, when the Greeks in the Peloponnese revolted, the 
Greek Cypriot uprising was brutally suppressed and members of the clergy were executed, 
including the archbishop. After 1830, the independent Greek state functioned as the national 
centre that propagated the ideas of Greek nationalism and of course the Megali Idea.91 Once 
the Greek state established its educational institutions, teachers educated in Athens were 
dispatched to schools in Anatolia and Cyprus, teaching Greek culture in standard modern 
Greek, thus linguistically unifying the Greek-speaking populations. According to 
Kitromilides, “the educational effort of the nineteenth century promoted the linguistic 
homogenization of the Christian Orthodox populations of the East, as the basis of their 
incorporation into the broader community of the Greek nation”.92 In the years following the 
establishment of the Greek Kingdom, conditions in Cyprus were not ripe for the expression of 
Greek nationalism. The arrival of the British in 1878 provided a fertile ground for the 
flourishing of national sentiment. This was evident in the words of Archbishop Sofronios II, 
as he welcomed the first British administrator, Sir Garnet Wolseley on July 12, 1878: “We 
adopt the change of Government inasumuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as 
it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with mother Greece, with which it is nationally 
connected”.93 The words of the archbishop describe in the most eloquent way the nature of 
Greek nationalism in Cyprus. The end of Ottoman rule and “the predominance of the Greek 
element resulted in an oversight even oblivion of the existence of a Muslim community in the 
island”.94  
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 With the support of the Church of Cyprus and members of the entrepreneurial elite, 
soon after the beginning of British rule, the first newspapers in Greek were launched, sport 
and literary clubs were inaugurated – such as the Gymnastic Association “Pancypria”, 
founded in Nicosia in 1894 – and great emphasis was given to education with the number of 
schools rising significantly within the first twenty years of British administration. The Greek 
Cypriot elite engaged enthusiastically in the spread of Greek nationalism. As the Ottoman 
Empire was gradually losing power and territories and Greece kept expanding, the ideal of 
Enosis seemed feasible and the members of the Legislative Council attempted to put forward 
the issue of autonomy or union with Greece repeatedly with petitions, memoranda and 
appeals to the British government. Until 1931, the Board of Greek Cypriot Education, the 
highest school authority, decided, together with the Greek Ministry of Education in Athens, 
on the appointment of teachers, the curriculum and the textbooks. Most of the teachers were 
either Greeks or Greek Cypriots who had studied in Greek universities and were paid by the 
Greek Ministry of Education through the Greek Consulate.95 The members of the Board were 
the Archbishop, three persons elected by the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative 
Council, six persons elected by the respective district committees and a representative of the 
colonial government.96 The Church of Cyprus dominated the Board of Education and the 
subcommittees in the provinces and the villages and in this way prevented the appointment of 
members who lacked Hellenistic enthusiasm. 97  As noted earlier, the nature of Greek 
nationalism in Cyprus was such that it was impossible to accommodate the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Especially after the end of the First World War, Greek territorial expansion 
caused waves of enthusiasm among the Greek Cypriots and created hope that Enosis could be 
achieved. Despite the fact that the Megali Idea was buried in Anatolia after the Greek army 
was defeated by the Kemalist forces, Greek nationalism in Cyprus only temporarily lost 
ground. The economic crisis of 1930, combined with the maximalist demands of the Greek 
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Cypriot elite and the nationalist fervour cultivated in schools, led to an uprising against the 
British in 1931. It should be noted here that this uprising took place under the leadership of 
persons who were acting contrary to the wishes of the Venizelos government in Athens and 
who could not be controlled by either the Greek government or any other force. 98  The 
measures that the colonial government took in order to limit the influence of the nationalists 
only managed to delay the outbreak of violence for about a quarter of a century. In 1955, the 
Greek Cypriots, despite the inability and hesitation of the Greek government, launched a 
guerrilla war against the British. The continued disregard of the presence of a Turkish Cypriot 
community on the island did not serve Greek Cypriot interests in the long run. The immediate 
result of this negligence was the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.  
  
 
Turkish Nationalism – From Abdülhamid and the Young Turks to Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and the making of Modern Turkey 
 
 Nationalism was undoubtedly one of the factors that precipitated the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was also the factor that shaped the face not only of modern Turkey but 
also of the area that used to be covered by the Empire, namely the Balkans and the Middle 
East. Greek and Serbian nationalisms were the first to demand and obtain, with the support of 
Western powers, their independence from the Empire. The territorial losses, however, were 
not the greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire. The rise of nationalism among the Christian 
populations in the Balkans and in Anatolia and the protection of the minorities were used as 
an excuse for continuous interventions in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state from the 
second half of the 19th Century until the outbreak of the First World War. The tanzimat 
reforms were planned and implemented in order to improve the circumstances of the 
minorities, promising equal rights for all subjects of the Sultan. The reforms did improve the 
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position of the Christian populations, but that whetted the appetites of their respective elites 
for more rights. With the rise of nationalism, the millet system that had served the Empire for 
four centuries had evolved into a threat to the integrity of the Ottoman state.99  
 The Muslim elites‟ reaction to the tanzimat reforms came in the 1870s, through a 
group called Young Ottomans. One of the main Young Ottoman intellectuals, Namik Kemal, 
wrote extensively on the term vatan, fatherland.100 In an attempt to answer the challenge 
posed by Balkan nationalisms, he emphasized the idea of Ottoman patriotism, although he 
made no distinction between Ottoman Turks, Arabs or Persians. Although the Christian Millet 
has long ceased to be perceived in religious terms after the rise of Balkan nationalisms, the 
Muslim millet did not differentiate a Turk from an Arab. This paved the way for the 
institutionalization of pan-Islamism under Sultan Abdülhamid. Seeing that Ottomanism had 
not succeeded in preventing the further radicalization of the Christian populations, expecially 
in the Balkans – and faced with successive defeats by the Russians, foreign intervention and 
the bankruptcy of 1875 – Abdülhamid came to power in 1876 with a plan to unite the faithful 
elements of the Empire under a pan-Islamic vision and an autocratic administration in order to 
control the centrifugal forces. According to Lewis, “the task was to drive out the foreign 
invaders, abolish foreign concessions and immunities, restore the true Islamic faith – and, to 
reunite all the Muslims in a single state, under its lawful sovereign, the Caliph”.101  
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 When, in 1897, a young poet called Mehmed Emin published a volume called Türkçe 
Şiirler (Poems in Turkish) the Ottoman elite considered the term “Turk” to pertain to the 
rural, uneducated masses of Anatolia. In the poem, Emin said the following: “I am a Turk, my 
faith and my race are mighty”.102 Even if Kushner is right in that the Turkishness of the 
writers of the Hamidian period is cultural, 103 it is in that period that the ideal of Turkism 
appears for the first time. This idea evolved significantly with the emergence of the Young 
Turks and their associations within the boundaries of the Empire as well as abroad. 104 
Russian-born intellectual Yusuf Akçura put forward the idea of Pan-Turkism, the union of all 
Turkish populations in one state, which gained popularity in the 1910s but faded away with 
the October revolution in 1918 and Ziya Gökalp‟s assertion of the need to join European 
civilization but hold on to Turkish culture.105  
 According to Fatma Müge Göçek, Turkish nationalism was based on the following 
factors: the wars fought by the Ottoman army in the period from 1878 to 1913 that resulted in 
the loss of the Balkan territories, Crete and Cyprus, loss of life and the influx of refugees from 
the lost provinces; the impact of the capitulations and the control of trade by foreigners and 
Christian minorities, especially at a time when the compatriots of the Christian merchants 
were seen as being aggressive against Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans; the bureaucratic 
reforms that intensified social tensions and alienated Ottoman Muslims and Christians due to 
the privileges granted to the latter; the educational reforms and emergence of the printed press 
that disseminated the new ideas; and, finally, the interaction of the secret associations, 
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especially the ones founded by members of the Committee of Union and Progress and the 
political parties.106 
 The outcome of the First World War precipitated not only the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire but also the consolidation of Turkish nationalism. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 
provided for the occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia by Britain, France and Italy, but 
most importantly allowed the creation of an Armenian state in northeastern Anatolia and the 
administration of the area of Izmir by Greece, which would leave only a small area in central 
and eastern Anatolia for a Turkish homeland. Led by Mustafa Kemal, the nationalist 
intellectuals first prepared the ideological basis of their struggle for national independence 
and then, from 1920 to 1922, fought the war against the invading forces. The victorious 
outcome of the İstiklâl Savaşı, the War of Independence, secured most of the territories that 
the nationalists had sworn to defend in the Misak-ı Millî, the National Pact that was approved 
by the last Ottoman Parliament in 1920.107 
 According to Taner Akçam, the reasons for the late emergence of Turkish nationalism 
are Islam, the imperial and multinational character of the Ottoman state and the attempt to 
save the Empire by using Islam and Ottomanism as tools. 108 Furthermore, Akçam argues that 
what led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, namely foreign intervention and occupation, the 
hostile policies of European powers and the role of the Christian populations, accordingly 
shaped Turkish nationalism. For example, Akçam refers to the fear of national extinction, 
animosity towards Christian minorities and suspicion towards human rights and democracy.109  
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 The victorious outcome of the Turkish War of Independence shaped the fate of 
Modern Turkey and Turkish nationalism alike. The exchange of populations between Greece 
and Turkey created a homogeneous Turkish Republic. With the abolition of the Caliphate and 
the Sultanate and the implementation of the secularist reforms, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tried 
to move Turkey away from its Islamic past and integrate its people into Western civilization. 
According to Smith‟s analysis, Atatürk‟s nationalism was a mixture of territorial and ethnic 
nationalisms: Kemalist nationalism considered Anatolia to be the homeland of the Turkish 
nation, which included the Kurds but excluded the Christians. 110  Indeed, since the 
establishment of the Republic in 1923, the presence of the few Greek and Armenians who 
remained in Turkey, primarily in Istanbul, was tolerated by the Kemalist bureaucracy.  
 Kemalist nationalism was born, like Kemalist Turkey, from a victorious war against 
foreign powers that threatened the existence of a Turkish homeland in Anatolia. The Turkish 
Cypriots, like other Turkish populations in the Balkans, were not included in the Turkish 
state, but they formed part of the Turkish nation. Since Kemalist ideology defined the 
characteristics of the Turkish nation, these had to be accepted by Turkish communities in 
order for them to reaffirm their place within the Turkish nation. Like the new Turkish 
identity, the new Turkish Cypriot identity was shaped throughout the 1920s.  
  
  
Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus – From an Ottoman-Muslim Community to an Ethnic 
Turkish Minority  
 
 From when Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans in 1571 until the start of British 
rule in 1878, the Turkish Cypriots constituted the ruling element. The privileges granted to the 
Orthodox Church secured a relatively long period of peace with occasional disturbances that 
were caused by social or financial issues. As we have seen, the revolt of 1821 was quickly 
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suppressed and, despite the rise of nationalism in Greece, there was no major unrest until the 
end of Ottoman rule. The distance from the capital and the absence of urban Christian 
populations meant that the Tanzimat reforms brought little change to the lives of both Greeks 
and Turkish Cypriots. The end of Ottoman rule was a great shock to the Turkish Cypriots. Not 
only did they have to come under the administration of a Christian power, they also had to 
share power with a Christian community that expressed – from the first day of the new 
administration – their wish to unite the island with Greece. Unlike the Greek Cypriots, who 
had the ideological tools of Greek nationalism, the Turkish Cypriots could not resort to 
Turkish nationalism, since Ottoman currents of thought had not yet produced a well-defined 
idea of Ottoman-Turkish nationalism.  
 The main concern of the Turkish Cypriot elite was to secure the community‟s 
position on the island and to make sure that the British would not give in to the Greek Cypriot 
demand for Enosis. Effective cooperation with the colonial government made the Turkish 
Cypriots the faithful and trustworthy element, in contrast to the Greek Cypriots. Given that 
the British kept intact the state apparatus they had inherited from the Ottomans, the Turkish 
Cypriots were interested in keeping their positions in the state sector. By demonstrating their 
loyalty to the colonial government, they could secure their status in the administration. Hence, 
in contrast to Greek nationalism, Turkish nationalism was not reactionary, since it did not 
advocate the end of colonial rule. On the contrary, until the end of the 1920s, the Turkish 
Cypriot elite insisted on the continuation of colonial rule as a counterweight to Greek 
irredentism.  
 The ideas of the Young Turks reached Cyprus through the arrival on Cyprus of 
members of the Young Turk movement. They contributed to the Turkish Cypriot press and, to 
a certain extent, created a wave of sympathy for the Young Turk cause, although the majority 
of the Turkish Cypriots supported the Sultan.111 Nevertheless, the Young Turk intellectuals 
contributed to the spread of Turkish nationalism through the 1909 opening of the Association 
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of Freedom and Progress, Hürriyet ve Terakki, which was later renamed “Brethen Hearth”, 
Kardeş Ocağı.112 This is the oldest Turkish Cypriot association that survives to this day. 
According to the memoirs of Turkish Cypriot lawyer Fadıl Niyazi Korkut, it was founded 
through the merger of two clubs, the “Turkish Mutual Help Association”, Türk Taavün 
Derneği, and the “Progress Association”, Terakki Kulübü. 113  We do not have much 
information on the Association, but the Young Turk ideas gained popularity in the years 
following the revolution of 1909.114 We can say that, during this period, the division in the 
Turkish Cypriot elite was consolidated. On the one hand, there were “Ottoman Cypriots” who 
emphasized the Islamic-Ottoman identity of the community and pledged allegiance to the 
Sultan and, on the other hand, there were supporters of the Young Turks who put emphasis on 
the Turkish identity of the community. Although Turkish was gradually replacing Ottoman 
identity, it was not until the start of the Turkish War of Independence in 1919, and the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, that Turkish identity was consolidated among 
the Turks in Anatolia and elsewhere. Despite the fact that Cyprus remained outside of the 
National Pact, the Misak-ı Millî, which set the limits of the Turkish state that was going to 
succeed the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism in Cyprus did not adopt an irredentist 
nature. With the help of intellectuals, the press and education, the Turkish Cypriots adopted 
the ideals of Turkish-Kemalist nationalism. The urge to adopt the Kemalist reforms can be 
explained by concern for the survival of the community. Administered by a colonial-Christian 
power and sharing the island with a radicalized Greek Cypriot community that ignored their 
presence, Turkish Cypriot identity had to be reformed along the lines of the Kemalist 
ideology: the new Turkey would be secular, Westernized and independent. By conforming to 
these principles, the Turkish Cypriots placed themselves in the Turkish nation, as this had 
been defined by Kemalist ideology. The anti-British, anti-colonialist comments of the 
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Kemalist press in the late 1920s can thus be attributed to the influence of Kemalist 
principles.115 According to Ahmet Kuyaş, anti-imperialist thought in Kemalist Turkey was 
limited to what was described as leftist Kemalism (Sol Kemalizm).116 However, since the 
Young Ottomans, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism had become popular. Hence, Turkish 
Cypriot nationalists could draw on the anti-imperialist components of Kemalism in order to 
build their anti-colonial rhetoric.  
 On the other hand, the colonial framework within which Turkish nationalism evolved 
in Cyprus permitted certain controversies, such as the opposition of the Nationalists to the 
abolition of the Muftiship or the concern for the fate of the Nicosia Medrese.117 For the 
nationalists, such deviations from Kemalist secular ideology were necessary, since the 
Muslim institutions were considered part of the community‟s identity and it was thought that 
they would safeguard this identity in a Christian environment.  
 The status of the island and the British presence in Cyprus can explain the resiliency 
of the Evkâfçılar, the supporters of the colonial government among the Turkish Cypriots. It 
should be noted that, like the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots too were unaware of the 
debate between Turkists and Ottomanists and Turkish nationalism started spreading among 
the Turkish Cypriot masses after the 1920s. The debate about the leadership of the community 
intensified in the 1920s and the Evkâfçılar gradually lost ground due to the blatant 
intervention of the colonial government in the Turkish Cypriot religious institutions and the 
further curtailing of the community‟s autonomy. These interventions shook the community‟s 
loyalty to the colonial government and led to the gradual radicalization of the Turkish 
Cypriots. Due to the Enosis threat, however, good relations with the British were maintained 
throughout the inter-war period.  
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 To conclude, in the period under investigation, Turkish nationalism was conveyed in 
Cyprus through education and the press. The quest for survival in what was conceived as a 
hostile environment, the impact of British colonial policies and the Greek Cypriot pro-Enosis 
activity contributed to the consolidation of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus.  
 
 
 
The Turkish Cypriot elite from the early years of British Rule until 1918 
 On the eve of British rule in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot society could be described 
as predominantly rural, although the proportion of Turkish Cypriots living in urban centers 
was higher than that of Greek Cypriots.118 The Cypriot economy was still mainly agricultural 
in the second half of the 19th Century and the Turkish Cypriot masses, quite like the Greek 
Cypriots, were farmers. The main issues facing the lower classes at the time were excessive 
taxation and their dependency on the large land-owners. The Church of Cyprus controlled a 
lot of land, which added to its political and social influence. 119  The Evkâf, the Muslim 
endowments that could be considered the equivalent to the Orthodox Church, also possessed 
considerable property.  
 While the lower classes suffered under heavy taxation, the local elites tooka rather 
separate path. Due to its limited access to state jobs, the Greek Cypriot elite dominated trade, 
and thus managed to accumulate wealth and power. Contrastingly, the Turkish Cypriot elite 
dominated bureaucracy and the police force.120 This privilege was lost soon after the advent of 
the British. Although Cyprus was still under the suzerainty of the Sultan, the imposition of 
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British rule caused the loss of the Turkish Cypriots‟ dominant position. The Turkish Cypriot 
population was a minority throughout Ottoman rule, but the status of the island as an Ottoman 
dominion was undisputed. Once the administration of the island was transferred to the British, 
the Turkish Cypriots were deprived of a protecting power, a government that guaranteed their 
rights but also regulated their everyday life through the appointment of religious, judicial and 
educational officials. Although, in the early stages of British rule, the Colonial government 
respected the existing bureaucratic structures that the Turkish Cypriot elite had to share power 
with a much more numerous Christian elite that was not only politically more dynamic, but 
also wealthier and readier to exploit the new opportunities that the British administration 
provided for the realization of their national goal, Enosis with Greece.  
 Within a quarter of a century after the advent of the British, the numbers of Turkish 
Cypriot schools rose from 71 to 144, while the number of pupils in said schools rose at an 
impressive rate of 177%.121 Nevertheless, while the Greek Cypriot schools had introduced a 
relatively modern curriculum, the Turkish Cypriot schools still gave greater emphasis to 
religious classes.122 Education thrived under British administration, but the Turkish Cypriot 
elite lacked the funds and the structures to help boost Turkish Cypriot education. With the 
financial support of the elite, Greek Cypriot education was oriented towards the diffusion of 
the Greek ideal, thus preparing Greek Cypriot youth for the realization of Enosis. The Turkish 
Cypriot elite, on the contrary, could not support Turkish Cypriot education due to the lack of 
funds. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots had to face new realities. Facing a rising Greek Cypriot 
nationalism, they decided to align themselves with the colonial administration, believing that 
in this way they could eliminate the threat of Enosis. In a petition to the Colonial Office in 
1882, the Turkish Cypriots showed their discontent for the representation of the Greek 
Cypriots in the Legislative Council, which outnumbered the Turkish Cypriot members, and 
pointed out that “the Moslems had loyally accepted the change in the government of the 
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island, not listening to the anti-English party, whereas the Greeks were agitating for the ruin 
and the oppression of the Moslems”.123 Loyalty to the Colonial government was perceived by 
the Turkish Cypriot elite as a necessary condition for the survival of the community. With the 
Cretan revolt of 1895, the Turkish Cypriot elite realized that Greek Cypriot claims could have 
serious repercussions for the fate of the community. An alignment with the colonial 
government was seen as the only chance to protect Turkish Cypriot rights. According to 
Kızılyürek, the Turkish Cypriot elite aligned with the Colonial power not only in order to 
safeguard the rights of the community, but also in order to safeguard its own position.124 This 
alignment was not only responsible for the late emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, 
which was also delayed by external factors, mainly the late emergence of Turkish 
nationalism. It was also responsible for the internal divisions of the Turkish Cypriot elite that 
were resolved, as we shall see, only in the late 1930s.  
 The Turkish Cypriot elite were left unprotected after the withdrawal of the Ottoman 
administration. In the same way that the Orthodox Church assumed the leading position 
among the Greek Cypriots, it was the Turkish Cypriot religious institutions that attempted to 
play this role for the Turkish Cypriot community. The absence of a wealthy elite of merchants 
or lawyers and the later emergence of secularizing forces among the Turkish Cypriots 
increased the importance of the religious institutions. Hence, until 1918, the Delegate of the 
Evkâf, the Mufti and the Baş Kadı (Chief Judge) claimed a leading role in the Turkish Cypriot 
community, drawing their legitimacy from their religious duties, their role in the management 
of the community‟s wealth or their appointment by the Ottoman government.  
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The Evkâf  
 
 Towards the late 19th and the early 20th century, the Turkish Cypriot community was 
still defined in religious rather than national terms. Their alignment with the colonial 
government and the disintegration of the Ottoman framework throughout the 1910s delayed 
the consolidation of a secular, nationalist elite. The Muslim institutions that were inherited by 
the Ottoman administration played an important role under the British, too. The evkâf, the 
department that administered religious properties and lands, played a crucial role in the 
financial, educational and spiritual affairs of the community, and thus the individuals who 
were appointed as its administrators enjoyed a leading position among the Turkish Cypriots. 
Together with the Evkâf, the spiritual leadership of the Turkish Cypriots was concentrated in 
the offices of the Mufti, the supervisor of religious life on the island, and that of the Baş Kadı, 
the Chief Judge of religious tribunals.  
 The term evkâf (plural of the Arabic word wakf, Ottoman Turkish vakıf) is used to 
describe a pious foundation, the responsibilities of which included the administration of 
religious properties and lands for philanthropic and religious purposes. 125  The income 
produced by these properties was used to support the poor and subsidize educational and other 
communal institutions. The local Evkâf department coordinated the administration of the 
properties and supervised the proper distribution of the income generated, but overall 
supervision was performed by the Evkâf department in Istanbul. There were many different 
kinds of Evkâf properties, but we shall refer to the two most common ones: The Mazbuta 
(Evkâf-ı Mazbuta) and the Mülhak Vakf.126 The Mazbuta vakf were administered by the evkâf 
department. They were religious or philanthropic buildings, such as mosques or tekkes, and 
public buildings or infrastructure, such as custom houses, bridges or aqueducts.127 Mülhak 
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vakfs were administered by trustees (mütevelli) who were appointed by the founders. These 
properties were often shops, houses or fields.  
 Given the evkâf‟s importance for almost all aspects of Muslim community life, the 
colonial government sought to get control soon after the transfer of power to the British. The 
first measure the colonial government took was to appoint a British delegate of the evkâf. The 
Ottoman government had the right to appoint the Muslim delegate, but did not practice this 
right. 128  The British delegate identified various irregularities in the practices of the 
administrator and the trustees.129 This provided the pretext for the government to take control 
of the evkâf. Almost all reforms of Turkish Cypriot religious institutions were conducted with 
the pretense of protecting the interests of the community through the elimination of misrule. 
Hence, the Evkâf gradually became a governmental department. In 1882, the government 
appointed Ahmet Hulusi Efendi as the Muslim delegate of the Evkâf and his appointment was 
ratified by both the Mufti and the Chief Kadi of Cyprus.130 For the next fifty years, the 
Turkish Cypriot Delegate of the Evkâf would be the unofficial leader of the Turkish Cypriots. 
Despite the fact that he was in essence an official of the Colonial government, the 
administration of such a crucial institution for the Turkish Cypriot community gave the 
Delegate of the Evkâf powers and influence that resembled those of the Archbishop for the 
Greek Cypriots.  
 After Ahmet Hulusi‟s death in 1899, Ahmet Sadık Efendi was appointed delegate of 
the Evkâf. After the latter‟s death in 1903, Musa İrfan Bey was appointed delegate of the 
Evkâf. He remained in this position until his death in 1925. He was elected member of the 
Legislative Council for three consecutive terms (1913, 1915 and 1921) and also served as a 
member of the Executive Council. In addition, he was the chairman of the Turkish Middle 
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School Commission.131 Musa İrfan worked as a teacher before he was appointed to the Evkâf 
in 1899. He was considered a decent administrator of the finances of the institution, while he 
also contributed in the building of the Haydarpaşa School in Nicosia.132 Nevertheless, the 
over-concentration of power in the hands of the Delegate of the Evkâf and the 
institutionalization of the position caused the Mufti and the Baş Kadi, the main 
representatives of the old Ottoman elite, to react. In 1907, they accused him of not running the 
Evkâf according to Islamic principles and of not being suitable for the post.133 The accusations 
were not addressed directly to Musa İrfan; they were rather an expression of grievance with 
the new status quo, which the old elite could not attack directly, since it was tolerated by the 
Ottoman government. This debate between the supporters and opponents of government 
policy was reflected in the press of the time. Mirat-ı Zaman supported Musa İrfan, while 
Sünuhat expressed opposition to the government‟s Evkâf policy. Sünuhat‟s publisher‟s son, 
history professor Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, explained the newspaper‟s anti-government stance as a 
reaction to the colonization of the Turkish Cypriot institutions, the appointment of pro-British 
teachers in the Turkish Cypriot schools and the partiality of British policy, given the fact that 
the Greek Cypriots were allowed considerable independence in their religious and educational 
affairs.134 This debate continued until the death of Musa İrfan and was intensified by the 
appointment of Mehmet Münir Bey in 1925. 
 The debate was eloquently described in an article by Dr Hafız Cemal which was 
published in the weekly İslam on April 6, 1908: 
I studied the Ottoman newspapers that have been published on the island 
until now and I have made an analysis of why [they] do not influence the 
nation, the Muslims of the island, as much as the Greek Cypriot press. I 
finally found out. It is well understood that every newspaper necessarily 
takes sides. There are publications that always exaggerate in favour of the 
side they support. Their columns are filled with hundreds of lies. Briefly 
following the usual prejudice, opposition, envy, personal self-interest of 
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some of our newspapers, [reading] references of the virtue, maturity, 
success and good deeds of the person they support, resorting to sad cases 
[of people] who behave like mad dogs that go around attacking, makes 
someone agree. Nevertheless, even cold-blooded ones are not serious at 
all. At least ninety percent of our people read the newspaper of the side 
they support most of the time free of charge, read the frivolous, 
unrealistic partisan statements and say “look how our has newspaper put 
down and silenced the other side, what a nice answer they gave, how 
strange that is all that is written”. The newspapers‟ words come to the 
mouths of the people and for a week at home, in coffee houses or even in 
some of our women‟s associations, the people utter these words to each 
other and they have fun and laugh.135  
  
 The reactions caused by the institutionalization of the Evkâf can be attributed to the 
overthrow of the old political elite, whose role and access to the lucrative religious 
endowments were gradually limited. Government control over the Evkâf was certainly a 
source of discontent – and the argument that the British were the only force that could protect 
the community and curtail Greek Cypriot claims for Enosis was not enough to limit the anti-
government complaints. Furthermore, the attempt to rationalize the Evkâf administration in 
order to improve its financial condition led to the incorporation of various smaller properties 
to the central administration, which caused the dismissal of their trustees and a subsequent 
loss of income.136 Apart from the fact that the new conditions caused discomfort among many 
Turkish Cypriots – members of the elite and the lower and middle classes – the attacks against 
Musa İrfan can also be attributed to petty politics. For example, Sünuhat‟s opposition to Musa 
İrfan was allegedly orchestrated by its financier Podamyalızade Mehmet Münir Bey in an 
attempt to oppose the Delegate of the Evkâf.137 The latter‟s brother-in-law, Podamyalızade 
Şevket Mehmet Bey, was a prominent Turkish Cypriot teacher, journalist at Yeni Zaman, 
member of the Legislative Council from 1906 to 1913 and mayor of Nicosia from 1908 to 
1911. He was also member of a Turkish Cypriot mission to Istanbul in 1907 that was 
dispatched in order to discuss educational issues with the community. He was accompanied 
by Ziyai Hacı Hafiz Efendi, teacher, member of the Legislative Council (1896-1904) and 
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Mufti of Cyprus from 1910-1927, and Osman Cemal Efendi, prominent lawyer, columnist at 
Mirat-ı Zaman and deputy mayor to Podamyalızade Şevket Bey.  
 The close association of the Delegate of the Evkâf with the British intensified the 
reaction of the nationalist Turkish Cypriots who, strengthened by the victorious outcome of 
the Turkish War of Independence, expressed their doubts regarding the ability of Musa İrfan 
Bey to advance Turkish Cypriot interests. Two petitions, one in 1922 and another in 1924, 
suggested an alteration tothe British policy, asking that a committee elected by Turkish 
Cypriots administer the Evkâf.138  
 The opposition to Musa İrfan did not manage to remove him from his post or change 
the British Evkâf policy. The Evkâf delegate died penniless in 1925, which proves his 
integrity. The debate between the supporters and the adversaries of British policy intensified 
towards the end of the 1920s, as we shall see in the following chapter. 
  
The office of the Mufti 
  
 The Mufti is considered the spiritual leader of an Islamic community. He is the 
interpreter of Islamic law and, until the advent of the British, he was appointed by Istanbul. 
The British did not interfere with the office of the Mufti and accepted the Ottoman 
government‟s appointment of Muftis in 1896 and 1912. Nevertheless, the office of the Mufti, 
like that of the Baş Kadı, lost a lot of its importance and independence under the British. They 
were paid by the Colonial government and in this way they were considered government 
officials.139  
 The Mufti was by no means a political figure. The advent of the British created new 
conditions and uncertainties regarding the fate of the community. The centralization of the 
Islamic institutions, namely the offices of the Mufti, the Chief Judge and the Evkâf, as we 
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have seen, eliminated the autonomy of the community.140 Under such circumstances, it was 
possible for the office of the Mufti, the spiritual leader of Islamic communities, to evolve into 
the status of a political leader too, given the lack of political leadership in the Turkish Cypriot 
community. The gap created by the evacuation of the Ottoman Empire from Cyprus gave the 
Muslim clergy an opportunity to undertake a more active role as representatives of the 
community.141 For example, in 1882, the Mufti Ahmed Asim expressed the community‟s 
discontent towards the decisions of the British Government to give equal rights to the Greek 
Cypriots, thus eliminating the Turkish Cypriots‟ leading position.142 It was again the Mufti 
who, in 1895, asked of the government that measures be taken to prevent Greek Cypriot pro-
Enosis rallies.143  
 The appointment of Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi in 1912 saw the arrival in the post of a 
well-known teacher who held a prominent position among the Turkish Cypriots. Hacı Hafız 
Ziyai Efendi was born in 1850 in Nicosia and was educated in Istanbul as well as at the Al 
Azhar mosque in Cairo. He served as head teacher of the Rüştiye School (Junior High School) 
for sixteen years. After the school was reformed according to the Ottoman Educational 
Reforms and changed its name into İdadi (High School), Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi taught 
religious classes for four years.144 In 1894, he was elected member of the Turkish Educational 
Board. He was elected president of the Board in 1910, a position that he kept until his death in 
1936. He also served for two terms in the Legislative Council and, before being appointed to 
the office of the Mufti, he served as a Chief Judge from 1906 until 1912. In 1912, he was 
appointed Mufti of Cyprus. He served for 15 years until 1927, when he resigned. Hacı Hafız 
Ziyai Efendi served at a sensitive period for the Turkish Cypriot community, which anxiously 
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watched the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Cypriots‟ pro-Enosis 
activities. The association of the Delegate of the Evkâf with the colonial administration, and 
the reluctance of the traditional leadership to question the allegiance to the Colonial 
Government, pushed the Mufti to undertake political initiatives. For example, together with 
other prominent Turkish Cypriots, the Mufti signed a petition that expressed the community‟s 
worries about Greek Cypriot Enosis claims. The most important of these initiatives was the 
convocation of a Turkish Cypriot national assembly (Meclis-i Millet) in 1918. The assembly 
took place under the presidency of the Mufti in his residence in Nicosia. The assembly voiced 
once again Turkish Cypriot fears of Greek Cypriot irredentism and expressed the wish of the 
community for the return of the island to the Ottoman Empire. The following year, the Mufti 
attempted to visit Paris as the leader of a Turkish Cypriot delegation in order to promote the 
Turkish Cypriots‟ position. The colonial government, however, did not allow the delegation 
to leave Cyprus.145  
 The retirement of Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi in 1927 offered the Colonial government 
the opportunity to dissolve the office of the Mufti and to institutionalize it by attaching it to 
the Department of Evkâf, which the government had controlled since the beginning of the 20th 
Century. As we shall see in the following chapter, this decision increased anti-government 
sentiment among the Turkish Cypriots and strengthened further the nationalist party. As for 
the Mufti himself, he died in 1936 but, unlike Musa İrfan, there were allegations that he had 
used his position in order to acquire more property. 146 
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The Sheri courts 
 
 The third institution, which completes the Turkish Cypriot communal network of 
power, was the Religious or Sheri court system (Mahkeme Sher‟i). According to the Cyprus 
Convention, the Sheri Courts would coexist with the civil courts. The main judge, the Baş 
Kadı, centered in Nicosia, was nominated by the Ottoman government and appointed by the 
High Commissioner. Three other judges who were under the authority of the Baş Kadı were 
appointed for local tribunals.147 The British considered this system quite costly and a luxury 
for a relatively small population.148 During the First World War, Britain used the Ottoman 
government‟s decision to enter the war with the Central Powers as a pretext to intervene in 
affairs that fell within the jurisdiction of the Kadı, namely the administration of property 
belonging to Ottoman subjects. 149  Furthermore, as we shall see in the next chapter, the 
Colonial Government was worried by the inefficiency of the Courts. The colonial government 
would use the financial affairs of the Turkish Cypriot institutions as a pretext in order to 
tighten its control over the community.  
 The Baş Kadı, Numan Efendi, used his office in order to attack the Delegate of the 
Evkâf on various occasions. In 1906, he accused Musa İrfan of being unsuitable for the post 
and argued that his appointment was not canonical and that he had intervened in the 
Legislative Council elections.150 In 1909, the Baş Kadı requested the removal of Musa İrfan 
from his office. In his petition he said the following:  
Musa İrfan Efendi performs the duties he has been assigned without 
neutrality and cannot gain [our] confidence. He always succumbs to 
selfish goals. There are a lot of grievances regarding the sacred 
Köprülüzade Mosque in Limassol that has suffered damage from the 
flood but no maintenance has been done […] In one word many village 
mosques are in ruins. They have their own endowment but this money is 
not spent.151  
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 These attacks against the Evkâf and the Delegate of the Evkâf were frequently not 
only because of governmental policies. By attacking Musa İrfan for being unsuitable, the Baş 
Kadı actually voiced concern for his increasing power. Long before Musa İrfan‟s appointment 
to the office of the Delegate of the Evkâf, prominent Turkish Cypriots had attempted 
unsuccessfully to abolish that office and attach it to the office of the Baş Kadı. The 
complaints can also be attributed to the limited powers that the Baş Kadı enjoyed under the 
British. In the interim report of 1949, we read that the religious judges had lost their religious 
functions, confining their work to litigation on matters of judicial character. 
 
The establishment and role of the Legislative Council in local politics 
 
 Soon after the advent of British rule, on 14 September 1878, the colonial government 
introduced a Legislative Council that consisted of the High Commissioner and up to eight 
official and unofficial members. This was by no means an innovation in Cypriot politics, 
since the new body was based on the Meclis-i İdare system (Administrative Council) that was 
in effect until 1878. While the Assistant Governor and the Chief of Justice were appointed by 
virtue of their office, the remaining members were elected by the local population.152 In the 
Legislative Council, the members would be appointed by the King or Queen, or provisionally 
by the presiding High Commissioner. With the 1882 constitutional reform, the following 
changes were made: The council consisted of twelve elected and six official members. It was 
presided over by the High Commissioner who had the casting vote. The twelve members were 
elected by the two communities in accordance with their numbers. That provided for nine 
Christian and three Muslim members. The council met at least once a year and elections were 
held every five years. The electorate consisted of all males over the age of twenty one who 
paid the property tax. Issues such as the salaries of state officials or taxation would be 
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discussed in the Council but in the case of a disagreement the decision depended on the vote 
of the High Commissioner. The latter was given the right to approve laws by Order in 
Council.  
 As a result, the Legislative Council managed to cause discontent not only among both 
communities, but also in Britain, where some voices characterized the Council as a “toy 
parliament” or a “sham gift”.153 The Greek Cypriots were discontented because their majority 
in the council was counterbalanced by the vote of the six official members and that of the 
High Commissioner. Even the terms “Muslim” and “Christian” were used as an attempt to 
avoid any identification of the “Greek Cypriot” members with Greece, thereby to undermine 
the goal of Enosis. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, saw the Legislative Council as a 
direct threat to their rights since, as they argued, “[the government] was giving the Greeks the 
greatest of all privileges by allotting them nine Christian members to three Muslims, whereas 
in Asia Minor, where the Muslims were in the great majority, the Christians had equal 
numbers and votes on Administrative Councils”.154 In terms of functionality, the council did 
not have any real powers, since it could not take any decisions on financial issues, for 
example.  
 After the initial euphoria, the Greek Cypriot members attempted to pass reforms that 
would make them the absolute majority in the council. These proposals were turned down in 
1889, 1907 and 1911. The Greek Cypriot members resigned en masse in 1911 and in 1920, 
after their proposals were rejected by the Council, but that measure too proved futile. When 
Cyprus became a crown colony in 1925, a constitutional reform increased the number of 
Greek Cypriot members to twelve while the number of Turkish Cypriot members remained 
three. The increase in the number of the elected members did not alter the balance of power 
and the Greek Cypriot majority was annulled through the alliance of the Turkish Cypriot 
members with the appointed members, while the High Commissioner – who was now called 
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Governor – retained the right of veto. The reformed council was not endowed with new 
powers and in various instances bills were passed through an Order-in-Council.155  
 Despite its shortcomings, the Legislative Council soon became a point of reference 
for political life. Though it was not qualified to make or approve laws, the local elites, both 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, gained influence and power through their election. The spiritual, 
political and intellectual leaders of the two communities were represented in the council.156 
The Archbishop of Cyprus and local bishops served in most of the eleven terms and the Evkâf 
Murahhası, the Delegate of the Evkâf, Musa İrfan, served consecutive terms from 1913 until 
1925. His successor, Mehmet Münir Bey, served from 1925 until 1931. While a degree in law 
was a passport to office for Greek Cypriot members, the smaller number of Turkish Cypriot 
members meant that, after the Evkâf delegate and occasionally the Kadi and the Mufti, the 
remaining seats would be distributed among the remaining members of the elite. The average 
Turkish member had some sort of relation with the Evkâf, in the Young Turk era journalistic 
activity and quite often some teaching experience. Occasionally, doctors and lawyers were 
elected too. The limited commercial activity of the Turkish Cypriots explains the absence of 
merchants in the Legislative Council. The triumph of Mısırlızade Necati Özkan, a Turkish 
Cypriot merchant, in the 1930 elections is thus significant.157  
 
Conclusions 
 
 Τhe Turkish Cypriot elite found itself at a crossroads after the end of the Ottoman 
administration. The Turkish Cypriots had lost their leading position and were now obliged to 
share power with a Christian community that was more numerous and politically more active. 
Most importantly, the Greek Cypriot struggle for Enosis was a constant source of worry for 
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the Turkish Cypriots. Under these circumstances, and given the absence of a wealthy and 
progressive elite, the Turkish Cypriots opted for close cooperation with the British in the hope 
that this would eliminate any danger of Enosis. At the same time, the heads of the Turkish 
Cypriot communal institutions emerged as the prospective leaders of the community, based 
on their role as religious leaders and claiming legitimization from their appointment by the 
Ottoman government. The Delegate of the Evkâf emerged as the undisputable leader, profiting 
from the importance of the Evkâf for the community, but his close cooperation with the 
colonial government caused resentment. The emergence of Kemalist Turkey in 1919 altered 
the balance of power among the Turkish Cypriot community and questioned old certainties. 
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CHAPTER 3 - CYPRIOT POLITICS AND SOCIETY UNDER THE BRITISH AND 
THE BIRTH OF CYPRIOT JOURNALISM  
 
 The advent of British colonial administration in Cyprus in 1878 caused political and 
social changes that greatly affected both communities. As far as the Greek Cypriots are 
concerned, the withdrawal of the Ottoman administration and its replacement by a Christian 
power was seen as an opportunity to put forward the Enosis agenda. Archbishop Sofronios II 
greeted the first British administrator, Sir Garnet Wolseley, with the following words: “We 
accept the change in government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as 
it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally 
connected.”158 Although the Ottoman administration in the second half of the 19th Century 
cannot be described as especially harsh, the political change secured in the eyes of the Greek 
Cypriots an atmosphere of equality that would replace a notion of insecurity and the idea that 
Christians were in some cases treated as second-class citizens. The administrative reforms 
introduced by the British included a legislative council that followed the pattern of the 
Ottoman Meclis-i İdare, where mostly wealthy and influential male Cypriots would be elected 
by a limited electorate. Other reforms affected the legal and judicial system and the tax 
system, which appeared to be fairer, although it included the Tribute, an annual tax that was 
to be paid to Istanbul by the British Colonial government but was instead levied upon Cypriot 
taxpayers.159 While for the Greek Cypriots the new administration caused hope for social and 
political change, for the Turkish Cypriots it was a source of worry and resentment. Not only 
were they considered equal to their Greek Cypriot counterparts, who formed the majority of 
the population. The reforms of the new administration targeted their privileged position in the 
state apparatus and they now had to compete on equal terms with the Greek Cypriots, who 
were in a better financial position.  
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The new political conditions allowed the press to flourish. According to Cobham, 
Cyprus was the first newspaper that was printed in 1878, only a few months after the arrival 
of the first British troops.160 It was published by Theodoulos Konstantinides, a teacher and 
publisher who managed to set up the first printing house in Cyprus with the financial support 
of the Cypriot Brotherhood in Alexandria. 161  Konstantinides also published the first 
newspaper in Greek, Neon Kition, which appeared a year later.162 In the first editorial, he 
wrote: “The pen of my journalism will be forever guided by a Greek heart. I neither can, nor 
wish to hide this”.163  Two years later in Limassol, the teacher and journalist Aristoteles 
Palaiologos published the weekly Alitheia (Truth). In 1882 in Larnaca, another teacher, 
Themistocles Theocharides, published the weekly Stasinos, which was later renamed Foni tis 
Kiprou (Voice of Cyprus). Another newspaper was published in Limassol in 1884, under the 
name of Salpinx (Trumpet), by teacher and lawyer Stilianos Hourmouzios. And a newspaper 
bearing the name of Greek Cypriots‟ national aspiration, Enosis (Union), was published by 
merchant and teacher Christodoulos Kouppas in Larnaca in 1885.164 In-between, there were 
short-lived attempts to print satirical newspapers and magazines that appealed to an audience 
motivated by the goal of Enosis that was propagated through newspaper articles and by school 
teachers who, educated in Greece, returned to Cyprus and taught more and more students. 
Already in 1888, there were 241 Greek Cypriot schools with 9,493 students.165 In 1891, there 
were 71 Turkish Cypriot schools with 1,869 students.166  
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The launch of Turkish Cypriot journalism came rather late. The fate of the Turkish 
Cypriot press was influenced by local and international politics much more than that of the 
Greek Cypriot press. The development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism within the time frame 
of this research can be divided into three stages: the first covers the period from the 
appearance of the first newspaper until 1914, when no Turkish Cypriot newspaper was 
published, due to Anglo-Turkish antagonism during the First World War. The second phase 
covers the period from 1919 until 1931, when a relatively free time for the press came to an 
abrupt end with the October revolts that allowed the British to impose strict censorship laws 
on both Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspapers. The third phase covers the period from 1931 
until after the end of the Second World War, when the press law and the ban on political 
activities were gradually lifted. The first phase of Turkish Cypriot journalism consists of 
attempts to establish a Turkish press that would be able to answer the demands for Enosis, 
whichthat had been propagated by a more vivid and multi-faceted Greek Cypriot press. Most 
of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers were critical of the Hamidian regime and this often led to 
their closure. This together with financial hardship and low readership can explain the short 
life of many titles.  
  The first Turkish Cypriot newspaper was published by an Armenian under the name 
of Alexan Sarafian, who had been sent to exile in Egypt in 1880.167 After the arrival of the 
British, he moved to Cyprus and started publishing Ümid (Hope). It was published in the 
same printing house as Cyprus. After five issues, its publication was ceased under pressure 
from the Sublime Porte.168 
Nine year later, in 1889, the second Turkish Cypriot newspaper Saded (Scope) 
appeared. Although Ağuiçenoğlu considers Ümid (Hope) to be the first Turkish Cypriot 
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newspaper, it has been impossible to establish this, since no issues of the said newspaper exist 
in archives or private collections.169 Its publisher, Ahmet Emin Ağa, was a retired official of 
the Ottoman finance office (malmüdürlüğü) that was abolished by the British.170 Saded was 
short lived – only 16 issues were published, of which none survives.171  
 Two years later, in 1891, Zaman (Time) started its publication. It was the third 
Turkish Cypriot newspaper. It was published by the Kiraathane-i Osmaniye, the Ottoman 
Club of Nicosia, and it was the first serious attempt at the publication of a Turkish Cypriot 
newspaper. Its publisher was Tüccarbaşı Hacı Ahmet Derviş Efendi, who was apparently 
illiterate.172 Its aim was to “evolve the education of the Turks, work for the benefit of the 
community, pioneer in the maturation and the progress of the nation and abstain from harmful 
publications of personal hatred. By doing this and staying close to the Ottoman State, the 
struggle against Enosis would be made easier”.173 It featured articles by various prominent 
Turkish Cypriots, such as Ali Rifki Efendi, the Mufti, Hafiz Ziyai Efendi and the headmaster 
of the Boys‟ Secondary School in Nicosia.174 It was printed at the first Turkish printing house 
in Cyprus, where the first book in Turkish was also printed in 1892.175 Zaman was published 
for nine years and it openly expressed its opposition to Greek Cypriot plans for Enosis with 
Greece. It often featured articles answering the pro-Enosis claims that were published in the 
Greek Cypriot Fwni tis Kiprou. 176  Although Zaman‟s publisher requested and obtained 
financial help from the Porte in 1892,177 when the following year the newspaper published an 
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article about judge Mustafa Fevzi Efendi, the Porte expressed its displeasure.178 When some 
of its contributors started voicing pro-Young Turk opinions, the disagreements within the 
Ottoman Club were also reflected in the newspaper, so much so that the supporters of the 
Young Turk movement founded another newspaper entitled Yeni Zaman (New Time) in 1892. 
It only published 22 issues and was closed the following year, to be succeeded by Kıbrıs 
(Cyprus). Kıbrıs was first published in 1893 and expressed its mission eloquently in its first 
issue: To face the Greek Cypriot press, to approach facts in a truthful away and not to publish 
lies, to serve the Turkish culture and the Turkish people and to support the Young Turks‟ 
case.179 Due to its harsh criticism of the Ottoman government, Ottoman officials intervened 
and managed to shut down the newspaper in 1898.180  
 Ahmet Tevfik Efendi, one of the contributors to Zaman, was the editor of the first 
satirical newspapers in Cyprus. It was published in 1896 under the name Kokonoz and its 
circulation stopped after 22 editions. In 1897, Ahmet Tevfik published another newspaper 
under the title Akbaba (Condor). Its style was somewhat less satirical and it openly criticized 
the Hamidian regime. The Ottoman authorities sentenced its publisher to death and tried to 
limit its readership. After 23 editions, Akbaba ceased publication.181 
 For one year, no Turkish Cypriot newspaper was published. It was again Ahmet 
Tevfik Efendi who published Mir‟at-i Zaman (The Mirror of Times) in 1901. In this 
journalistic endeavor, too, Ahmet Tevfik sharply criticized the Ottoman government and 
adopted a pro-Young Turk stance, which may explain the frequent suspensions of 
publication. 182  Mir‟at-i Zaman also engaged in a battle with another weekly, Sünuhat 
(Manifestations), which was first published in 1906, over the issue of the Evkâf and the policy 
of the British Colonial government regarding their control. As we shall see in the following 
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chapter, this issue would dominate Turkish Cypriot politics and divide the Turkish Cypriot 
elite and press more in the following years. Mir‟at-i Zaman was published on and off until 
1910.  
 Another four newspapers would be published in the following years. Islam (1907-
1909), Vatan (Motherland) (1911-1913), Seyf (Sword) (1912-1914) and Kıbrıs (1913-1914). 
After the Young Turk revolution in 1908, all newspapers supported the Union and Progress 
case and gradually introduced the notion of Turkishness to their readers. The gradually 
increasing Greek Cypriot pressure for Enosis did not remain unanswered by the Turkish 
Cypriot press either, while the Evkâf issue continued to divide the community. The outbreak 
of the First World War inaugurated a period of silence for the Turkish Cypriot press that 
lasted four years. It seems that the reasons for this were not only political, due to the 
censorship laws that were enforced because of the Ottoman Empire‟s decision to enter the war 
with the Central Powers, but also financial. 
Newspapers and Coffeehouses – Bringing the News 
 The beginning of British rule in Cyprus gave great impetus to the press, but the 
diffusion of this new medium was not very widespread due to the following reasons: the 
nature of the language used in both Turkish and Greek Cypriot newspapers, the prevalence of 
illiteracy, and the cost of a newspaper subscription. As we have seen, the newspaper owners 
and editors were the “enlightened” men of the time, educated in prestigious schools and 
universities in Athens, Istanbul or other commercial and cultural centers. The Greek Cypriot 
newspapers were published in Katharevousa, a form of Greek closely connected to Ancient 
Greek that became the official language of the independent Greek Kingdom. It was 
incomprehensible to everyday people even in mainland Greece. In Cyprus, it must have 
sounded even more distant, given that the local dialect uses many local words and idioms. 
The local Turkish dialect is not that different from mainland Turkish, but the Ottoman 
Turkish of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was still a bureaucratic language, with many 
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Arabic and Persian idioms that made it difficult to comprehend for the majority of Turkish 
Cypriots.183 
Both communities gave importance to education and actively engaged in opening 
schools, and they were able to improve literacy rates within one or two decades. According to 
Bryant, both communities could be considered literate in the definition put forward by 
Goody.184 Nevertheless, the first newspapers could only have a limited readership. 
Finally, the newspaper must have been a luxury item for the average Cypriot towards 
the end of the 19th Century. Although we do not have a full image of the cost of an annual 
subscription, the publishers of Zaman often asked their readers to pay their subscriptions, as 
this was the main source of income, and we also know that the readers would often complain 
about the price of the newspaper.185 
 Despite the aforementioned obstacles, the press soon became a point of reference for 
local politics. It did so through its presence in a public space par excellence in Cypriot cities 
and villages, the coffee house.186 The coffeehouse was the centre of social life. All around the 
eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, the coffeehouse was the place where males would 
meet, discuss the local news and politics, talk about social, political or financial issues, play 
games and gossip. In Nicosia, but presumably in other cities too, there were different coffee 
houses for specific purposes: for example, the coffeehouse of Mehmet Dayı in the old town of 
Nicosia was where wedding or circumcision ceremonies took place, and the Karabülük 
coffeehouse was where carriers would park their carriages and wait for their customers.187 
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 It was there that the literate members of the community, more often the school teacher or the 
doctor, would read the news aloud. For instance, teacher Hasan Fadıl Avkan says in his 
memoirs that he would read the newspaper Söz to the villagers of Topçuköy (Ayios 
Andronikos) in the evenings while he was working there.188 In most cases, the reader would 
also have to translate the news into the vernacular form of Greek or Turkish for his public to 
be able to understand. In this way, the coffee house became the centre of political activity, the 
opportunity for propaganda or indoctrination, especially for the Enosis cause, the stage where 
politicians tried to win votes for the legislative council elections or where anti-government 
feeling was expressed.189  
Since the Cypriot psyche, Turkish or Greek, could not be expressed in the 
conventional newspapers due to the language used, there were, as we have seen, a few short-
lived attempts to publish satirical newspapers that were published in the local dialect. These 
newspapers were written almost entirely in the Cypriot dialect and often in verse.190 The first 
attempt was made by Konstantinides, the publisher of the first newspaper on the island. It was 
named Keravnos (Thunder) and it was published for a short time in 1882.191 Two years later, 
Horkatis (Villager) was published. It lasted for a year and, according to Koudounaris, it was 
closed down under pressure from the Cypriot community in Egypt, because they considered 
the Cypriot dialect brutal.192 Poet and painter Vasilis Michailidhes published the fortnightly 
Dhiavolos (Devil) for a few months in 1888. The language and style used in the satirical press 
followed the tradition of the piitaridhes, the local oral poets who would express the issues 
everyday Cypriots were facing or report the local and international news in the local 
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dialect.193 Michailides, who is considered one of the greatest Cypriot poets, wrote in fifteen-
syllable verses with rhyme. His poems dealt with social, philosophical and romantic themes.  
Kokonoz was the first Turkish Cypriot satirical newspaper, which was published 
briefly in 1896, but was soon shut down, partly because of financial issues, partly because of 
the discontent of the Sublime Porte, due the paper‟s hostile stance towards the Istanbul 
government.194 The satirical newspapers followed the local tradition of folk poetry to which 
both communities were accustomed. In this early stage of the press in Cyprus, the satirical 
press would reflect the people‟s worries, their complaints about British policy or their 
financial hardships. It was an ideal time for the satirical press to thrive, before the rise of 
nationalism dissuaded publishers from similar endeavours. Due to the Turkish Cypriots‟ 
knowledge of Greek, the Greek Cypriot press and even more the Greek Cypriot satirical press 
had a readership among both communities.  
Despite the shortcomings, censorship and financial difficulties, the press soon became 
not only an informative medium but also a tool for political indoctrination. While for the 
Greek Cypriots it served to propagate Enosis, for the Turkish Cypriots it became an 
instrument of the Young Turk movement, though it was also an opportunity to answer Greek 
Cypriot claims. The First World War deprived the Turkish Cypriots of newspapers for five 
years. When the first Turkish Cypriot newspaper was published again in 1919, the conditions 
for both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot press were very different.  
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Cyprus after the First World War – the emergence of a new political and intellectual 
elite.  
 
The end of the First World War brought an end to the five-year censorship of the Turkish 
Cypriot press. New journalistic attempts were urgently needed because of the new challenges 
the community had to face. On 5 November 1914, Cyprus was officially annexed by Great 
Britain. In the meantime, Greek Cypriot pro-Enosis activities in Cyprus and abroad were a 
constant source of worry for the Turkish Cypriots. The most important source of worry, 
though, came from Anatolia. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of 
large parts of Anatolia by European powers and the Greek army alarmed the Turkish 
Cypriots. Under this scope, the traditional pro-British policy of the Turkish Cypriot Elite as 
the only response to the threat of Enosis gradually found its adversary in the form of Turkish 
nationalism. The Turkish Cypriot elites were divided along these lines already from the 
beginning of the Turkish War of Independence and the struggle culminated towards the end of 
the 1920s. Soon after the end of the war, new titles began to appear. Doğru Yol (The True 
Path) and Söz (Statement) were the main propagators of Kemalist ideology in Cyprus, while 
Ankebut (Spider), first published in 1920, and Hakikat (Truth) were the main advocates of the 
Evkâfçılar, the pro-British group. Birlik (Unity), first published in 1924, and Masum Millet 
(Innocent Nation), published in 1931, were the two other newspapers that supported the 
nationalist cause. Among all these, the most ardent supporter of Turkish nationalism in 
Turkish Cypriot journalism was Mehmet Remzi Okan.  
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Söz Newspaper 
 
 Mehmet Remzi‟s journalistic debut took place on 8 September 1919, when Doğru Yol 
(The True Path) started its publication in Nicosia. 195  It was the first Turkish Cypriot 
newspaper to appear after the ban that was imposed by the colonial authorities during the First 
World War. Mehmet Remzi was the co-editor, assisted by the lawyer Ahmet Raşit. From the 
first issue, the publishers vowed to support the Turkish War of Independence and oppose 
Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. Nevertheless, Doğru Yol would often be subjected to the 
censorship laws that were still in effect. Mehmet Remzi applied for permission to issue 
another newspaper in case Doğru Yol would be shut down and indeed, two years later, he 
published one of the most influential and certainly the longest-running Turkish Cypriot 
newspaper under British rule, Söz (Statement).196 From August 1920 until his death in January 
1942, the newspaper was published on a weekly basis.197 In order to ensure the continuous 
publication of the newspaper in case of closure due to censorship, Mehmet Remzi registered 
Söz with the colonial government. All through the 1920s, it was published every Thursday in 
four broadsheet pages. The first page was usually reserved for one or more editorial pieces by 
Mehmet Remzi. The remaining pages were reserved for local news, reports from the 
provincial capitals (e.g. Famagusta) and Turkey. In case there was no news from Cyprus, the 
first page was devoted to news about Turkey and more specifically about Turkish foreign 
policy. Söz had the biggest circulation with approximately 1,200 copies throughout the 1920s, 
with Hakikat coming second.198  
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 Mehmet Remzi was born in 1885 and, after graduating from Mektep-i idadiye in 
Nicosia, he started working as a teacher. On the eve of the First World War, Remzi was head-
teacher at the Sarayönü Boys School in Nicosia.199  One of his students remembers how 
Mehmet Remzi instilled love for the Turkish flag in his students.200 After the end of the war, 
Remzi turned down a teaching job in the city of Paphos and devoted himself to journalism. In 
Söz, Mehmet Remzi continued the endeavour he had initiated through the editorial line of 
Doğru Yol, that of support of the Kemalist forces. During the later years of the Turkish war of 
independence, Söz undertook the task of encouraging and boosting the morale of the Turkish 
Cypriots. On the editorial of 5 September 1921 under the title “Difficult Days”, Mehmet 
Remzi commented on the broadcast of a Greek news agency that Ankara had been occupied 
by Greek forces:  
 
The publications of the Greek press and the information of the Athens 
News Agency report that, since a couple of days ago, Ankara too has been 
occupied by the Greek army. If we believe that these opinions are correct 
and accept for a second that these events have occurred, we cannot 
consider that the war has come to an end and we cannot regard it as 
possible that the Western countries shall not intervene. That is because the 
Anatolian Turks are fighting to defend their existence and independence. 
We do not think that the allies that deluge the nations that admirably 
defend their freedom and independence will adopt decisions that will 
deprive the Turks of their right to fight in this good cause.201 
 
The outcome of the Greek-Turkish war in Anatolia was worrying the Turkish Cypriot 
community, as it was feared that a strong Greek presence in Anatolia would have serious 
implications for the future of the community in Cyprus. In order to ease the worries arising 
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from Greek war propaganda, Söz published a series of articles attempting to maintain the 
community‟s faith in the Kemalist forces. The difficulty of obtaining objective and accurate 
information from the war in Anatolia and the need of the Turkish Cypriot community to keep 
faith in the Kemalist movement led many Turkish Cypriots to support Söz and Mehmet 
Remzi. From 1921, the newspaper was sent to the Turkish Association (Türk Derneği) in 
Nicosia.202 His services were acknowledged by the Kemalist regime in a complimentary letter 
signed by the General Director of the Press and Information office.203  
 Until the beginning of the Turkish war for independence, the Turkish Cypriot elite 
had adopted a pro-British policy in order to secure its position in relation to the colonial 
administration and as a reaction against the demands for Enosis. As a result, the Evkâf, the 
main Turkish Cypriot institution and source of wealth for the community, had come under the 
control of the colonial government. Through his articles, Mehmet Remzi started to challenge 
this policy and, after the successful outcome of the war and the prevalence of the Kemalist 
forces, he considered loyalty to the British harmful to the Turkish Cypriots. He believed that 
the Turkish Cypriots should adopt all the Kemalist reforms and foster strong ties with the 
motherland.   
 The end of the War of Independence was celebrated by the Turkish Cypriots and Söz 
commented extensively on the importance of the victory of the Kemalist forces for the 
Turkish Cypriot community. Indeed, it was thought that the defeat of Greek nationalism in 
Anatolia would hold back Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. Soon after, the launch of the 
secular reforms was not only positively commented upon, but Mehmet Remzi often published 
long editorials asking persistently for the implementation of the reforms and insisting on the 
need for the Turkish Cypriot community to follow the path of modernization.  
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 Furthermore, the successful first steps of the Turkish Republic strengthened the 
feeling of Turkish sentiment among the Turkish Cypriot community and provided the impetus 
for Mehmet Remzi to engage dynamically in the diffusion of Turkishness and the Kemalist 
ideas. When Sait Molla, one of the yüzellilikler,204 arrived in Cyprus in May 1925, Mehmet 
Remzi expressed his discontent. Although Sait Molla tried to convince the Turkish Cypriot 
intellectuals that there were no political motives hidden behind his arrival in Cyprus, Remzi 
Okan, as well as the publisher of Birlik, Hacı Bulgurzâde Ahmet Hulusi, investigated Sait 
Molla‟s activities in Egypt and pointed out his treacherous stance towards his motherland 
(vatana ihanet).205 It seems that Sait Molla did not abstain from political activities. As a 
result, Mehmet Remzi published a series of articles attacking Sait Molla. Sait Molla tried to 
respond to these allegations, although he did not manage to have his announcements 
published in the Turkish Cypriot press. When he dismissed the Turkish Cypriot newspapers as 
“rags” (paçavra), Mehmet Remzi published an article in Söz on 17 November 1925, under the 
title “Molla infected everything” (Molla her tarafı bulaştırdı) where he attacked Sait Molla: 
 
[...] You cursed fellow. If we flee we will go to Turkey and live among 
our people. But you; you are disgraced, bloody handed, dirty. One day 
you will definitely leave from here, we‟re expecting that day. Where will 
you go? What is your nation and which is your homeland? (…) This is 
certain: Wherever Molla goes, the Turk‟s revenge will be personified 
sometimes in the form of Raşit,206 sometimes in the form of Remzi and he 
will suffer with regret as they throw in his face his abominable deeds. If 
he does not feel anything because of unscrupulousness [they will] 
uncover his malice and they will spoil his plans and he will always live in 
pain and suffering. Molla and his companions may struggle as much as 
they want, they may hit their brainless heads here and there, they may 
even slither through the mud like poisonous snakes. Their poison will 
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only burn their filthy selves. Because the Turkish nation has been saved 
from their kind and in order to be completely safe from their evilness they 
put a black stamp on their faces and sent them to exile. Sait Molla may 
become as furious as he wants. Like a venomous dog he may greedily eat 
his own body. His fuss will have no impact, neither here nor in Turkey. 
We know what lies behind his cries and as we hear them we feel pleasure 
instead of mercy as we take our revenge.207 
 
The language and the style may seem quite offensive, but Mehmet Remzi often used 
such a tone when attacking his opponents in his editorials. A few months later, on 3 April 
1926, with an article entitled “Attention, there are mischievous intriguers among us” (İçimzde 
hain müfsitler var, dikkat), Mehmet Remzi attacked Sait Molla once again. Only this time, he 
accused him of espionage in favour of Greece. The latter brought suit against the publisher 
that resulted in a two-month jail sentence.208  
 The openly pro-Kemalist stance was again acknowledged and rewarded. Shortly after 
the opening of the Turkish Consulate in Larnaca in June 1925, the consul Mr. Assaf Bey met 
with journalists Hacıbulgurzade Ahmet Hulusi, editor of the weekly Birlik, Ahmed Raşid and 
Mehmet Remzi and promised them financial assistance from the Turkish government.209 In 
the same meeting, the consul stated the Turkish government‟s satisfaction with Turkish 
Cypriot journalism. It is interesting that the editor of the third important weekly Hakikat 
(Truth), which kept a moderate stance towards the Kemalist regime, was not invited to the 
meeting. Mehmet Remzi opted for Turkish nationality in 1926, a right that was given to 
Turkish Cypriots through the Lausanne Treaty.210 
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 Mehmet Remzi published a lot about the “hat revolution” (şapka devrimi), advocating 
the implementation in Cyprus of the Kemalist reforms that provided for the abolition of the 
fez. On 17 October 1925, he wrote: 
 
Until yesterday we were trying to preserve our peculiarity and rejected 
the headgear that is used by all civilized nations by considering it a curse. 
It wasn‟t deemed necessary to wear a hat out of fear of looking like 
Europeans. Because by wearing the hat we will look like our brothers in 
Turkey from which we‟re no different. I‟ve heard that many of our young 
people are preparing to wear a hat on the Day of the Republic. From the 
letters we receive from the provinces we understand that there too on that 
day many young people will follow Kemal Paşa by wearing a hat.211 
 
 With the pretext of the implementation in Cyprus of the language reform, Mehmet 
Remzi met with Mustafa Kemal himself and secured some financial support in order to print 
Söz in the new Turkish alphabet.212 Already from the beginning of 1929, Söz began publishing 
its title and later in the same year some short articles or just their titles in the new alphabet. 
Gradually, the whole newspaper was published in the new alphabet.  
 All through 1928, Söz published a series of reports on the language reform from 
Turkey and editorials emphasizing the need for the full implementation of the reforms. In the 
editorial of 13 September 1928 entitled “It is our task to take up the new letters”, Mehmet 
Remzi adopted the language reform: 
 
With the new Turkish letters established and approved by the Language 
Committee, capital and small, everyone will read and write and our 
beautiful Turkish [language] shall be rescued without any riddle. The 
success of this part of the sacred revolution is very important and 
comprehensive. For with that [the new Turkish alphabet] it‟s not only the 
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Turks of Turkey who are saved, the millions of Turks living in the four 
corners of the world and are unfortunately sentenced to remain ignorant 
by not getting a share of Turkish education shall be illuminated and with 
the light and enlightenment they will attain their self esteem. After ten 
years Turks everywhere will one way or another read and write and there 
is no doubt that they will reflect one way or another. It‟s that simple 
[…]213  
 
 It is evident that Söz had fully adopted the Kemalist cause and, moreover, had taken 
up the task of enlightening the Turkish Cypriot community. Towards the end of the 1920s, 
the position of the Kemalists had been consolidated among the Turkish Cypriots and Söz 
claimed a leading role in the process of transforming an Ottoman Muslim community into an 
ethnic Turkish one. Towards this aim, all Turkish national holidays were celebrated by the 
Turkish Cypriots. On the first page of Söz on the 29th October 1931, the 8th anniversary of the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic, we read: 
 
Turks all around the world are feeling a wave of joy coming from the 
grandeur and the elevation of this day and they manifest this joy without 
breaking the laws of the countries where they are living. And the Turkish 
children living in the motherland are celebrating this day in a more joyful, 
more dignified and more independent way, in safety and purity given by 
their fathers‟ clean blood […] When their joyful laughter and the shining 
gleam from the national holiday reflect to us, we are glad too and we feel 
joy and gratitude. Because we know that this is our holiday, our joyful 
day.214  
 
 The emergence of a nationalist political elite and its consolidation in power lasted 
throughout the 1920s. Despite the attacks against British policy on the Evkâf issue and the 
promotion of Turkish nationalism, the old guard, the Evkâfçılar, or supporters of the colonial 
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government, managed to win the 1925 elections for the Legislative Council. 215  Mehmet 
Münir Bey won the elections for the 1st Electoral District for Nicosia and Kyreneia and, 
together with various other positions that he held in the colonial government and the Turkish 
Cypriot community, the most important being the Evkâf delegate, he became the number one 
target for Söz and the other Kemalist forces. During the following five years, Mehmet Münir 
was targeted for his devotion to the British colonial government and his almost absolute 
control over the community‟s institutions. Remzi Okan fought vigorously for the election of 
nationalist Mehmet Necati Özkan in the 1930 elections for the Legislative Council, which 
meant the end of Münir Bey‟s undisputed control over the community. Necati Özkan 
published his articles in Söz and the newspaper advertised extensively the Turkish Cypriot 
National Congress that took place a year later and was organized by Necati Özkan and his 
friends. Söz engaged in an often aggressive confrontation with the rather conservative 
Hakikat over these two issues. Through his articles, Mehmet Remzi considered himself the 
defender of Kemalist ideology in Cyprus and saw it as a task to fight all opposing views.  
 Following the Kemalist pattern, Söz focused on the need of the Turkish Cypriot 
community to modernize, not only in order to follow the Turkish example, but most 
importantly in order to be able to compete with the Greek Cypriots. In other words, the 
modernization of the community was thought to be the answer for all political and financial 
hardships.  
 Indicative of Remzi‟s perception of his role as an instructor of the Turkish Cypriot 
community is his reaction to the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the Communist 
movement of Cyprus. In an article entitled “The stray lambs are eaten by the wolf” (Sürüden 
ayrılanı kurt yer), Mehmet Remzi makes the following comment:  
[…] Nevertheless, the Turks that added their names under any 
circumstance to the Bolshevik lists, intentionally or unintentionally, have 
caused great harm to their own community. We know that there is no 
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religion or ethnicity in Bolshevism. [...] From what we have read in the 
Greek Cypriot newspapers we understand there are about 60 teachers who 
engage with the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, there is no Turkish teacher. 
This is very good for us and it is a good proof that the Turkish 
community has no intervention in the Bolshevik movement. [...] It is not a 
defect or a fault of the community if one or two Turks have been carried 
away by communist propaganda and have turned away from us. But if 
some have turned away from us and have followed dark paths, there 
should be no doubt that those who leave the flock get eaten by the 
wolf.216  
 Remzi assumed the role of the teacher and parent of his readers, adopting a discourse 
that combines sermon and reprimand towards those who “stray from the righteous path” of 
Turkish nationalism.  
Hakikat – the official organ of the Evkâfçılar 
 Hakikat was published from 1923 to 1933 and was the second-best selling newspaper 
after Söz.217 Why is it, then, that the official history ignores Hakikat? The answer, I argue, lies 
in the newspaper‟s political stance. Unlike Söz, Hakikat never supported the Kemalist cause. 
This, however, does not mean that it campaigned against Kemalism. It just remained loyal to 
the Evkâfçılar and insisted on the importance of good relations with the colonial government. 
As we‟ve seen, the newspaper‟s first edition was published on May 12, 1923. It was 
published by Derviş Ali Remmal and the editor was Mehmet Fikri Yağmur.218 Derviş Ali 
Remmal was born in 1852. He was active in commerce before opening a printing house in 
Larnaca. Remmal was the publisher of weekly Ankebut (Spider), which was published from 
1920 to 1923.219 From 1920 until 1933, he was the publisher of Hakikat, which was published 
in Larnaca until 1930 and in the Hakikat printing house in Nicosia thereafter.  
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Mehmet Fikri Yağmur was born in Larnaca in 1900. Together with Derviş Ali 
Remmal, he published Ankebut and Hakikat. After the latter‟s publication ceased in 1932, he 
took over the printing house and named it Mehmet Fikri. Various Turkish Cypriot 
newspapers were published in his printing house and he was also the publisher of short-lived 
Haber (1934-1925).220  
The available editions of Hakikat at the National Archives in Keryneia cover the 
years 1923-1926 and 1931-1933. It is, hence, difficult to trace the political side that the 
newspaper chose over the years. Moreover, the biographies of the publishers do not highlight 
the reasons that the newspaper sided with the Evkâfçılar towards the end of the 1920s.  
Hakikat covered the official holidays of the Turkish Republic by publishing photos of 
Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü accompanied by celebratory comments. In that sense, its 
political stance in the early stages did not vary significantly from that of Söz. With the rise in 
power of Mehmet Münir and especially when the nationalists started attacking the Evkâf 
administration, the newspaper accused Necati Özkan of attempting to harm the community‟s 
good relations with the government. In an article published on August 1, 1931, the newspaper 
accused the nationalist opposition of having adopted a contradictory attitude regarding the 
religious institutions: 
In the leading article of this issue the changeable attitude and the 
contradictory claims of the Opposition are set out as follows: They 
formerly asked for the abolition of the Sheri Courts and of the Muftiship, 
and for the introduction of certain reforms. They also declared that they 
considered it an insult to be called as Moslems. After a short time they 
undertook the protection of the Moslem religious institutions, and elected 
a Mufti. This is nothing but anarchy. The Government appears to be too 
much tolerant towards them. But we think that it is the duty of the 
Government to protect the dignity of individuals and of institutions, and 
to make them understand that there is a limit to Liberty and to the Liberty 
of the Press. 221 
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 Hakikat argued that the nationalists were contradicting themselves in demanding that 
the government handed the administration of the religious institutions back to the community. 
The main line of argument was that it was the nationalists themselves who had requested the 
abolition of these institutions in the past. The most interesting part of this article, though, is 
the use of religion as a weapon against the nationalists. The newspaper implied that Necati 
Özkan and the other members of the nationalist party insulted the Muslim religion with their 
actions. In the end, the newspaper appealed to the government of support. This was a common 
feature in Hakikat‟s articles.  
  
On the contrary, Hakikat seldom referred to Kemalist ideology and the secular reforms. 
Indicative of this is the newspaper‟s publication in Ottoman Turkish even in 1933, 5 years 
after the Language Reform was introduced. The newspaper published only its title and the 
titles of some articles in Latin letters, as well as the advertisements. On the contrary, Söz was 
published already from 1931 exclusively in the new Turkish alphabet.  
 I will not include more articles from Hakikat, given that I have used many more in 
other chapters that give an idea of the newspaper‟s political and ideological stance. In all, 
Hakikat adopted a pro-government attitude and supported loyalty to the government. Its 
attitude towards the Kemalist revolution in Turkey was rather ambivalent. On the one hand, 
the newspaper praised the founders of modern Turkey in official holidays, but it also 
abstained from referring to the Turkish Cypriots‟ need to adopt the Kemalist reforms. Support 
for the Evkâf administration was strong, but there is no evidence that links the newspaper to 
the Evkâf or to Mehmet Münir. After Hakikat ceased its publication in 1933, the Evkâfçılar 
were left without any newspaper to promote their policies.  
Emigration to Turkey and the attitude of the press 
 The issue of Turkish Cypriot emigration to Turkey in the 1920s is a quite interesting 
topic in Cypriot history. According to Article 21 of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkish nationals 
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residing on the island on 5 November 1914 would acquire British nationality. They were 
given, however, “the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming 
into force of the present treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after 
having so opted”.222 Republican Turkey was eager to welcome Turkish populations from the 
Balkans and elsewhere in order to boost the economy in underpopulated areas.223 The Turkish 
government opened a consulate in Larnaca in 1925 in order to facilitate migration to 
Turkey.224 The first Turkish consul, Asaf Bey, seems to have encouraged the Turkish Cypriots 
to migrate by advertising the opportunities that were awaiting them in Turkey.225 For Turkish 
Cypriots, migration could offer a way out of poverty, although the risks attached were not 
negligible. The Colonial Government, on the other hand, could not pose obstacles to those 
who decided to migrate, even though the exodus of a large number of Turkish Cypriots could 
have weakened its position towards Greek Cypriot arguments for Enosis.  
Turkish Cypriot emigration to Turkey started in 1924 and continued after the period 
provided by the Lausanne Treaty. The Turkish government had reserved areas in southern 
Anatolia that could accommodate about 20,000 Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, Turkish 
Cypriots could also settle in big cities such as in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir or Bursa.226 The main 
reasons that drove the Turkish Cypriots to migrate are the following: the wish for a more 
secure and stable life in Turkey; the thought that they could provide a better future for their 
children; the scarcity of arable land and the frequent droughts in Cyprus; feelings of devotion 
to Turkey; the desire to free themselves from Greek Cypriot domination on an economic 
level; the lack of Turkish higher education institutions in Cyprus; and the wish of the younger 
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generation to receive higher education in Turkey.227 According to an article published in Söz 
in 1926, the Turkish Cypriot population could be divided into the following social groups: 
land and property owners, government officials, self-employed, craft workers, tradespeople 
and workers.228 It was the self-employed, craft workers, tradespeople and workers who were 
facing the greatest hardship. Hence, they were the ones who were most likely to choose 
migration as an option.  
In a letter addressed to the Turkish prime minister, İsmet İnönü, the headmaster of the 
secondary school of the village of Kaleburnu on the Karpas peninsula, Ahmet Celal, 
requested that the Turkish government allocated land to those Turkish Cypriots who wished 
to settle in Turkey. The author expressed the fear that, if the Turkish Cypriots remained in 
Cyprus, their Turkishness would gradually be lost and they would not have access to Turkish 
schools and Turkish culture. 229  
The Turkish Cypriot press and elite were not unanimously in favour of the prospect of 
migration to Turkey. Legislative Council member Musa İrfan bey criticized those Turkish 
Cypriots who opted to migrate by implying that they were “led to believe that they would live 
in a fool‟s paradise in Asia Minor”.230 The weekly Birlik published an article in August 1926, 
when the time-limit for emigration to Turkey was about to expire. In it, the publisher, Ahmet 
Cevdet, maintained that Turkish Cypriot immigration to Turkey was not in Turkey‟s interest. 
“The Turks, by remaining on the island, by increasing in numbers, by acquiring property 
through hard work, can be of benefit to Turkey. If the island remains in the hands of the 
Greeks, this means that one day the island will belong to Greece. […] We cannot see any 
reason that leads the Muslims that live here to migrate. What benefit can come of this? […] 
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By migrating without reason, they ruin their families, their property and their health”.231 The 
pro-Kemalist Söz, on the other hand, encouraged Turkish Cypriots to migrate to Turkey. In an 
article published in 1926, the newspaper expressed its gratitude to the Turkish Consul, Asaf 
Bey, for facilitating Turkish Cypriot migration to Turkey.232 On another occasion, though, the 
newspaper emphasized the need for the Turkish Cypriots who chose to remain on the island to 
unite and organize.233 During the period provided by the Treaty (1924-1926), 9,130 travel 
documents were issued to Turkish Cypriots, but it is estimated that only about 2,500-3,000 
persons used the right to migrate.234  Many of those who opted to migrate and obtained 
Turkish passports did not make use of their right within twelve months, as the Lausanne 
Treaty allowed, and were pressured to abandon the island by the colonial government.235 The 
reason for this was that these persons had acquired Turkish passports and, by not abandoning 
the island, the issue of their nationality arose. The colonial government claimed that these 
persons had lost their Turkish nationality. The issue was complicated due to a 
misunderstanding that arose from the misinterpretation of the Lausanne Treaty on behalf of 
the Colonial Government. After consulting with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the 
government issued a statement whereby those Turkish Cypriots who had opted for Turkish 
nationality but had not moved to Turkey within the period provided by the Treaty of 
Lausanne had not lost their Turkish nationality. This resulted in another issue for the 
government: the approximately 6,000 Turkish Cypriots with Turkish nationality who had not 
migrated to Turkey could constitute a community of Turkish nationals in Cyprus.236 The 
government was faced with the dilemma of asking these Turkish Cypriots to migrate or 
allowing them to remain in Cyprus. The difficulties that the Turkish Cypriots faced in Turkey 
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led many of those who had migrated to return to Cyprus and explains the reluctance of those 
who had opted for Turkish nationality to migrate.  
Migration to Turkey continued in smaller numbers after 1926 with or without legal 
documents. In 1934, 142 Turkish Cypriots from the area of Karpass emigrated to Turkey, 
while there were reports that Turkish Cypriots from three villages in Famagusta district had 
applied to the Turkish Consulate for visas in order to immigrate to Turkey.237 Concerned by 
this wave of Turkish Cypriot migration, the government decided to impose a £10 passport fee, 
hoping in this way to dissuade the Turkish Cypriots who wished to migrate.238 As Turkish 
emigration to Turkey continued, albeit in smaller numbers, the issue continued to divide the 
community. For example, in an article by Judge Mehmet Zekâ, we learn that, in 1937, some 
Turkish Cypriots attempted to migrate to Turkey illegally by boat. Zekâ was against 
emigration, but maintained that the conditions of living for the Turkish Cypriots had become 
so difficult that he could not blame the Turkish Cypriots who decided to seek a better future 
in Turkey.239 Mehmet Remzi reacted to Mehmet Zekâ‟s encouraging of emigration with the 
following words: “Emigration to Anatolia must be the last action and the last movement to 
salvation”.240  The author, however, admitted that he had encouraged through his articles 
“those who were in distress to migrate to Turkey and had published long articles in this 
connection”. I argue that this constitutes a quite controversial behaviour. The period that the 
author refers to is 1924-1926. At a time when the Turkish Cypriots made up approximately 
19% of the total population, that is about 64,000,241 encouraging the emigration of members 
of the community could only cause the weakening of the community‟s position vis-à-vis the 
Greek Cypriots and the colonial government. How, then, can one justify Remzi Okan‟s 
attitude? This controversy can be attributed to the enthusiasm that was caused by Turkish 
nationalism. Remzi Okan was, as we have seen, an ardent Kemalist and Turkish nationalist 
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and he considered it his task to support the “motherland” at all costs, although that was 
harmful to the interests of his native community. We can also assume that Remzi Okan was 
worried about the conditions that the Turkish Cypriots were facing and considered emigration 
to Turkey their only way out of the difficulties and economic hardship.  
Hakikat, contrary to Söz, did not support the emigration of Turkish Cypriots to 
Turkey. When the issue came up again in the agenda, the newspaper published an article 
accusing lawyer Fadil Niyazi (Korkut) of encouraging emigration:  
This question was raised five years ago, but the leaders at that time 
were neither the Masum Millet nor Fadıl Niyazi bey. The Söz and a few 
persons supporting it were encouraging this idea, and many persons were 
persuaded to emigrate. In consequence of this encouragement, hundreds of 
men, women and children emigrated, selling their properties at ridiculous 
prices, and as they were not prepared and equipped for emigration most of 
them were ruined. But, those who described emigration as the Door of 
Happiness, the Editor of Söz and his friends, did not move from their 
places. They kept back, strengthened their position by obtaining British 
Nationality and […]feasted on the corpses of the men they ruined.  
And now Fadıl Niyazi bey began to lay open this old wound. I‟m 
not going to reply to his open letter to His Excellency the Acting Governor. 
He is at liberty to submit his thoughts and ideas to the Government, but it is 
tragic to see him saying: “You will either accept these, or we shall 
emigrate”. First of all, what does the Government care if we do emigrate? 
Why should the Government be afraid of our emigration and admit the 
claims put forward, simply because of this threat? Secondly, supposing the 
Government rejected those claims and Fadıl Niyazi Bey gave the command 
of Emigration, how many persons will obey to that command? Thirdly, 
assuming that some persons obeyed to it, is he not going to see them off 
and remain in Cyprus as a British Subject just like the former 
propagandists? But above all, he must know that this Community will 
never follow this ill advice. The Moslem people of Cyprus will never go 
away leaving behind under the feet the sacred tomb of Umm Haram, the 
Prophet‟s aunt, and will never give an opportunity to others to put bells on 
St. Sophia and other mosques. This is the destination of the policy followed 
by Fadıl Bey and his colleagues. But, the Moslem Community is not of the 
same opinion and it has always been understood that this is not desired 
even by Turkey.242  
 
 Hakikat portrays the Evkâfçılar as a responsible and sensible power while accusing 
the opposition of irresponsible actions. The issue of emigration is indeed indicative of the 
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contradictions of the nationalist party. Earlier in this chapter, we saw how Söz and Remzi 
Okan accused Mehmet Zekâ of supporting emigration to Turkey, when it was the newspaper 
that encouraged Turkish Cypriots to emigrate in the mid-1920s. In this article, Hakikat 
accused the nationalists of encouraging emigration without warning the people of the dangers 
they were going to face. The article proceeds with a serious accusation that those who 
encouraged emigration may have benefited at the expense of the emigrants. Finally, the article 
concludes with the most crucial argument against emigration – that it could eliminate the 
Turkish Cypriot presence on the island. And in order to emphasise its concern, the article 
refers to the tomb of Umm Haram, the most sacred Muslim place in Cyprus. Reference to the 
religious sentiment of the Turkish Cypriots was frequent in Hakikat‟s articles, which is a 
point that differentiates it from Söz. 
 
  
 
Conclusions 
 The beginning of British rule in Cyprus facilitated the flourishing of the press. The 
first to appear were the Greek Cypriot newspapers that promoted the claim of Enosis with 
Greece. The Turkish Cypriot press attempted to answer these claims, but at the same time 
provided an opportunity for the Young Turks who had fled from Istanbul to criticize the 
Ottoman government.  
The Turkish war for independence and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey were 
crucial for the national awakening of the Turkish Cypriot community. This chapter has 
demonstrated the conditions under which the Turkish Cypriot elite embraced the Kemalist 
reforms. Being one of the three major Turkish Cypriot newspapers in the 1920s, Söz soon 
became the most devoted supporter of Kemalist ideology among the Turkish Cypriots. 
Presenting the issues that impeded the modernization of the Turkish Cypriot community, Söz 
tried to emphasize the issues that were holding back the Turkish Cypriot community and 
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attempted to boost the morale of the Turkish Cypriots, in order to be able to counterbalance 
the Greek Cypriots‟ numerical and economic advantage. At the same time, the newspaper 
promoted the Kemalist reforms and answered, often harshly, the opponents of the Kemalist 
movement. Towards the end of the 1920s, the newspaper fully supported the nationalist 
political movement. On the other hand, Remzi Okan‟s enthusiasm for Turkish nationalism 
was at times harmful for his community, as the case of Turkish Cypriot migration to Turkey 
proved.  
 Hakikat, on the other hand, was the official organ of the Evkâfçılar. It followed a pro-
government line, supporting the Evkâf administration and the British policy of centralization 
of Muslim institutions. Unlike Söz, it did not promote the Kemalist cause, and at times it was 
against the secularization process. The newspaper adopted a more moderate stance with 
regard to its opponents and insisted on cooperation with the government, no matter what the 
cost for the community. Its support of the government‟s policy on the religious institutions 
was contradictory, given that the dependency of the Evkâf or the Mufti on a non-Muslim 
government was against Islamic religious practice.  
 In the period that followed the October 1931 disturbances, the Turkish Cypriot press 
continued its work, but the censorship laws that were applied by the colonial government 
limited the opportunities of newspapers like Söz to publish anti-government and pro-Turkish 
articles. Hakikat was published until 1933, while Söz continued until Remzi Okan‟s death in 
1942. His daughter attempted to continue with the publication of the newspaper in 1943, but 
their endeavors lasted only until 1946.243 Söz‟s services to the nationalist movement were 
significant. In the 21 years since it had first been published, Söz had systematically 
propagated the ideals of Turkish nationalism. In the 1940s, conditions were ripe for the 
nationalists to compete with the Greek Cypriots.  
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CHAPTER 4 -  MEHMET MÜNİR AND NECATİ ÖZKAN: THE EVKÂFÇI AGAINST 
THE KEMALIST 
 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, three principal factors shaped Turkish Cypriot 
identity under British rule: first, the ideological debates in the Ottoman public sphere, namely 
the conflict between Ottomanism and pan-Islamism; second, the late emergence of Turkish 
nationalism as a result of these debates; and, third, Greek Cypriot irredentism and the fear for 
the survival of the community due to the Cretan precedent. These three factors had an impact 
on the evolution of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. With the arrival of the British in 1878, the 
Turkish Cypriots not only lost the status of the ruling element. They were limited to the status 
of a minority, administered by a Christian power. The Legislative Council was a first step 
towards a representative government, but it played a rather minimal part in Cypriot politics, 
since all of the decisions were approved by the government. Until 1930, none of the Turkish 
Cypriot members of the Council managed to rise to the position of a community leader. 
Contrastingly, the Archbishop, as head of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, and various 
members of the Greek Cypriot elite competed for the role of the unofficial leader of the Greek 
Cypriot community. What, then, were the reasons for the lack of leadership among the 
Turkish Cypriots? According to Keyder, already from the second half of the 19th Century, a 
state bureaucracy came into being that expanded significantly with the foundation of new 
government departments. 244  In Cyprus, this state bureaucracy was staffed primarily by 
Turkish Cypriots. With the arrival of the British, they were incorporated into the colonial 
government. Traditionally, it was the Ottoman army that gave access to public offices, but it 
was now the British who were in charge of the military. The bureaucratic middle class that 
had emerged in Cyprus, too, failed to affect local politics.245  
 As far as the religious elite is concerned, unlike the Orthodox Church, which had 
played a pivotal role in Greek Cypriot social and political affairs, the nature of the respective 
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Islamic institutions, namely the Mufti, the Kadı and the delegate of the Evkâf was strictly 
religious. In other words, the Islamic institutions could not interfere in politics and their heads 
could not undertake political roles. Finally, the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were the leading 
element during Ottoman times secured the community‟s access to government jobs but 
limited its interest in commerce. Consequently, the Turkish Cypriots lacked a wealthy 
entrepreneurial elite that could engage in politics without any dependency on the government. 
In fact, employment in the colonial administration, according to Rappas, was “an enviable 
position in a society of indebted smallholding peasant proprietors as it opened prospects of 
financial autonomy”.246 In comparison to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots had much 
better relations with the colonial government for another reason: the fear of Enosis. The 
continuation of British rule was thus in the interests of the community.  
 With the end of Ottoman rule, Cyprus practically ceased being part of the Empire. In 
the Young Turk era, Cyprus did host various members of the Young Turk movement, but 
most of them did not remain in Cyprus after the Young Turk revolution in order to take up 
political roles. The outbreak of the First World War, and the restrictions that were imposed on 
the Turkish Cypriots because of the Empire‟s involvement in the war against Britain, hindered 
the emergence of a Turkish Cypriot leadership. The gradual centralization of the Turkish 
Cypriot religious institutions extended the dependence of the community on the government. 
The British, on the other hand, favoured the centralization of Muslim institutions and their 
administration by Turkish Cypriot notables who were, in essence, public servants. The most 
important of these posts was that of the Evkâf delegate who was charged with the 
administration of the community‟s religious endowments. These included real estate, property 
that constituted the community‟s wealth and the source of funding for schools and welfare 
institutions. In short, those who controlled the Evkâf also controlled the community. The 
Evkâf was administered by a Turkish Cypriot and a British delegate, appointed by the 
government. This essentially meant that the government was in control of the Turkish Cypriot 
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community. In the second half of the 1920s, the colonial government subjugated the Sheri 
Courts and the office of the Mufti to the Evkâf office. Münir Bey was the personality the 
government chose for the position of the administrative leader of the Turkish Cypriots. In the 
second half of the 1920s, Mısırlızade Necati Özkan attempted to challenge Münir Bey‟s 
domination and demand that the government secured the community‟s independence. 
Mehmet Münir Bey and Necati Özkan were the two main protagonists in the struggle for 
power between the old guard and the new. The leading role of the traditional Turkish Cypriot 
political elite was threatened by the emergence of Necati Özkan. The political bloc he led was 
named Halkçılar (populists) and they hoped to challenge the policies of the government 
towards the Turkish Cypriot community. Meanwhile, their opponents, the Evkâfçılar – named 
after their decision to comply with the Colonial Government‟s policy to centralise the 
administration of the Evkâf – chose to cooperate closely with the Government and abstained 
from criticizing the latter‟s policies on any matters that affected the community. This chapter 
aims to examine the leaders of the two political parties, Necati Özkan and Mehmet Münir, in 
order to demonstrate their roles as leading figures in the conflict that would gradually shape 
the identity of the Turkish Cypriot community.  
 
 
 
 
Mehmet Münir Bey: The Traditional Leader of a Changing Community 
 
 Mehmet Münir Bey was not only the head of the Evkâfçılar. He was the also longest 
serving Delegate of the Evkâf (1928-1947), a member of the Legislative Council from 1925 to 
1930 and the holder of various other positions in Turkish Cypriot institutions. Yet Turkish 
Cypriot historiography has shown little interest in Münir Bey. 
 Born in 1890 in Nicosia, he was the nephew of Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi, the Mufti of 
Cyprus until 1927, whose daughter he later married. He graduated from the English School of 
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Nicosia and then studied law in London. He worked at the Treasury Department of the 
Colonial Government and served as temporary Judge of the District Court of Kyreneia.247 His 
appointment as Delegate of the Evkâf in 1925 was definitely the most influential for his 
career. In a letter signed by Ahmet Said, lawyer and adversary of Mehmet Münir, to Lord 
Passfıeld, Secretary of State for the Colonies, we learn that Mehmet Münir occupied the 
following offices: Member of the Executive Council, ex-officio member of the Central Board 
of Education, President of the Town Committee for Secondary Education, ex-officio member 
of the Central Administrative Council (Meclis-i İdare), member of the Museum Committee, 
member of the Public Loans Commissioners, member of the Board of Irrigation, member of 
the Cyprus Social Hygiene Council, member of the British Empire Leprosy Relief 
Association and head of the Muslim Religious Tribunal (Mahkeme-i Şeri).248 In 1931, he was 
named Officer of the British Empire and in 1947 he was given the title of Sir.249 
 Such an over-concentration of power was an indication that the Colonial Government 
had bestowed a great amount of trust in Münir Bey. Even after the first wave of complaints 
about Münir and his excessive powers, the Colonial Government chose not to limit his powers 
nor to attempt to build bridges with the Kemalist bloc. Münir‟s position in the community 
easily won him a seat in the Legislative Council in the 1925 elections. According to Gazioğlu, 
“no other Turk before or after him until the end of colonial rule undertook such extensive 
power and responsibilities, won the trust of the English administration and served the colonial 
administration with such loyalty”.250  
 In order to understand Mehmet Münir's position and role in the Turkish Cypriot 
community, it‟s necessary to examine the nature of the Turkish Cypriot community, its 
economic institutions and its main sources of wealth. Following the Ottoman system of 
Religious Endowments, Cyprus‟ agricultural lands were administered to a great extent by 
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these Endowments (Evkâf). The Muslim Religious Endowments can be divided into three 
main categories, in accordance with their nature and administrative method: the regular ones 
(mazbut), which were directly administered by the Evkâf Administration; and the dependent 
ones (mülhak), which each belonged to a particular family and could be transferred from one 
family member to another. The intervention of an administrator from the Evkâf 
Administration was not very common. Finally, there were exceptional ones (müstesna), which 
were administered by a trustee. When the Britain undertook the administration of the island in 
1878, a British bureaucrat was appointed to the Evkâf together with the Delegate of the Evkâf, 
an Ottoman subject who was appointed by Istanbul. In 1914, Cyprus was officially annexed to 
Britain. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the annexation of the island to Britain in 
1914 meant that the position of the Delegate of the Evkâf became a state institution. The 
appointment of Mehmet Münir Bey as Delegate of the Evkâf and the government‟s decision to 
strengthen its control over Muslim Religious Endowments further intensified the dependency 
of the community on the colonial government. The Delegate of the Evkâf could thus use his 
position in order to build and support a clientelistic network that could secure him the 
necessary votes in the elections of the Legislative Council.251 
 In a similar way, through the control of the Evkâf property all around the island, 
Mehmet Münir managed to extend his patronage to farmers and small craftsmen alike. This 
network was even extended to the wealthy notables, since Mehmet Münir could also 
somewhat control the public administration, namely the appointment of trustees or other 
public servants. Through his control of Evkâf property and commodities, the elite was also 
dependent on Mehmet Münir.252 
 Mehmet Münir rose to power in a transitional time for the Turkish Cypriot 
community, at a time when the community was moving from tradition to modernity. He 
cannot be described as a politician. He was rather a notable, who owed his power not the 
popular vote but to the government who had appointed him to the posistion of the Delegate of 
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the Evkâf. There are no indications that he launched an electoral campaign for the 1925 or the 
1930 elections. As we have seen, the clientelist network he created with the help of the Evkâf 
was enough to secure him a seat in the Council. He did not even feel the need to publish 
articles in the pro-government press. Mehmet Münir acted more like an Ottoman vizier. He 
did not feel the need to address the community, because his powers emanated from the 
colonial government. Because of the lack of sources on Münir Bey, we can only approach his 
personality through his correspondence with the colonial government and the comments of 
British officials. In 1930, the issue of Münir Bey‟s multiple positions in political and 
communal institutions was raised by lawyer Ahmet Said.253 He claimed that his offices were 
political and, as Delegate of the Evkâf, he should “stand above all politics, confining himself 
to the discharge of his official duties alone, carrying them out with justice and impartiality”. 
The issue was discussed in the Colonial Office in London and one official, Arthur Dawe, 
justified Münir Bey‟s multiple positions in the following way:  
  
With respect to the general question of Munir‟s multiple 
appointments, there is, I think some force in the criticism that one man 
ought not to be allowed to combine so many functions. The practical 
difficulty is, however, that the Cypriot Turks are not a very bright lot, 
and when a Turk has to be appointed to a Council or Committee the 
choice naturally falls upon Munir as he is the only one among them 
who carries the necessary guns. The occasions for making such 
appointments are numerous in Cyprus as Cypriot representation is 
always on a communal basis. The field for Greek committee men is 
extensive; but for the Turks it is practically confined to Münir.254  
 
 The colonial government undoubtedly believed in Münir Bey‟s skills but, more than 
that, in his loyalty. With the help of Münir Bey, the good relations between the Turkish 
Cypriot community and the Colonial Government were preserved until the late 1920s, though 
it was also due to an increasingly worrisome factor for the Turkish Cypriots – Greek Cypriot 
intransigence in the demand for Enosis. In light of this danger, the Turkish Cypriots‟ obvious 
choice was to ally with the Colonial Government. The price for this loyalty was a gradually 
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tighter control over Turkish Cypriot institutions that, combined with the dire economic 
conditions of the late 1920s, led to Mehmet Münir‟s defeat in the 1930 elections for the 
Legislative Council. The balance of power towards the end of the 1920s had changed. 
Kemalist ideas had gradually become popular among the Turkish Cypriots and the association 
of Mehmet Münir with the Government, as well as his role in the centralization of the Evkâf, 
was a source of grievance.  
 Although he was the most powerful Turkish Cypriot personality, Mehmet Münir 
apparently had limited contacts with Turkey and the Kemalist government. For this reason, 
we cannot be sure of his opinion on Republican Turkey. It is worth mentioning here that 
although Münir kept an undoubtedly pro-British stance, he was at times accused by anti-
Turkey persons, such as Said Molla, of acting in favour of Turkey.255 There were, of course, 
many Turkish Cypriots who opposed the Kemalist reforms for religious reasons but for Münir 
Bey, I believe, the reason was more practical. Münir Bey‟s power lay in the combination of 
politics and religion. He knew that the secularist reforms were a threat to his powers and 
therefore he tried to limit the influence of the Kemalist ideas in Cyprus. This explains, for 
example, his refusal to grant permission to fly the Turkish flag on the minaret of the Mosque 
of Larnaca on the 29th of October 1930, the anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The 
explanation given by the Delegates of the Evkâf was that “the Mosques are religious buildings 
[and] could not participate in political demonstrations”.256 Mehmet Münir gradually distanced 
himself from the nationalist Turkish Cypriots and refused to acknowledge the rising 
popularity of Kemalist ideology among the younger generation. He seems to have influenced 
the colonial government as well, because neither Governor Storrs nor other government 
officials attempted to approach the Kemalist forces and instead remained loyal to Mehmet 
Münir.  
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 The defeat in the Legislative Council elections did not affect his status as head of the 
community. He was not removed from most of the offices he held until 1948. Nevertheless, 
Mehmet Münir was considered, by most Turkish Cypriots, not a leader but a servant of the 
Colonial Government. For this reason, Turkish Cypriot historiography has treated Mehmet 
Münir as alien to Turkish Cypriot interests.  
 
Defying the old guard: Mısırlızade Necati Özkan, leader of the Turkish Cypriot 
Kemalists 
  
The 1920s witnessed the emergence of a new political elite among the Turkish Cypriots. The 
most prominent member of a group of young intellectuals and professionals who questioned 
the Turkish Cypriot community‟s close association with the British government of Cyprus 
was Mısırlızade Necati Özkan. He was born to a family of merchants in 1899 as Mehmet 
Hulusi. The surname Özkan (true-blooded) would be given to him later, by Kemal Atatürk 
during a visit to Ankara.257 His great grandfather, Halil Ağa, had worked in Egypt at the Suez 
canal, which earned him the name Mısırlızade (the Egyptian‟s son). After returning from 
Egypt, he worked as a merchant and importer of raw materials. His grandfather, Hacı Osman 
Ağa, was a shoe-maker while his father, Ahmet Mısırlızade, worked at the Land Registry 
office in Nicosia, but soon resigned and took over the family shop. Later on, he built a career 
in the construction sector. In 1924, when Necati Özkan was twenty five years old, his father 
unsuccessfully attempted to place his candidacy for the elections of the Legislative Council, 
which would take place the following year against the then Delegate of the Evkâf, Musa İrfan 
Bey. Another family member, Necati Özkan‟s father‟s son-in-law Bahaeddin Bey, was also a 
candidate against Mehmet Münir Bey. 258  Due to his family‟s political views and their 
                                                          
257Ergin M. Birinci, M. Necati Özkan (1899-1970) I. Cilt, (Istanbul: Necati Özkan Vakfı Yayınları, 
2001), pp. 224-5. Necati proudly commented that he was the first and only Turkish Cypriot politician 
to meet with Kemal Atatürk.  
258SA1:679/1925 
104 
 
involvement in politics against the Evkâfçılar, Necati Özkan was introduced to politics 
already from a young age. 
 According to his memoirs, Necati Özkan was arrested together with some of his 
fellow students at the age of 15, during the school year of 1914-1915, at the outbreak of the 
First World War, for singing the Ottoman imperial anthem. After graduating from the Turkish 
Lycée in 1918, he started preparing for the Istanbul University Law School exams. The 
British colonial government, though, imposed obstacles to the movement of Turkish Cypriots 
to the Ottoman Empire, due to the latter‟s involvement with the Central Powers in the First 
World War. As a result, Necati Özkan gave up his plans to study law and instead started a 
teaching career at the Turkish Lycée of Nicosia. He taught Turkish, Geography and History 
for three years and some future Turkish Cypriot leaders were among his students, such as Dr 
Fazil Küçük, who was vice-president to Archbishop Makarios after Cyprus gained its 
iindependence in 1960, and Mehmet Zekâ, who was a member of the Legislative Council and 
a judge. 
 Necati Özkan‟s political career begins with the leadership of the National Front party 
(Millî Cephe Partisi). Although the Legislative Council, the island‟s only representative body, 
did not provide for the elections of political parties rather than individual candidates from 
both communities, the National Front can be considered as the first attempt among the 
Turkish Cypriot pro-Kemalist intellectuals to stand against the Delegate of the Evkâf and “de 
facto” Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Münir. Necati Özkan was elected member of the 
Municipal Council of Nicosia in 1926.259 As his popularity rose, he gathered around him a 
group of professionals, lawyers and merchants who shared the Kemalist ideals. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
259Birinci, M. Necati Özkan, p. 116; nevertheless according to other sources Necati Özkan may have 
been elected to that post in 1929; see Altay Nevzat, Nationalism among the Turks of Cyprus: The first 
Wave, unpublished doctoral Thesis, (Oulu, University of Oulu, 2005p. 360; According to his own 
words Necati Özkan was elected member of the Municipal Council in 1926. 
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 This success paved the way for the next electoral victory, this time at the elections for 
the Legislative Council. The 1930 elections were the culmination of the battle of the halkçı 
party against the Evkâfçı, the party led by Münir Bey. The decision to run as a candidate in 
the electoral district of Nicosia-Keryneia against Münir Bey, who was defending his seat in 
the Council, was to be expected given Necati Özkan‟s background, but most importantly the 
increase of the Kemalist bloc‟s influence in the Turkish Cypriot community. Having already 
gained experience from his election in the Nicosia Municipal Council, and with the support of 
the family network, Necati Özkan could also count on the support of the biggest-selling 
Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Söz. He announced his candidacy in the following words: 
 
I have taken the decision and I will put up my candidacy for the 
Legislative Council. If you want to serve the fatherland and the nation 
elect me. Whenever you want, whatever your problem is, come and see 
me. Whereas, if you go to Mister Münir, who sits behind closed doors, he 
shall not accept you. Because this person who is not only an Evkâf 
Delegate but also a member of the Lyceum Committee and a member of 
the Legislative Council, is actually serving the interests of the English as 
well as his own. At this point Turkish Cypriots are in need of 
representatives who will support the rights of the Turks. That‟s why I‟m a 
candidate for the Legislative Council. I shall stand wherever I see the 
nation‟s benefit.260  
  
The elections that took place on October 15, 1930 gave Necati Özkan the opportunity 
to reaffirm his leading position among the nationalist bloc. The elections took place at a point 
when Kemalist ideas had an increasing appeal to the younger generation of Turkish Cypriots. 
What fueled Necati Özkan‟s electoral victory, however, was the frustration caused by the 
increasing control of the Turkish Cypriot institutions by Mehmet Münir, whose pro- English 
stance could not serve Turkish Cypriot interests any longer. The centralization of the Evkâf 
and the other Muslim institutions was presented as necessary in order to fight corruption and 
secure their prudent administration in favour of the community. Instead, the Turkish Cypriots 
felt that they had been cut off from their institutions. More importantly, however, the Turkish 
Cypriot population, which consisted primarily of farmers and craft workers, suffered not only 
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from the dire economic conditions due to the Great Depression and the drought that affected 
Cyprus in the late 1920s. Mehmet Münir‟s control of the Turkish Cypriot religious institutions 
helped him create a successful corporatist network, through which he could control the 
populace and maintain a group of voters numerous enough to secure his election to the 
Legislative Council in 1925.261 The dire economic conditions towards the end of the 1920s led 
to Turkish Cypriot farmers and craft workers‟ dependence on either Mehmet Münir or Greek 
Cypriot usurers. The economy helped Necati Özkan overturn Mehmet Münir‟s influence and 
win the election. 
 Necati Özkan won the Nicosia-Kyreneia Legislative Council seat with 1,993 votes 
against 1,553 for Mehmet Münir. Ιn a speech that he made in front of the Kardeş Ocağı262 
after his victory, he said the following: 
  
Friends, it's not my victory, it's the nation's victory; it's yours, friends. 
You worked, you tried and you won. I congratulate you. I undertook this 
task immediately in order to serve my nation. Nevertheless, I'm not only a 
representative of the people who voted for me, I'm also a representative 
of those who voted against me and my opponent's, Mr. Münir's. They 
should not hesitate. We are inseparable. Let them come, we should unite 
under the same principles. Let's continue the national struggle all 
together. Everyone should direct their appeals to me. It's my duty to 
fulfill them. I will do everything for the sake of my nation and my 
fatherland.263 
  
 It‟s obvious though from this speech that Mısırlızade Necati‟s aim was for Mehmet 
Münir‟s powers to become the question. His appeal for unity was directed at his political 
opponents, who had seen their power and influence decline. 
 Soon after his election, Mısırlı Necati used his capacity as member of the Legislative 
Council to overturn the Colonial Government‟s policies with regard to all issues affecting the 
Turkish Cypriot population: thegovernment control over the Religious Endowments (Evkâf), 
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the Religious Courts (Mahkeme-i Şeri), the abolition of the post of the Müftü and government 
control over Turkish schools. Due to Münir Bey‟s role as Delegate of the Evkâf and member 
of the School Committee, and also the reluctance of the Colonial Government to grant any 
autonomy to the Turkish Cypriot institutions, Necati‟s endeavors were not very successful. 
During the short period of time between his election in October 1930 and the abolition of the 
Legislative Council in November 1931, after the Greek Cypriot anti-Government riots, Necati 
Özkan engaged in various debates with Government officials, not only in Council sessions but 
also in the meetings of the School committees.  
 Strengthened by his electoral victory, Necati Özkan proceeded to his next political 
endeavor. On May 1, 1931, he called, at his own house in Nicosia, a National Congress with 
the participation of representatives from all over Cyprus. Söz newspaper published the call for 
participation in the congress on 20 April, 1931. The congress discussed the main issues 
affecting the community and elected a Mufti. The congress and its results were not taken into 
consideration by the government and the elected Mufti was not recognized. 
  To the esteemed Turkish Cypriot people. 
  Dear fellow citizens; 
There is no need to deny that we're living very fragile and 
extraordinary times. Today there are a lot of urgent issues that are at 
stake and that severely concern our community. The time has come 
long ago to settle these issues in respect to the desires and the needs of 
the people and to inform the government of our wishes. In this matter 
justice means to comply with the performance of our national 
interests. Our poor people will be affected by the great damage that 
will occur as a consequence. For this reason it's our national duty to 
search for ways that will procure a line of action taking care of our 
national issues and needs in accordance to the rules of our religion and 
to protect our rights arising from our everyday businesses. I strongly 
believe that no one should flee from the patriotic cause. I'm sure that 
our esteemed people shall demonstrate once again the vigilance they 
have always shown in regard to the national cause. For this reason it is 
apparent that the people shall demonstrate the highest degree of 
sensitivity in issues that affect their existence. 
The representatives who shall be elected for every village and 
neighborhood shall meet in my house on the fourth Friday of the 
Kurban Bayramı at ten o clock; I ask that our esteemed people take 
their participation in the congress seriously and I expect that they will 
undergo any sacrifice and demonstrate patriotism and nationalism [...] 
. 
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 The National Congress shall be discussed in detail in chapter 6. Here, I only refer to 
the decisions taken by the congress. The central committee of the congress consisted of 
prominent Kemalists and Mısırlızade Necati‟s allies. The Congress reaffirmed the Kemalist 
bloc‟s stance on the issues affecting the community and elected Ahmet Sait Efendi, a lawyer, 
to the position of the Mufti. As expected, the Colonial Government did not grant the National 
Congress any legitimacy and did not recognize the elected Mufti. 
 Mısırlızade Necati‟s election and his political activities were a cause of grievance for 
the colonial administration. The biggest threat to the stability of the colonial government was 
the disruption of the balance of power in the Legislative Council. Until 1931, the Colonial 
Government was able to block the frequent appeals of the Greek Cypriot members by using 
the votes of the Turkish Cypriot members. When Mısırlızade Necati voted with his Greek 
Cypriot colleagues in order to turn down a customs bill, the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Ronald 
Storrs, had to intervene and impose the bill by an Order-in-Council. For his temporary 
alliance with the Greek Cypriots, Necati Özkan was portrayed as “the little Turk” or the 
“thirteenth Greek”. Governor Storrs could not hide his irritation regarding Necati Özkan, 
calling him “a man of straw”, who in effect possessed “the casting vote of the Legislative 
Council”.264 
 The October riots that led to the abolition of the Legislative council put an end to 
Mısırlızade Necati‟s political career.265 The repressive measures imposed by the Colonial 
Government after October 1931 did not allow much space for political activity. Like their 
Greek Cypriot counterparts, Turkish Cypriot intellectuals however continued with the 
diffusion of Turkish nationalism and the implementation of the Kemalist reforms.  
 Necati Özkan belonged to a generation of Turkish Cypriots that had received 
schooling during the Young Turk era and the First World War. He witnessed the frustration 
caused by the disintegration of the Empire and was introduced to the ideas of Turkish 
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nationalism at a time when it had become clear that this was the only way to secure a 
homeland for Turkish communities. He embraced Turkish nationalism as it was advocated by 
the Kemalist regime and demanded that the Kemalist Reforms be implemented in Cyprus. His 
approach to the issue of the fez is indicative of his decisiveness to impose the reforms when 
there was no alternative. For example, during the annual congress of the Turkish Teachers 
Association on July 1, 1931, Necati took the floor, after a teacher named Raşit Bey had 
spoken out against the use of the fez and “with his pocket knife cut his fez into shreds”.266 
 The loyalty to the Colonial Government that had safeguarded Turkish Cypriot 
interests seemed problematic, especially when seen in light of Turkish nationalism. For 
Turkish nationalists, the enlightenment of their compatriots was regarded as a task for the 
nation. Therefore, Mısırlızade Necati considered the Evkâfçılar to be enemies of their own 
community. Hence, he dedicated all his efforts to putting an end to their rule over the 
community. By doing that, Necati Özkan and his supporters sought the opportunity to rule the 
Turkish Cypriots according to Kemalist principles, and also take control of the community‟s 
wealth. In their attempt to consolidate their power, the nationalists used the Muslim 
institutions in a way that was contradictory to the Kemalist secular reforms. The abolition of 
the office of the Mufti by the government was in accordance with Kemalist principles. 
Nevertheless, the nationalists demanded that the Mufti be elected by the people. The office of 
the Mufti was thus given a political dimension too, apart from his religious one, in order to 
serve as a spiritual and political leader. It should not be a surprise that the colonial 
government did not recognize the Mufti that was elected by the National Congress.  
 After the abolition of the Legislative Council, Mısırlızade Necati remained politically 
active through the publication of regular articles in Söz and the dispatch of petitions and 
memoranda to the government. We also know that he was frequently in contact with the 
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Turkish government in Ankara.267 He also engaged in business and commerce. His devotion 
to Kemalist ideals can be traced in his business career too. He named his Cigarette Factory 
Altı Ok (Six Arrows) in a tribute to Kemal Atatürk‟s Republican People Party‟s emblem, 
which referred to the six main principles of Kemalist ideology.268 
 
Conclusions 
 
 This chapter has presented the two leading personalities that struggled for power 
among the Turkish Cypriots, Münir Bey and Mısırlızade Necati. Münir Bey was appointed 
Delegate of the Evkâf and, by virtue of this office, occupied almost all important posts in 
communal institutions. In this way, he became the leader of the community even though, as 
Delegate of the Evkâf, he was only a public servant. He owed his power to the colonial 
government and to the clientelist network that he managed to build through control of the 
community‟s finances. Mehmet Münir and his supporters were called evkâfçılar due to their 
support of the government‟s policy of controlling the Evkâf. They used the Greek Cypriot 
movement for Enosis as an excuse to display unconditional loyalty to the colonial 
government. Mehmet Münir‟s opposition to Kemalist ideas cannot be attributed solely to 
ideological reasons. I argue that the evkâfçılar felt threatened by the popularity of Kemalist 
ideas because they challenged the very foundations of their authority, namely the emphasis on 
the religious identity of the Turkish Cypriots and their loyalty to the colonial government. 
Turkish nationalism was seen as secularist and anti-colonial force and, despite their attempts, 
it gradually prevailed in Cyprus too.  
 On the other hand, Necati Özkan was a self-made entrepreneur, who challenged the 
supremacy of the evkâfçılar by running as a candidate against Mehmet Münir in the 1930 
elections for the Legislative Council and winning the seat in the Nicosia -Kyreneia electoral 
district. Necati expressed the opinion that loyalty to the colonial government was harmful for 
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the community, since the latter had curtailed the independence of the Turkish Cypriot 
religious and communal institutions. He accused Mehmet Münir of neglecting the 
community‟s interests and undermining its future. Furthermore, Mısırlızade Necati clashed 
with the government over the issue of the Lycée administration. The 1931 disturbances that 
caused the abolition of the Legislative Council ended Necati‟s political career and denied the 
nationalists the opportunity to oppose the government‟s decisions, since all powers were now 
gathered in the hands of the governor. Nevertheless, Necati Özkan continued publishing 
articles in Söz and criticizing the government. However, autocratic rule was not lifted until the 
end of British rule. Mısırlızade Necati later went into commerce. Although this generation of 
Turkish Cypriot nationalists was denied public office, their efforts were not futile. By the end 
of the 1930s, the Turkish Cypriots had embraced Turkish nationalism and the community had 
been modernized in line with the Kemalist reforms. Therefore, I argue, the debate between the 
Evkâfçılar and the nationalists should not be seen exclusively as a debate between Islamists 
and Kemalists. This division of the Turkish Cypriot elite should also be considered as a quest 
for power and influence.  
 The next generation of Turkish Cypriot statesmen adopted a more radical attitude 
towards both the Greek Cypriots and the colonial government. This is evident not as much in 
Dr Fazil Küçük, who served as vice president in the first Cypriot government after 
independence, but in Rauf Denktaş, who was one of the founders of TMT, the Turkish 
Cypriot Resistance Organization that fought against Enosis in the 1950s. 
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CHAPTER 5 – TURKISH CYPRIOT EDUCATION – THE FIGHT FOR THE LYCÉE  
 Throughout British rule, the issue of education was often at the centre of public 
discourse. At that time, the elites of both communities were fighting for the fulfillment of 
their respective national goals, each of which contradicted the other. The Greek Cypriot 
majority was fighting for Enosis with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriot minority was trying 
to secure its position on the island having lost the support of the Ottoman presence. Hence, 
education was crucial for both communities, in order to prepare future generations for their 
future. While Greek Cypriot education was in a more favourable position due to the support 
of the Greek Kingdom, which provided teachers and material, the Turkish Cypriot schools 
were bound to the Ottoman educational system and thus all its deficiencies –hesitation to 
introduce modern disciplines and difficulties in the funding of schools due to the deteriorating 
finances of the Evkâf. The end of the Empire and the establishment of the Republic were 
milestones for Turkish Cypriot education. The transformation of the community and the 
embracing of Turkish, Kemalist identity became the target of the educational system after 
1918. The emergence of a state entity that replaced the Ottoman State secured the supply of 
teachers and material. More importantly, though, Turkish Cypriot education and more 
specifically the administration of Turkish Cypriot schools became the focal point of the 
dispute between the pro and the anti-British parties. 
 This chapter will attempt to analyze the nature of Turkish Cypriot education 
throughout British rule. In order to do that, I will look at the evolution of education in 
Kemalist Turkey. I will then present the procedure through which education became a 
controversial matter in Turkish Cypriot politics that culminated in the dispute about the 
administration of the Turkish Lycée in Nicosia. 
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Turkish Cypriot Education in the Early Stages of British Rule  
 
 In 1878, the Turkish Cypriot community operated sixty-five primary schools 
(İptidai), one high school (Rüşti) and seven religious schools (Medrese). 269  In 1884, an 
Islamic Council of Education (İslam Maarif Encumeni) was established, with the participation 
of prestigious Turkish Cypriots. This would serve as the representative of the Ottoman 
Ministry of Education.270 According to reports of the colonial government in 1879, there were 
a hundred and forty schools, 76 Christian and 64 Muslim.271 In the last years of Ottoman rule 
and during early British rule, apart from the Quran, apparently no other subject was taught in 
Turkish Cypriot schools. Despite the fact that the colonial administration initially regarded the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot educational systems as one entity, in 1881, the Secretary of State 
approved the creation of separate Educational Councils for the two communities.272  The 
general secretary of the colonial government presided over both councils. The Education Law 
of 1885 confirmed the distinct educational councils. Moreover, the Law provided for 
Provincial Committees (Kaza Komisyonu) and Village School Committees (Köy Okul 
Komisyonu) that, in theory, gave the two communities authority over education issues on a 
local level. In practice, the functioning of the schools was determined by the available funds. 
The separate educational committees paved the way for the implementation of a nationalist 
educational agenda that was planned in Athens or Istanbul (and, after 1923, Ankara). 
 The Department of Turkish Education comprised the president, who was the general 
secretary of the government, the chief judge, the Mufti and the six elected members of the 
Provincial Committees. Amongst other things, the committees were responsible for deciding 
on the curriculum and appointing and dismissing teachers. In this way, the Greek Cypriot 
Educational Board approved the following lessons to be taught in Greek Cypriot schools: 
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religion, Greek grammar, mathematics, physics, history, geography, music, hand-writing, arts 
and sports. The Turkish Cypriot educational board approved the following lessons to be 
taught in Turkish Cypriot schools: Quran, Turkish language, Ottoman and world geography, 
and basic arithmetic, as well as Arabic and Persian language in the highest classes. 273 From 
the curricula, it becomes clear that the two educational systems varied significantly. Most of 
the educational reports confirm the disparity in the quality of Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
education. More specifically, Turkish Cypriot schools were improperly funded, the teachers 
were poorly paid and, in many cases, especially during the First World War, the supply of 
books was problematic. In many cases, teachers had to depend on local communities for 
support, although that was not always the case. The memoirs of teacher Mehmet Zihni 
İmamzade offer some insight into the conditions of the Turkish Cypriot schools in the early 
20th Century: 
 […]When the villagers appointed a teacher there were a lot of 
irregularities. The maximum wage was 12 Cypriot pounds. Some 
speculators would impose a commission and made teachers give 4 pounds 
back. The teacher in these days was both a teacher and an imam. Some 
profit would also be made from the mosque. […] Among the graduate 
teachers of the İdadi (Ηigh School) I was the third. Since the provincial 
teachers‟ positions had been filled I applied for a post in the villages. 
Through the help of a good friend I applied at the village of Aydın 
(Ayyanni) The muhtar of the village was an enlightened man, also a 
graduate of the İdadi and supporter of the new ideas. With good 
bargaining I was appointed as a teacher with a wage of 18 Cypriot pounds 
per year. Nevertheless the villagers considered this excessive and there 
was a lot of gossiping. But the patriotic songs I taught the children and 
the shows they presented at the end of the year left the villagers happy. 
[…] I taught for five years in Ayyanni from 1915 to 1920. On the second 
year a village school was added and thanks to that in a village where 
Greek was spoken the new generations forgot Greek and became 
accustomed to speaking Turkish.274 
 
 
 There was a widespread belief among the Turkish Cypriot elite that the religious 
lessons that were taught in schools, together with the indifference of the community towards 
the education of its youth, were the reasons behind the backwardness of Turkish Cypriot 
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education. Watching the Greek Cypriots investing more in their schools, some Turkish 
Cypriots expressed their discontent at the colonial government for the deficiencies of their 
own schools. 275  They also expressed grievance with regard to the position of girls, the 
hesitance of some Turkish Cypriots to educate their daughters and the obligation on the girls 
to wear the headscarf.276 This explains the willingness of the Turkish Cypriots to adopt the 
Kemalist reforms, especially the ones that were related to social progress, for example the 
language reform, the abolition of the fez and the introduction of surnames. Hasan Saffet 
Hocalar, a teacher at the Nicosia Rüşti, described the introduction of the hat reform in the 
following words:  
[…] One day my dad called us and said: “Atatürk gave an order that 
every Moslem should wear a hat. Even though our family has always 
been a family of turbaned hodjas and they will advise you not to wear it 
don‟t listen to them. Since it‟s imposed by law you will are supposed to 
wear it. I then took off my fez and started wearing a hat.277  
 For Turkish Cypriot female students, the Kemalist reforms were an opportunity to 
secure the right to education like their Greek Cypriot counterparts. The Turkish Cypriots were 
less eager to send their children to school and the proportion of female students was smaller 
than that among the Greek Cypriots. From the memoirs of Hıfsiye Ziya Hacıbulgur, daughter 
of the editor of Birlik newspaper, we learn that, as a student at Victoria Girls Technical 
School (Viktorya İslam İnas Sanat Mektebi) in 1917, she used to wear a headscarf and a veil 
(çaraşflı ve peçeli). Through her father‟s friendship with the Turkish Consul in Cyprus, but 
most importantly under the influence of her older sister Melahat, who came to Cyprus in 1927 
after finishing her studies in Istanbul, she took off her headscarf.278  
 In rural areas, teachers had to face villagers‟ reluctance to send their children to 
school. According to Sıddıka Ahmet, who served as a teacher in the village of Kokkina in the 
northwestern coast of the island in 1925, the parents of the only student in the school did not 
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want her to teach subjects other than Turkish out of fear that their son would leave the village 
in search of a better life in one of the big cities. Moreover, in cases of mixed villages, students 
would often speak Greek Cypriot dialect instead of Turkish.279  
 It was under these adverse conditions that the Turkish Cypriot community embraced 
the Kemalist reforms such as the language reform. For the Turkish Republic, this meant a 
break from the ancien régime.280 But for the Turkish Cypriots, this transformation was seen as 
a necessary step that would bring the community closer to republican Turkey. Due to the 
British presence for more than 40 years, both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots had been 
acquainted with aspects of modernity. The relatively moderate nature of Turkish Cypriot 
Islam, as we have seen, facilitated the adoption of secularist reforms. But, for the Turkish 
Cypriots, the educational reform was seen as a prerequisite for communal progress, and such 
progress as a prerequisite for national existence. Hence, Atatürk acquired the status of the 
saviour (kurtarıcı) of the community that, together with the local enlighteners (aydınlar), 
would lead the community into the future.281 This also explains the frequent comparison with 
the Greek Cypriots‟ education and the grievance that the Greek Cypriots demonstrated social 
and financial progress through their investment in education.  
 For their part, the British preferred to organize the educational system in Cyprus 
along religious rather than national lines. While this was the case until the 1920s, both 
communities retained a certain amount of autonomy in deciding the curriculum, the use of 
national symbols (flags, pictures of national heroes) and the celebration of national days. 
Until 1931, the colonial Government did not intervene in the expression of national sentiment 
in schools. Despite the fact that the names of the Turkish Cypriot schools would often bear 
the term “Muslim”, even in the 1920s, the curriculum used was the one used in mainland 
Turkey, most of the teachers had been educated in Turkey and the British did not impose any 
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obstacles to the use of education to instill the nationalist principles of Republican Turkey in 
Turkish Cypriot youth. Greek Cypriot schools followed the same pattern.  
 The most prestigious Turkish Cypriot schools were found in Nicosia. They were 
established in the vicinity of Hagia Sophia Mosque in the Turkish district of the old city of 
Nicosia, where the Büyük Medrese (Religious Islamic School) used to be until 1936, when the 
building was destroyed by a fire.282 Despite the eagerness the Turkish Cypriots displayed in 
implementing the secularist reforms, the Medrese was not shut down until 1940. 283 Although 
the colonial government facilitated the implementation of the reforms, they did not interfere 
in the operation of the Medrese. The Ruştiye School (Junior High School) was also 
established in the vicinity of the Hagia Sophia mosque in 1862.284 In 1896, it became in İ‟dadi 
(High School) and, in 1926, its name was changed into the Muslim School (İslam Erkek 
Lisesi) or Lycée, from the French, following the Kemalist reforms in education. It was built in 
neoclassical style, following the architectural style of İ‟dadi schools in Anatolia.285 It was the 
only Turkish Cypriot secondary education school until 1944-1945.286  
 Due to the need for female education, a Professional School for Moslem Girls (İslam 
İnas Sanayi Mektebi) was founded in 1901. It was funded by wealthy Turkish Cypriots and it 
also received a donation of fifty pounds sterling from the Colonial Government in honour of 
the Jubilee of Queen Victoria. Thereafter, it was known as the Victoria School for Girls 
(Viktorya Kız Okulu).287 The school was funded with financial contributions from wealthy 
Turkish Cypriots as well as the Evkâf. The colonial government also offered financial support. 
It provided lessons in handicrafts, the Quran, writing and English.288 Graduates of the Victoria 
School as well as the Moslem School were appointed as teachers. Towards the end of the 
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1920s, Turkish Cypriot graduates from Turkish universities were also appointed in Turkish 
Cypriot schools. 
 The colonial government attempted to regulate education with various laws. 
According to the provisions of the 1920 law, teachers were appointed and dismissed by the 
governor according to the suggestions of the Educational Committee. The 1929 law gave the 
governor responsibility in regard to the above-mentioned issues. Despite the fact that the 1929 
law was a step closer to the centralization of educational policies, it still gave some autonomy 
to the communities, for instance in relation to the books that were imported from Turkey and 
Greece. The 1931 riots obliged the colonial government to enforce much stricter regulations 
that established, among other things, the government‟s control over textbooks, the 
government‟s appointment of the members of the Educational Committee, the government‟s 
total control over the taxes collected for educational purposes and the Educational Committee 
members‟ strictly consultative role. 289  These measures aimed at limiting the impact of 
nationalist ideas in Greek and Turkish Cypriot schools.  
 The educational policy of the colonial government, already from the early stages of 
British rule in Cyprus, to allow the establishment of separate educational boards for the two 
communities paved the way for the upbringing of the younger generations of Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots in accordance with the principles of Turkish and Greek nationalism. Despite 
the fact that British officials presided over the educational boards, both communities actually 
decided on the appointment of teachers, the curriculum, the celebration of national holidays, 
etc. In the memoirs of the governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, we read that, as far as the Greek 
Cypriot schools were concerned,  
 
[…] there was no definite anti-British curriculum in the Schools but they 
were all actively Hellenizing. Al Greek Elementary Schools used the 
“Analytical Programme” as published in Greece and adopted by the 
Cyprus Board of Education. No reading books were allowed in these 
schools except those that were approved by the “Critical Committee” in 
Athens. The Gymnasium of each town and the Teacher Training College 
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were recognized by the Greek Ministry of Education, and worked under 
Regulations issued there-from. Portraits of King Constantine and Queen 
Sophie, of Venizelos and other worthies, but of no English sovereign, 
adorned the walls of the class-rooms, together with elaborate maps of 
modern Greece; while the that of Cyprus, if to be found at all, was as a 
rule small, out of date, worn out, and frequently thrust behind the 
blackboard.”290  
 
   
 According to Storrs, even the Greek Cypriot scouts “were under the Greek 
constitution and made annual returns to the Greek Ministry of Education.”291 While Storrs 
pointed out the expression of Greek nationalism in Greek Cypriot schools, since this was 
connected to the Enosis movement, which was a source of concern for the government, the 
Turkish Cypriot schools too followed a curriculum adopted by the Turkish Ministry of 
Education in Ankara and their walls were likewise adorned by portraits of Mustafa Kemal and 
İsmet İnönü.  
 Given Kemalist Turkey‟s role in Turkish Cypriot education, it would be useful to 
examine the nature of Kemalist educational principles. They were implemented in Cyprus 
together with the secular reforms and inevitably shaped the Turkish Cypriot youth. According 
to İsmail Kaplan, Kemal Atatürk and his party, the Republican People‟s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi) played a decisive role in the creation of the Turkish nation-state and Kemalism 
became the official ideology of this state. National education thus bore the stamp of Kemalist 
ideology.292 What, then, was the role of education according to Kemal Atatürk? The founder 
of modern Turkey believed that the aim of education was “to raise the young generations to 
become loyal to the Turkish nation and state and to prepare them to take up the fight against 
the enemies of the Turkish nation and state”.293 The aim of the Turkish educational system 
was to equip the citizens of the new Turkish state with two characteristics: civilization 
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(medenilik) and patriotism (yurtseverlik).294 The “accepted citizen” (makbul vatandaş) should 
be civilised, that is, able to follow the achievements of Western civilization and a patriot, 
ready to protect the nation and safeguard the state and its principles. These of course included 
the secular reforms. In order to achieve this goal, the secular educational system incorporated 
the element of ethnicism that had become a component of Kemalist nationalism.295 History 
textbooks portrayed the Turkish nation as “a superior race”. At the same time, the Ottoman 
past was neglected; the Ottoman state was presented as almost foreign.296 
 This was the nature of the Turkish educational system. To a great extent, with the 
help of Turkish teachers, educated in Turkish universities, it was followed in Turkish Cypriot 
schools too. Turkish Cypriot students thus were educated according to the principles of 
Kemalism and, by the end of the 1920s, a generation of Turkish Cypriots had fully adopted 
these principles. Unlike the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot youth abstained from acts of 
disobedience but, as we shall see, the nationalist party mobilized Turkish Cypriot students on 
the issue of the Lycée.  
 Cyprus, however, was not an exception in the use of education as a source of political 
agitation. In mandatory Palestine, too, despite the fact that Arab education had been placed 
under the control of the British, “nationalism thrived in the schools”. 297 For the Palestinians, 
education was regarded as a tool that would enable future generations to overthrow foreign 
domination. In that sense they resembled the Greek Cypriots, since for them, too, education 
was regarded as the path that would lead the Greek Cypriot youth towards the goal of Enosis 
with Greece. The grievance of the Palestinians due to British involvement in Education, 
namely government control over Arab schools, was shared by both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, who also demanded more autonomy in educational affairs. For the Turkish 
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Cypriots, in particular, the appointment of a British headmaster at the Lycée became a matter 
of dispute between the conservatives, the Kemalists and the colonial government.  
 
 
 
 
The battle for the Lycée 
 
 As we saw in the previous chapters, the debate between the Evkâfçılar and the 
nationalists heated up towards the end of the 1920s. Mehmet Münir‟s tight control of 
practically all communal institutions, and the loyalty to the colonial government that – 
according to the views of the Kemalist-oriented opposition – limited the independence of the 
community, were the main factors that led to the 1930 debate. The administration and control 
of the Lycée was at the centre of the debate between Mehmet Münir and Necati Özkan.  
 Georghallides offers a detailed account of the origin of the debate. In 1928, Mehmet 
Münir, head of the Turkish Board of Education, selected R. N. Henry from Saint Columba‟s 
college in Dublin for the position of the headmaster of the Lycée, with the approval of the 
governing body of the school.298 The new headmaster reorganized the school in accordance 
with the curriculum set out by Istanbul University, so that more graduates could proceed to 
higher education. A part of the school was organized as a college with classes in English that 
would prepare students for studies in Britain, government jobs and commerce. These changes 
were approved by the Evkâf, the government and the board of education who supported the 
school financially. This attempt came to a standstill after one year, when headmaster Henry 
became Assistant Director of Education. His successor, Major Lewis J. Grant, who took up 
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duty in 1930, was considered unsuitable for the post and did not speak a word of Turkish. 
That, however, was not the only problem facing the Lycée. After the 1930 elections, the 
school‟s governing board came under the control of the Kemalist opposition, which had 
elected two members in the Legislative Council. From that point onwards, the newly-elected 
Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zekâ used their majority in the committee to demand that Grant be 
removed from his position and that a Turkish headmaster be appointed.  
 The issue of the Lycée was used extensively by Necati Özkan during the campaign 
for the 1930 elections. Although there were more urgent issues in the agenda of the Kemalist 
party, such as the independence of the Evkâf, Necati Özkan chose the Lycée as a central point 
in his campaign against Mehmet Münir and the colonial government. Knowing that the 
colonial government would not agree to alter its Evkâf policy, he chose an easier target, that 
of Turkish Cypriot education and in particular the Lycée. The demand for the appointment of 
a Turkish headmaster at the Lycée appeared to be a more feasible target although, as we shall 
see, the colonial government was not willing to break its alliance with the Evkâfçılar.  
 According to a memorial sent to the Secretary of State, signed among others by 
Mehmet Münir, Necati Özkan owed his election to the “capital he made out of 
misinterpretations of policies relating to the Lycée initiated by Münir bey as chairman of its 
governing body”.299  
 The Lycée students rallied around Necati Özkan, participated in his election 
campaign, including by taking part in public meetings, and even wrote a poem praising 
him.300 On the night of the election, governor Storrs reported that “Necati stirred up a riot in 
the Turkish Lycée in which one of the English masters was assaulted”. 301 Necati was accused 
by the government of intervening in the Lycée when, a few days after the elections, during a 
visit to the school, he entered the headmaster‟s office and took a notebook with the purpose of 
examining the headmaster‟s wrongdoings. According to Necati Özkan‟s memoirs, after the 
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incident, the governor asked to see him in an apparent attempt to examine his intentions.302 
The governor‟s reaction proves that the British failed to realize the influence of Turkish 
nationalism and the extent of the discontent with the government‟s decisions on the Turkish 
Cypriot institutions.  
  When the headmaster refused to hoist the Turkish flag on the occasion of Turkish 
Republic Day on the 29th of October, the students went on strike.303 On the same day, the 
refusal of the Evkâf to illuminate the Nicosia minarets raised anti-government feelings.304 By 
criticizing the government, Necati Özkan was actually attacking the Evkâf and Mehmet 
Münir. In an article published on 16 July 1931, under the title “What have they done? What 
did we do and what do we want to do?” (Onlar ne yaptılar? Biz ne yaptık ve yapmak 
istiyoruz) nine months after the elections, frequent Söz columnist Ahmet Raşit attacked the 
Evkâf, referring to the chronic issues of the Muftiship and the Religious Courts. On the Lycée, 
he wrote the following:  
 
[…] They assigned the Religious Courts to the Service of the Evkâf. […] 
Because if they [the Courts] are seen belonging to another institution 
other than the Evkâf this may give the impression that there are other 
institutions and other powers except the power of the Evkâf and this may 
pave the road for the expression of people‟s wishes contrary to the Evkâf 
mentality. They wanted to alienate the Lycée just for the support of these 
politics. Considering that there were Kemalists in the country they had to 
prevent this while there was time. Because those who graduate from this 
school could have been intoxicated with these ideas and cause problems 
to the Evkâfçılar and the government. However if an English headmaster 
is appointed to the school the aim of the school is turned away from 
Ankara and the danger of educating an obedient and depraved youth they 
way they want could not be prevented.305 
 
 The 1930 election results raised hopes among the Kemalists that the influence of the 
Evkâfçılar could be limited through the rising power of Necati Özkan. Nevertheless, nine 
months after his election, Necati Özkan had not managed to change the pro-government 
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policies of the Evkâf and, despite the majority in the board of the Turkish Lycée, the 
Kemalists had been unable to impose their will, that is, to appoint a Turkish headmaster. 
Interestingly, the author expresses his concern that the appointment of yet another English 
headmaster would alienate the students from Kemalist principles and would raise a youth 
obedient [to the government] and depraved (mutî ve mütereddî).  
 The Lycée governing body met on 27th January 1931 and, this time, the government 
and the Evkâf refused to pay the annual grant to the school unless the English headmaster was 
reinstated. Necati Özkan reacted by saying the following: 
 
[…] we request our legal rights and this grant is legally ours. His 
Excellency the Governor is not giving this money to us because we 
request it, out of pity or generosity. We request this money that belong to 
our Community and come from the budget of the Evkâf property that 
remains from our ancestors. It is the Evkâf that our ancestors dedicated 
thinking of our benefit. Neither the Evkâf delegate nor the Governor can 
cut this grant. Our ancestors dedicated the Evkâf property. It wasn‟t the 
grandfathers of his Excellencies Storrs and Gallagher. 306  The 
Government‟s only right over this endowment consists of the right to 
supervise the financial part. The Government had undertaken by treaty 
towards the Islamic Community to protect the integrity of the Evkâf. How 
does the Government not interfere in the Church property of the other 
nation that lives in Cyprus like us and how doesn‟t the government 
examine how they spend their revenue the government and an 
interference is unnecessary and outside of the Governor‟s authority.307  
 
 This extract shows that at the heart of the Lycée issue lay the administration of the 
Evkâf and the issue of the community‟s independence, hence the comparison with the Greek 
Cypriots and the government‟s lack of interest in controlling the Orthodox Church and Greek 
Cypriot education. 308  Necati Özkan was not complaining so much about the quality of 
education offered by the Lycée, as about control over it. He was trying to get the school under 
the control of the Kemalist party. The appointment of a Turkish headmaster was crucial 
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because it would secure the diffusion of the principles of Turkish nationalism. The majority in 
the governing board of the Lycée was the opposition‟s only success against the Evkâfçılar 
after the latter‟s victory in the Legislative Council elections. Sadly for the opposition, the 
school funding remained in the hands of the government and the Evkâf. The government, on 
the other hand, did not show any intention to satisfy the demands of the opposition. Towards 
that end, the government could use the opposition‟s arguments, too. On January 29, 1931, the 
Turkish members of the governing body of the school, Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zekâ, sent 
a memorial to the Secretary of State. They claimed that the budget was not enough to support 
college classes and they insisted that, instead, there should be more English classes together 
with Mathematics, Chemistry and Physics. While they repeated the claim that the current 
headmaster was inadequate, they admitted that “the non existence of a qualified person 
amongst our nation to administer this school is very much annoying the community”.309  
 The lack of a qualified Turkish Cypriot to be appointed to the position of the 
headmaster of the Lycée was not the reason behind governor Storr‟s refusal to satisfy the 
demands of the signatories. That must be attributed to the government‟s unwillingness to 
break its alliance with the pro-British political elite. The pro-government Hakikat responded 
to the Kemalists with an article signed by Dr. Eyyup Necmettin, published on February 7, 
1931 under the title “We‟re being dragged to Anarchy” (Anarşiye Sürükleniyoruz).  
 
[…] The Turkish space on the island is for 2-3 years a boiling cauldron 
and around this cauldron there are some janissary aghas. They say that 
inside the cauldron boils a mixture of Turkishness and nationalism and 
that they try to present this to the pure Turkish people. All along they 
claim that there are those who are not Turkists and who betray 
Turkishness! We are not in the position to give explanations about the 
extent of the attachment of the Turks of Cyprus to the motherland up to 
twenty years before the occupation. […] The Turks of this country have 
sacrificed themselves and have demonstrated proximity to the motherland 
and its prosperity – that hasn‟t been abundant – and its calamities more 
than the Turks of other countries. […] How many years has it been since 
the primary schools follow the curriculum of the primary schools of the 
motherland? Is there anyone who can disaffirm our claim that the Latin 
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letters were approved here and were included in the schools the earliest 
after Turkey? As far as the case of the hat is concerned, how was the 
initiative of the religious people who were at the governing body of the 
Lycée to stop the compliance with the measure confronted and what were 
the results of this confrontation? If all these are not an open 
demonstration of the ideals and the national will of those who lead the 
social and national destiny of the Turks of Cyprus in the previous years, 
then what are they?310  
 
 Eyüp Necmedin, the only candidate of the pro-government party who managed to get 
elected to the Legislative Council in 1930, attempted to answer the claims of the Kemalist 
party that cooperation with the colonial government equalled betrayal of national ideals. In his 
article, Necmedin referred to various expressions of national pride on behalf of the Turkish 
Cypriots in the years preceding the rise to power of the Kemalist party, in order to highlight 
the loyalty of the community to Republican Turkey. He went further by accusing the 
Kemalists of attempting to indoctrinate the Turkish Cypriots with a nationalist propaganda 
that was not necessary, since they had demonstrated time and again their attachment to the 
motherland. Indeed, Hakikat celebrated the Turkish Day of the Republic or Victory Day by 
publishing pictures of Mustafa Kemal on the front page. Yet the newspaper was still 
published in old Turkish even in 1931, three years after the language reform.  
 The Lycée debate did not come to an end with the Governor‟s refusal to accept the 
appointment of a Turkish headmaster. It continued throughout 1931 through memoranda and 
press articles. On April 23, the minority on the Lycée‟s governing body sent a petition to the 
Secretary of State in order to respond to the arguments of the majority. They argued that the 
school was organized according to the requirements of Istanbul University, that the College 
classes were necessary for the education of Turkish Cypriot youth and that conditions were 
not ripe for a Turkish headmaster. They even went as far as to request an amendment of the 
Moslem Secondary Education Law in order to “change the composition of the governing 
body so as to dissociate education from the fetters of political intrigue by which is at present 
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bound”.311 In other words, the pro-Government party wanted to see the Kemalist party‟s only 
majority curtailed in an attempt to reverse the adverse election results.  
 Ahmet Raşit and Mehmet Remzi dealt with the Lycée and the issue of Turkish 
Cypriot education extensively in columns of Söz. In an article published on March 19, 1931, 
under the title “What should be the direction of our education?”, Ahmet Raşit repeated the 
claim that the Turkish Cypriots were under foreign rule and that the government was not 
going to be kind and loyal towards the community.312 For this reason, the Turkish Cypriots 
needed a national educational system (millî bir maarif sistemi lâzimdir). He claimed that the 
Turkish Cypriots should search for inspiration and sources in the great Turkish soul (büyük 
Türk ruhunda arayacağız). According to Raşit, following the educational development of the 
motherland and using it as an example would save the Turkish Cypriots from darkness and 
ignorance (karanlık ve cehaletten kurtaracaktır). The appeal to the community to adopt the 
Turkish educational reforms in order to save itself from ignorance was not a novelty either in 
Turkish or in Turkish Cypriot discourse. The need for modernization had been constantly 
repeated since the Tanzimat era. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself used the term “ignorance” in 
relation to the Caliphate and the need to abolish it.313 The Kemalist-oriented intellectuals used 
this rhetoric against the Evkâfçılar, accusing them of undermining the future of the 
community and condemning the Turkish Cypriots to backwardness. In other words, objection 
to the secular reforms was equivalent to betrayal of the community and the ideals of the 
Turkish nation. 
  In the same article, Ahmet Raşit repeated what was common ground among Turkish 
Cypriot intellectuals – that the community lagged behind in terms of education. (Biz maarifçe 
maalesef geri kalmış bir cemmatiz.) This argument was repeated, however, in order to point 
out the need for a new educational system. According to the author, this system should 
comply fully with the Turkish educational system. In that sense, Ahmet Raşit was not against 
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certain kind of schools. “If the motherland deemed it necessary to establish Lycées or 
Colleges so should the Turkish Cypriot. If the Turks in Anatolia decided to abolish the 
College system so should we.” In short, it did not matter what kind of an educational system 
the Turkish Cypriots would adopt as long as it was a national educational system.  
 After the end of the school year, July 9, 1931, Söz published an article under the title 
“Lycée Graduates”. The author (presumably Mehmet Remzi) addressed the financial issue 
facing the Department of Education, due to which the graduates would not be given teaching 
jobs. Using rather reconciliatory language in comparison to previous publications, the author 
requested the replacement of the member of the Department of Education, claiming that they 
were inadequate and could not serve the present educational system.314  
 Another incident that proves that the headmaster, Major Lewis Grant, had been 
alienated from his students and the nationalist Turkish Cypriots is described in an article 
published on July 16, 1931 in Söz. On the occasion of Turkish National Sovereignty Day 
(Milli Hakimiyet Bayramı), the students requested that the school remained closed. The 
headmaster turned down this request and announced that the absent students would be 
punished. The following day, the students came to school but did not enter the classrooms. 
When the deputy Headmaster saw one of the teachers, Mr. Ekrem Tahsin, among the students, 
he forced him to enter the classroom.315 Like the governor and other British officials, the 
headmaster was unable to realize the importance of Turkish national sentiment among the 
Turkish Cypriots.  
 The debate on educational issues was not limited to secular education. The issue of 
the dire condition of the Ayasofya Medrese in Nicosia, the second oldest Medrese in Cyprus, 
worried Söz, which published an article on August 18, 1931, under the title “The Ayasofia 
Medrese is being demolished, let‟s see what will come out of its foundations”. Despite the 
fact that all Medreses had been closed down by the Kemalist government in Turkey, the 
newspaper seemed alarmed by the condition of the building and did not request that all 
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medreses in Cyprus be closed down. Instead, the author criticized the government and the 
Evkâf for not taking care of Turkish Cypriot monuments. It was not, though, the first time that 
the Turkish nationalists in Cyprus had supported Muslim institutions in contrast with the 
secular policies of the Turkish government. 316  Institutions such as the Muftiship or the 
Medresses were considered vital even by the nationalist-oriented Turkish Cypriots for the 
survival of the community. Although the Kemalist reforms provided for the 
institutionalization of religion so that it would come under state control, the nationalists in 
Cyprus resisted the institutionalization of their own institutions and their control by the 
Colonial Government.  
 Hakikat answered Söz‟s questions with an article published on September 26, 1931, 
entitled “The Reformation of the Medreses”. According to the author, the restoration of the 
Medrese was under way and the object was “to establish an İlmiye School (Religious School) 
where candidates for the religious posts of Imam, Hatib,317 Muderris318 and Preachers will be 
educated”.319 Hakikat used a rather exuberant tone in reporting the role of the Evkâf delegates, 
which shows the editor‟s approval of this project. For the record, the said Medrese was 
destroyed in 1936 and in its place the Evkâf founded a religious school.320  
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Conclusions 
 
 This chapter has attempted to examine the role of Turkish Cypriot education in the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism in the island. The Turkish Cypriots had realized that they 
lagged behind in terms of education in comparison to the Greek Cypriots and various attempts 
were made to raise the quality of schools and teachers. Nevertheless, the dire economic 
condition of the Evkâf and the absence of a wealthy entrepreneurial elite willing to fund the 
establishment and running of secondary schools delayed the process of modernization. The 
attempt of the government to control the only secondary education institution, the Lycée, 
caused the nationalist opposition to react and the issue of the Lycée became part of the debate 
over the independence of the Turkish Cypriot community. The limited independence of 
Turkish Cypriot education was curtailed by the government restrictions imposed after the 
Greek Cypriot revolt of 1931. For the nationalist opposition, the government aimed at 
alienating the Turkish Cypriots from Kemalist Turkey, while the pro-British Evkâfçılar failed 
to see any fault in the government‟s educational policies.  
 After 1931, the debate about the administration of the Lycée continued, since the 
government refused to satisfy the Kemalists‟ demand for a Turkish headmaster. In 1933, the 
Lycée was renamed Cyprus Muslim Lycée (Kıbrıs İslam Lisesi) and, in the same year, a 
Turkish headmaster, İsmail Hikmet bey, was finally appointed.321 This did not appease the 
nationalist press, who accused him of applying European principles that were not suitable for 
the school.322 It seems that the issue of the Lycée was still being used by nationalists for 
political purposes. Despite occasional obstacles that were presented by the colonial 
government, teachers from Turkey were appointed in Turkish Cypriot schools and they used 
Turkish textbooks. Although the colonial government imposed strict control on Turkish 
Cypriot education after 1931, it did not manage to suppress nationalist sentiment, because the 
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younger generations of Turkish Cypriots were brought up in accordance with Kemalist 
principles.  
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CHAPTER 6 – THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN THE 1920s – THE EMERGENCE OF 
THE NATIONALIST ELITE AND THE QUESTIONING OF LOYALTY TO THE 
COLONIAL GOVERNMENT  
 The disastrous outcome of the First World War for the Ottoman Empire, the 
dissolution of the Empire and the War of Independence caused worry among Turkish 
communities in Anatolia, the Balkans and the Middle East. In addition to the concern caused 
by the developments in Anatolia, the Turkish Cypriots were facing another danger, namely 
Greek Cypriot demands for the unification of the island with Greece. After the end of the war, 
the ban on the Turkish Cypriot press was lifted and the first attempts to organize a Turkish 
Cypriot challenge to demands for Enosis were made. The successful outcome of the Turkish 
War of Independence and the subsequent consolidation of the Kemalist regime in Turkey 
facilitated the appearance of a Kemalist party in Cyprus, too, that soon gathered around it all 
the forces that opposed the Turkish Cypriot community‟s close association with the colonial 
administration. The traditional elite was not willing to surrender its leading position, but the 
popularity of Kemalist ideas and the colonial government‟s continuous and blatant attempt to 
control the Turkish Cypriot religious and educational institutions resulted in the consolidation 
of the Kemalist movement in Cyprus and the questioning of the community‟s unconditional 
loyalty to the Colonial Government. This was manifested in the results of the 1930 elections 
for the Legislative Council and the convening of the second Turkish Cypriot national 
congress (Meclis-i Milli) the following year.  
 This chapter will discuss the political and social developments within the Turkish 
Cypriot community in the 1920s, in order to examine the extent to which Kemalist ideas were 
adopted by the Turkish Cypriots and how they transformed an until then traditional, religious 
community into an ethnically-defined one. Furthermore the chapter will seek to analyze the 
extent to which control of the Evkâf and the other Turkish Cypriot institutions was used by the 
Colonial government in order to control the community and limit the impact of Turkish 
nationalism – and whether these attempts were successful. Finally, the 1930 elections for the 
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Legislative Council will be presented as a case study of the dispute between the nationalists 
and the Evkâfçılar.  
 
The National Congress (Meclis-i Millet) of 1918 
 
A few months after the end of the First World War and before the beginning of the 
Turkish war of Independence, in December 1918, the Mufti, Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi, 
together with Ahmet Raşid and Mehmet Remzi, editors and publishers of Doğru Yol and Söz, 
convened the first Turkish Cypriot national congress (Meclis-i Millet).323  Representatives 
from many villages gathered at the residence of the Mufti in Nicosia and demanded that a 
committee be sent to Istanbul in order to safeguard the community‟s rights. According to 
lawyer Fadıl Niyazi Korkut, who was present at the conference, the delegates were alarmed 
by the rumor that the Chief of Justice, a government official, had been seen in the house of the 
Mufti. 324 The congress issued a statement of protest against the Greek Cypriots‟ demand for 
the unification of Cyprus with Greece and expressed the wish that Cyprus be returned to its 
legitimate owner, the Ottoman Empire.325  
 The congress elected a seven-member committee that soon dispersed leaving behind 
Fadıl Korkut, doctor Behiç and lawyer Con Rifat. When the committee requested passports in 
order to travel to Turkey, their petition was rudely turned down by the secretary of the 
colonial government.326 In an apparent attempt to dissuade the members of the committee 
from further political action, the government arrested Dr. Behiç and Dr. Esad, imprisoned 
them in Kyreneia castle and warned Fadıl Korkut and Con Rifat to avoid further involvement 
with politics.  
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 Political conditions did not allow for the political organization of the Turkish 
Cypriots. After the ban on the Turkish Cypriot press was lifted, the first Turkish Cypriot 
newspapers appeared. On the first anniversary of the congress, Ahmed Raşit wrote the 
following in Doğru Yol: “I do not know how to define these moments. For my part, a great 
light of hope was lit in my soul that had been doubtful, until that sacred date, about the 
presence of the Islamic [community] on the island and, by taking away my despair in one 
moment, it created a hope that we shall enter a period of salvation.”327  
 It was the Turkish Cypriot press that undertook the task of awakening the community. 
Doğru Yol and Söz, followed by Birlik and Ankebut, often published editorials and articles 
pointing out the disadvantageous position of the Turkish Cypriots. Emphasis was given to 
financial activities as well as education. Witnessing the Greek Cypriots‟ progress in trade, the 
newspapers‟ editors wanted to draw attention to the dangers of the Turkish Cypriots‟ dire 
economic conditions. On 2 April 1921, in an article published in Ankebut, entitled “Sloth in 
commerce is the reason for the collapse” expressed his fears in the following words: 
 “After it has been determined that the Turkish Cypriot community lives 
in poverty because of not engaging with trade, and that poverty causes 
political casualties; that Turkish youth stays away from enterprising, 
understanding that after a short period they are not going to be successful 
they show laziness and they abandon their jobs and the national 
sovereignty of the population is nonexistent”.328  
  
 At a time when Kemalist forces were fighting in Anatolia and Greek Cypriots were 
repeating their demands for Enosis, the press expressed the fear that the Turkish Cypriot 
community‟s lack of competitiveness would undermine its national existence.  
 Watching Greek Cypriot progress in education, the Turkish Cypriot press was quick 
to point out the deficiencies of the Turkish schools. After news was circulated that the 
foundations for a Greek Cypriot middle school had been laid in the city of Famagusta, Doğru 
Yol published the following article:  
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Against the interest that our Christian fellow citizens show in education, 
the insufficiency and the miserable conditions of our schools is a sign of 
our ignorance. We cannot know when similar donations will come to 
light and when we will adorn our columns with such news that will cheer 
up our hearts. We wonder whether we will have the happiness to see a 
good proprietor take the first step for the high school that our country 
needs more than anything.329  
 The issue of backwardness was a common theme in the Turkish Cypriot press during 
the Turkish War of Independence, but even more after the Kemalist revolution set out its 
principles for reforming the Turkish nation. The pressure felt by Greek Cypriot irredentism 
fueled the need to modernize education, since it was felt that only in this way would the 
Turkish Cypriot community overcome the disadvantageous political position that threatened 
its national existence. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the launch of the 
Kemalist reforms, the Muslims of Cyprus were also to be transformed into Turks. Like the 
Anatolian Turks, Cypriot Turks too needed to follow the Kemalist reforms and enter an era of 
enlightenment.330 For the Turkish Cypriots, the need for modernization was more urgent, 
given that the progress of their Greek Cypriot fellow citizens would leave the Turkish 
community behind and would allow the Greek Cypriots to accumulate wealth and further 
promote the cause of Enosis. The issues of the Turkish Cypriots‟ lack of competitiveness and 
dependency on Greek Cypriot merchants were raised by Ankebut in 1921: 
 “Our farmers, grape growers, tradesmen strive day and night and 
produce thousands of goods that our Greek rivals are shipping abroad. 
This means that there‟s one easy and effortless job left to our rival, which 
means that they become mediators to our consumption and our 
production. Those familiar with trade know that the mediators are more 
relaxed than the producers, their position is always safe and their profits 
are proportionally big. If the profit of the two elements of the island are 
taken into consideration aren‟t we, the Turks, the sponsors of the giant 
businesses of our rivals who consider us enemies? The Greek has always 
searched for profit in the Turk. He has again obtained today‟s wealth and 
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comfort through the Turk. Nevertheless the Turk has never harmed the 
Greek.”331 
  
 The political and financial condition of the Turkish Cypriots could be attributed to the 
lack of a united leadership. In an editorial in Doğru Yol in October 1919, under the title “Our 
Position in the island”, Ahmet Raşıd referred to the issue in the following words:  
Our life is taken up with factions, enmity, revenge. Especially our 
leaders. It is not a difficult thing to see the end, when the father is against 
the son. This state of ours made us directly or indirectly helpers of the 
other element. We gave the arm to the enemy with our own hand. […] It 
is our duty to try hand in hand and love each other and thereby save our 
society and country.332  
 
 After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots regained 
their confidence and found in Mustafa Kemal not only the saviour of the Turkish nation but 
also the provider of a new identity that replaced that of the Ottoman-Muslim Cypriot.333 The 
Turkish Cypriots expressed their faith in Mustafa Kemal and his new Turkey because he was 
seen a progressive leader who could lead the community to enlightenment. Yet the Turkish 
Cypriot community still lacked a personality who could rise up to become a leader like 
Mustafa Kemal, who would defend the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots and the 
colonial government. Until the first half of the 1920s, loyalty to the Colonial Government and 
control over the Muslim institutions prevented the emergence of such a personality.   
 The Evkâf delegate could have become the Turkish Cypriot leader, if it were not for 
the close cooperation with the British that had caused the reaction of the nationalist press. 
Already from the early 1920s, the Evkâf delegate quite often became the target of the 
Kemalist press. On various occasions, Söz newspaper published critical comments on the 
function of the Evkâf, suggesting cases of corruption or maladministration. Bearing in mind 
the nationalists‟ objection to governmental control over the Evkâf, it is no wonder that the 
newspaper often attacked the Evkâf delegates even if the name of Musa İrfan was not always 
                                                          
331Ankebut, 21 May 1921, in An, Kıbrıslı, p. 34. 
332SA1/1153/1919, extract from Doğru Yol, 24, 6 October 1919.  
333Bryant, Imagining, p.152. 
137 
 
explicitly mentioned. In one case, Söz complained about what they considered a case of 
overspending regarding a property in Famagusta. In the article, the newspaper attacked the 
Evkâf and the government for supporting individuals of Armenian origin. The style and 
language of the article is quite aggressive:  
The officials of the Evkâf Department whose duty consists of managing 
the Moslem Evkâf within the boards of certain prescribed laws and rules, 
have a strange mentality and it is this: To endeavour to defend those 
persons who are hostile to Turkey and to secure a living for such persons! 
It is really difficult to ascertain the source and motive of this mentality 
which is diametrically opposed to this duty. [...] A person called Hafuz 
Ali Zihni who had cooperated with the Armenians soon after the French 
occupation of Adana and had caused many tortures to the Turks and had 
reported to the French people the children of the Turks who had defended 
the country and had caused the death of such Turks with many tortures. 
This man came to this country with certain Armenians after the 
occupation of Adana by Kemalists. He was defended by the Evkâf and a 
residence was secured for him in a school.334 
  
 It is interesting that the article referred to the sensitive issue of the occupation of 
Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence, which surely aroused patriotic feeling 
among the readers. The author, presumably the editor Mehmet Ramzi, accused the Evkâf 
delegates of renting a coffee shop in Nicosia to another Armenian subject, playing the religion 
card this time: “At present let us try and understand the reason why a coffee-shop that is the 
property of the Vaqf, is taken away from a Muslim and given to an Armenian and let us try to 
ascertain the mystery of compelling all the Turks to go to an Armenian Coffee-shop on these 
sacred days of Bayram!”  
 In this way, the newspaper attempted to connect the Evkâf with anti-Turkish 
activities, in order to convince its readers that the said institution was not only run in a way 
harmful for Turkish Cypriot interests; it also turned against the interests of the Turkish nation. 
Knowing that the government policy on the Evkâf was irrevocable, the nationalist press 
attempted to create a feeling among its readers that the national faction was the only one able 
to safeguard the interests of the community against the İngilizci or Evkâfçı, the supporters of 
British policy.  
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 The implementation of the Kemalist reforms was considered of utmost importance for 
the nationalist faction. This would prove that the Turkish Cypriots were keeping pace with the 
motherland and also that they were following the path of modernization that would enable 
them to compete with the Greek Cypriots. The colonial government did not pose a significant 
obstacle to the secularization process. The major Muslim institutions were already under the 
control of the government and it was in the nature of Cypriot Islam that it raised only limited 
resistance to the secularization reforms. Polygamy was abolished and the fez was gradually 
replaced by the şapka (the European hat). Bryant gives another explanation as to why the 
Kemalist reforms were embraced by the Turkish Cypriots with greater enthusiasm than that of 
the Turks in Anatolia. The Kemalist reforms constituted part of the civic nationalism project 
that spoke of the need for progress and modernization. That need was almost universally 
shared by the Turkish Cypriots and that explains the zeal that the community demonstrated in 
the implementation of the reforms. 335 
 The implementation of the language reform in 1928 met no serious resistance either. 
Already from the early years of the Turkish War of Independence, the Turkish Cypriot 
schools played a role in the diffusion of Kemalism. Niyazi Berkes, a well-known Turkish 
historian of Cypriot origin, remembers that most of his teachers were Kemalists who had 
returned to the island after the end of the war.336 Berkes also remembers that the Turkish 
audience would watch plays about the Turkish War of Independence in Greek Cypriot-owned 
theatres, since the community did not own its own theatre.337 In 1923, Faiz Kaymak, a young 
primary school teacher in Limassol, described the climate in the schools in the following 
words: “After the proclamation of the Republic, our fight against the colonial administration 
started growing. We were taking power from Atatürk and we were not afraid to fight. After I 
completed my High School education in 1923-1924 and started teaching our first duty was to 
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teach Atatürk to the students; to explain his greatness and importance. For this goal I exerted 
great effort.”338  
  Just as their Greek Cypriot fellow citizens celebrated mainland Greek holidays, the 
Turkish Cypriots also started celebrating Turkish national days by decorating their houses, 
schools and other public spaces with Turkish flags and portraits of the founder and president 
of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the war hero and prime minister, İsmet 
İnonü. Turkish republican leaders soon became quite popular among the Turkish Cypriots 
and, with the consolidation of the Kemalist regime, Kemalist ideals were greatly accepted. 
However, there were cases of Turkish Cypriots who did not agree with the secularization 
process and expressed their discontent publicly. According to police reports in November 
1924, a schoolmaster from Kaymaklı in Nicosia accused Mustafa Kemal of being “the son of 
a Jew” and of ruining the [Turkish] nation rather than protecting it. On another occasion, the 
same individual, when asked whether they [the Turkish Cypriots] should pray in the name of 
the Sultan or in the name of the Turkish constitution, said that “they should pray in the name 
of the Sultan as Mustapha Kemal has set aside the Koran and he has also removed the veils 
(yaşmak) from the women”.339 These comments were made in front of a woman under the 
name of Aishe Said, who then reported them to men from the village of Mathiati. This is 
indicative of the levels of popularity of Kemal Atatürk among the Turkish Cypriots. The 
discourse, on the other hand, shows that the reforms had an impact on the community and 
raised tensions. The report followed a publication by Doğru Yol, addressed to the King‟s 
Advocate, which referred to the schoolmaster and his insulting comments and, appealing to 
the friendly relations between England and Turkey, requested his prosecution.340  
 The author of the article avoided an aggressive tone, as it was addressed to a 
government officer. In an attempt to press for the prosecution of the schoolmaster who used 
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derogatory words for Mustafa Kemal, he appealed to the good relations between England and 
Turkey and the need to preserve the good relations between the community and the Colonial 
Government. Despite the grievances of the Turkish Cypriots, this loyalty secured a relatively 
higher number of Turkish Cypriot public servants and made sure that Greek Cypriot demands 
for autonomy would not materialize. In the second half of the 1920s, though, a combination of 
factors led to the further radicalization of the Turkish Cypriots and the predominance of the 
Kemalist elite over the pro-English traditionalists.  
 
 
 
The rise of Mehmet Münir and the further institutionalizion of Turkish Cypriot 
organizations  
 
 In 1925, Evkâf delegate Musa İrfan died unexpectedly, after twenty-one years in 
office. Due to his close association with the colonial government, he was often condemned by 
the nationalist press for failing to safeguard Turkish Cypriot interests. Hence, his death caused 
hope that the government would appoint someone who would put the community‟s interests 
before his own. 341 Nevertheless, the government appointed Mehmet Münir Bey, a lawyer 
who had long served in the government and, like his predecessor, was considered too pro-
British. Born in 1890, Mehmet Münir Bey served for about twenty years at the Treasury 
Department. He studied law in London and in 1922 he became a barrister. Like his 
predecessor, he was a member in various communal institutions. A few months after his 
appointment, he was elected member of the Legislative Council in the electoral district of 
Nicosia-Kyrenia with an ample majority of 2,189 votes over the 513 of his opponent, lawyer 
Bahaeddin Efendi. 342  The Evkâfçılar managed to elect their candidates in the other two 
districts, with Mahmud Celalledin winning the elections in the Famagusta-Larnaca district 
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and Dr Eyyüb Musa in the Paphos-Limassol district. Despite the popularity of Kemalist ideas 
among the Turkish Cypriots, the Colonial government failed to realize that they could not 
secure the support of the community through an alliance with a pro-British elite that was 
losing ground rapidly and that was often accused of putting its own interests before those of 
the community. The British had reasons to avoid the radicalization of the Turkish Cypriot 
community, since they already had to cope with rising Greek Cypriot nationalism. Turkish 
Cypriot nationalism could further destabilize the political order and deprive the British of the 
valuable support that the Turkish Cypriots had offered to the Colonial government until then. 
Hence, the British opted for Mehmet Münir who, according to a report from the colonial 
office, “is the leader of the Turkish population. […] He is 100% pro-British, has the mentality 
of an old Turkish pasha, and has absorbed into himself every office he could. Nonetheless he 
has rendered good service to the British Government.”343  
 Mehmet Münir followed the policy of his predecessor, Musa İrfan. As we have seen, 
the Evkâf held great importance for the Turkish Cypriot community. It played a vital role in 
the running of schools and other communal institutions but, most importantly, through its 
considerable property, it influenced the everyday life of the community. The person in control 
of the Evkâf could control the community‟s sources of income. The limited presence of 
Turkish Cypriots in the trade sector meant that the main source of income for Turkish Cypriot 
notables originated from land ownership and government jobs. A large part of the landed 
property was controlled by the Evkâf through the trustees, who were appointed again by the 
Evkâf. Hence, the trustees owed their wealth and thus their status to their relation with 
Mehmet Münir. Through his position as a government official and given his excellent 
relations with the colonial government, he could also secure the appointment of those Turkish 
Cypriots he deemed loyal. In this way, Mehmet Münir could secure the support of the Turkish 
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Cypriot notables by using his power as Evkâf delegate to appoint or remove the trustees of the 
Evkâf property and by regulating the access to government jobs of those favorable to him.344 
 A similar relation of dependency was imposed on the craft workers and tradespeople 
through control of the places of business. Since these shops and commercial spaces belonged 
to the Evkâf too, the amount of rent paid by the professionals could greatly affect their 
business. The scarcity of capital in cases of financial difficulties led Turkish Cypriot 
tradespeople into the arms of Greek Cypriot money lenders or to the Evkâf. 345 
 The rural classes were also affected by their dependency on the Evkâf. Turkish 
Cypriot farmers either rented land that belonged to the Evkâf or worked on Evkâf-owned 
farms. In this way, farmers owed their income and to a certain extent their jobs to their 
favourable relations with the Evkâf delegate.346  This clientelist network secured Mehmet 
Münir‟s victory in the 1925 Legislative Council elections and allowed him to extend his, and 
therefore the government‟s, control over the Turkish Cypriot population. Mehmet Münir‟s 
distance from the Kemalist party and his full association with the government fueled the 
nationalists and further alienated the Turkish Cypriot population from the old elite. 
 In 1925, Cyprus was proclaimed a crown colony. Apart from some amendments in 
the function of the Legislative Council that did not alter the balance of power between the two 
communities, this change produced no major changes either for the Greek or for the Turkish 
Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot nationalists perceived it as yet another obstacle in the path of 
Enosis while the Turkish Cypriots were content that the British presence was re-emphasized. 
Encouraged by the lack of opposition, the colonial government proceeded with a 
reorganization of the judicial system. Using maladministration and excessive expenditure as a 
pretense, the government abolished the post of the Baş Kadı and the three regional Kadıs and 
instead established three Sheri Courts for the Nicosia-Kyernia, Famagusta-Larnaca and 
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Limassol-Paphos districts respectively.347 As a result, the jurisdiction of the Sheri Courts was 
reduced and their independence was limited, since the three judges were now appointed by 
the Governor.348  
 Next in line was the Evkâf, which became a government department in 1928. This 
was done by an Order-in-Council, according to which salaries and other expenses of the Evkâf 
would now be covered by the Evkâf‟s revenue.349 In this way, the Evkâf officially became a 
governmental institution, but without the government bearing the burden of its financial 
support any longer. Again, this decision provoked complaints from the nationalists, who 
expressed fear that the centralization of the Evkâf and the termination of government funding 
further undermined the independence of the community.  
 The colonial government went a step further with the abolition of the office of the 
Mufti. When the Mufti, Hacı Hafız Ziyai Efendi, retired in 1927, the Ottoman Empire had 
ceased to exist and there was no institution in republican Turkey to appoint his successor. 
Hence, the government appointed Hurremzade Hakkı Efendi to the post of the Mufti. Hakkı 
Efendi was Mehmet Münir‟s brother-in-law and had served as a judge in the Famagusta-
Larnaca district. At the beginning of 1929, the post of the Mufti was abolished too; it was 
replaced by the Fetva Eminiliği (The Office of the Superintendent of Religious Opinions). 
Hurrem Hakkı Efendi was appointed Fetva Emini. The government went on to curtail the 
duties of the new Fetva Emini, attached the post to the Evkâf and ordered that the salary of the 
Fetva Emini be paid by the Evkâf.  
 The reform of the Turkish Cypriot institutions was completed in 1930 with the 
attachment of the Sheri Courts to the Evkâf department, which then bore the responsibility to 
pay for the expenses and the salaries of the judges.350 Thus, the colonial government managed 
to bring all Turkish Cypriot institutions under its direct control. All powers were gathered in 
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the hands of the Evkâf delegate, Mehmet Münir, who, through his clientelist network, became 
the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. This role was not acknowledged, though, by the 
Turkish Cypriot people. The colonial government thought that the Turkish Cypriot 
community would express little or no objection to the centralization of their institutions, 
because the British presence in Cyprus prevented the realization of Greek Cypriot plans for 
Enosis. Nevertheless, the British failed to recognize the popularity of the Kemalist movement 
in Cyprus. In their attempt to control the rise of Turkish nationalism, they aligned with a 
conservative elite that was gradually becoming more alienated from the Turkish Cypriot 
people. The Evkâfçılar were accused of siding with the government in order to protect their 
privileges. Mehmet Münir, the Turkish Cypriot ethnarch, was bestowed with so many powers 
that his influence was compared to that of the Archbishop of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot 
religious and political leader. The Kemalist elite, on the one hand, challenged the legitimacy 
of Mehmet Münir, claiming that he used his powers to protect his own interests and not those 
of his people. On the other hand, many Turkish Cypriots did not agree with the abolition of 
the offices of the Mufti and the Baş Kadı and showed their discontent with the curtailing of 
their community‟s independence. They claimed that, while the Colonial Government showed 
no intention of intervening in Greek Cypriot affairs, they burdened the Evkâf with the funding 
of the now centralized Sheri courts, limiting in this way the already insufficient communal 
funds. The elections of the Legislative Council in 1930 provided an opportunity for the 
expression of this discontent. 
 
 
 
 
The 1930 Legislative Council elections – the first nationalist victory  
 
On 15 October 1930, elections for the Legislative Council were announced. The 
nationalist elite considered the elections to be an opportunity to challenge the authority of 
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Mehmet Münir Bey. The popularity of Kemalist ideas and the objections to British policy 
with regard to the Turkish Cypriot institutions fueled the reaction against the Evkâf delegate. 
The Kemalist party needed a strong personality to compete against Mehmet Münir Bey. They 
found a suitable candidate in the shape of Necati Özkan, a wealthy merchant from Nicosia.351 
Necati Özkan, a successful businessman, was not new to politics. He was elected member of 
the Nicosia municipal council in 1926 and, in 1930, he stood as a candidate in the Nicosia-
Keryneia district. In the Famagusta-Larnaca district, there was only one candidate, Kemalist 
lawyer Zekâ Bey, after the incumbent member, lawyer Mahmud Celaleddin Bey, withdrew 
his candidacy.352 In the Limassol-Paphos district, there were four candidates, the incumbent 
member, Doctor Eyüp Necmeddin, lawyer Ahmed Said, Köprülüzade Hulusi and Teralı Faik 
Efendi. Mehmet Münir‟s influence extended even over the two incumbent members, through 
his family relations with Celaleddin Bey and Eyüp Bey‟s dependency due to his debts to the 
Evkâf.353 Eyüp Bey‟s indebtedness to Münir Bey can explain his total transformation from a 
fierce opponent of the government to a supporter of government policies.354 According Fadil 
Korkut, the reasons for Eyüp Bey‟s transformation may not be exclusively political. 355 
Whatever the reasons, by asking for help from Münir Bey, Eyüp Bey became indebted to him 
and thus he alienated himself from the nationalist front, to the discontent of his former 
comrades. Governor Sir Ronald Storrs‟ comments on the main anti-Government politicians 
explain the government‟s incapacity to build bridges with the Kemalist opposition. 
“Celaleddin Efendi was portrayed as almost illiterate and as entirely led by his relative Munir; 
while Dr Eyüp was described as quite unreliable though at present he is in debt to Mehmet 
Munir and completely under his influence.”356  
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The governmental decisions on the Turkish Cypriot institutions were high on the 
agenda of the opposition. The almost absolute dependency of the Turkish Cypriot community 
on the Colonial Government caused discontent among many Turkish Cypriots. The abolition 
of the office of the Mufti, the abolition of the Evkâf office and the administration of the 
Turkish Lycée, but most importantly the concentration of so much power in the hands of 
Münir Bey, dominated the election campaign. The two major Turkish Cypriot newspapers had 
already picked sides, with Söz supporting the nationalist candidates and Hakikat supporting 
the traditionalists. Hakikat had been published since 1923 and, although it was as popular as 
Söz, Turkish Cypriot historiography has not dealt with its role. One of the main reasons for 
this neglect must be the pro-British stance that the newspaper kept throughout the 1920s and 
1930s. According to Ünlü, the newspaper was run by a certain Derviş Ali Remmal, while its 
editor was Mehmet Fikri. 357  According to Turkish Cypriot historian Harid Fedai, the 
newspaper‟s main columnists were Midhat Bey, a translator working for the government, and 
Dr. Eyyub Necmeddin, member of the Legislative Council.358 
In the period leading up to the elections, the press was the main tool for the Kemalists 
to propagate their views, while the Evkâfçılar used the columns of Hakikat to defend the 
government. Hakikat repeated the argument of the pro-government party in its publications. 
In order to support the Evkâf policy against the attacks by Söz, Hakikat criticised the editors 
of Söz, arguing “that they must be under the influence of writing with a view to opposing the 
Turkish existence in the island”.359  
  In 1930, lawyer Ahmet Said, nationalist candidate in Limassol-Paphos district, sent 
various memorials to the Secretary of the Colonies, Lord Passfield, regarding the multiple 
positions held by Mehmet Münir and the incompatibility of the office of Evkâf delegate with 
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that of Legislative Council member.360 These petitions were also published in Söz.361 Ahmet 
Said‟s petitions epitomized the opposition‟s grievances regarding the overconcentration of 
power in the hands of Mehmet Münir. As was to be expected, the government dismissed the 
petition, claiming that “the general objections are either self-evident or inconsiderable, but in 
the light of actual circumstances they are not impressive”. The memorial was accused of 
being “replete with personal animus”. 362  Eyüp Necmeddin, conservative candidate for 
Famagusta-Larnaca district, sent a letter to the Secretary for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, 
where he maintained that Said Efendi was expressing the position of only a few Turkish 
Cypriots and asked the government not to take notice of the memorial.363 Hakikat newspaper 
accused Said Efendi on various occasions: On the 30th June 1930, the leading article criticized 
Said Efendi‟s second memorial with the following words: “There is no doubt that for the 
Turks in this country there are two hostile fronts. The one is commanded by the Greeks 
themselves and the other by Said Efendi and his Greek colleague Papaioannou. The second 
front attracted very much the attention of the Turkish people. They saw that the Greek anti-
Evkâf activities in the Council, in the press and in other circles are exactly followed and 
imitated by Said Efendi.”364 A few weeks later, Hakikat attacked Said Efendi‟s memorials, 
accusing him of “following the Greek policy” and having the desire “to substitute the 
Delegate with a man who will simply obey the Greeks”.365 In another article, Hakikat once 
again accused Said Efendi of siding with the Greek Cypriots and claimed that it was Söz that 
had asked for the abolition of the Turkish Cypriot Muslim institutions.366  A week later, 
Hakikat accused Said Hoca and the anti-Evkâf clique of having an entente with the Greek 
Cypriots.367 It is interesting that Hakikat played the treachery card accusing the anti-Evkâf 
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party of siding with the Greek Cypriots. The pro-British party would always emphasize the 
importance of Turkish Cypriot “obedience” for the safeguarding of the community‟s interests.  
In the months leading up to the elections, Söz published various articles pointing out 
that the office of the Evkâf delegate had become a government institution.368 A few weeks 
before the elections, Söz published an article by lawyer Ahmet Reşit, which described the 
aftermath of the 1925 elections. The author attacked the Evkâf delegate for being distant and 
indifferent to the people‟s petitions and maintained that Münir Bey demonstrated a vengeful 
stance against all those who criticized him.369  
In an article entitled “Turkish Youth, do your task” (Türk Gençleri Vazifenizi 
yapınız!), published in Söz one day before the elections, the author, Mısırlızade Necati Bey, 
candidate in the Nicosia-Kyrenia district, addressed the younger generation with a reference 
to Mustafa Kemal‟s “address to the youth”, where he appealed to the responsibility of the 
youth to their country:  
Whatever the duty of the fatherland requires, you are bound to do it and 
in this task you will not think of your family, your wealth, your future. I 
believe in these rightful words. There is an Evkâf power that threatens our 
country for years now, that attacks our people in any way and leads [us] 
to disaster. We have to form a united front in order to take us to the 
position of the other elements in order to fight and regain our lost rights. 
[…] I am convinced that I‟m doing my duty to my community and my 
country. It is your duty to gather around me and fight together the 
national cause. The election is due next Wednesday. On that day you are 
charged with the duty to come to the ballot boxes and honour with the 
white vote those who share the same ideas with you. On that day maybe 
some of you will witness a great rise in your work or, for example, 
someone‟s child may die. Postpone the burial for the following day. But 
never postpone voting. Because the dead is gone. There‟s time for the 
burial. But the Election Day is concrete and definite. The following 
Wednesday turns a new page for the Turkish Cypriot community. This 
page has been turned in order for our community to take its condition and 
its future in its hands. We expect courage and bravery on your behalf on 
this marvelous day. You are charged with the duty to paralyze with your 
own vote the Evkâf power that organized all kinds of plots to blind and 
paralyze the community and does not appreciate you. […] On Wednesday 
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night, once it is recognized that the Evkâf power is destroyed the people 
will celebrate and we will make the celebrations official.370  
 
The article was published on the eve of the elections and the message was clear. 
Necati Özkan used the Kemalist address to the youth in order to appeal to the Kemalist ideals 
that had become popular among the Turkish Cypriots. The author also appealed to the Turkish 
Cypriot electorate‟s sense of duty, arguing that it had to remove the Evkâf delegate from his 
office. He asked his followers to sacrifice themselves for the “fatherland” (memleket), 
reassuring them that he had done his duty by standing as a candidate. Necati Özkan was 
influenced by Kemalist ideology, which called for the sacrifice of the individual for the 
fatherland. The content of the appeal and the tone used by Necati Özkan are indicative of the 
opposition‟s confidence that they could question the authority of the Evkâf and overturn the 
decisions of the government. The balance of power and government policies did not justify 
this optimism. Moreover, the Legislative Council did not carry the weight of a parliamentary 
body and was often bypassed by the governor with Orders-in-Council. Nevertheless, Necati 
Özkan and the nationalist opposition believed that they had the support of the Turkish 
Cypriots and were certain that by winning the elections they could put forward their agenda.  
In an article entitled “Despotism is tumbling”, also published on the eve of the 
elections, the publisher and chief editor of Söz, Remzi Okan, called his readers to use their 
votes to overthrow the Evkâf administration: 
The Evkâf power, that fell over the people‟s heads for twenty five 
years in an unlawful manner and tried to strike all the power of the 
community by attacking people who wanted the rights, has become fairly 
furious in the last years and has lost its patience. We have estimated that 
the public opinion has been merging secretly for some time now against 
the tyranny and domination of the Evkâf power and we have reported that 
the elections taking place this year will be very turbulent and noisy. The 
Evkâfçılar have not been able to appreciate the power of the people that 
has been merging secretly, they are confused seeing today‟s movement 
and have come to a point where they do not know what to do and what to 
say. […] In the speeches that were delivered in Yeni Cami, Asma Altı 
and Kanlı Mescit five to six thousand people were gathered without 
exaggeration.371 These people are a power and this power has undertaken 
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a duty against the tyranny and domination that is threatening us. In this 
way the demolition of the domains that constitute this domination is a 
matter of one day. With the tumbling of this despotism a special 
revolution will take place in the name of the Turks of Cyprus. All 
servants of the fatherland have undertaken a duty in this revolution and 
are working wholeheartedly. There are some exceptions though that are 
found among every nation and are given the name “Dog of the nation”. 
Everyone, villager or city dweller, has understood that the Evkâf 
administration is an association that wrecked and scattered the 
community. And those related to this department are neither innocent nor 
reliable. Even if they are imams or preachers. Therefore the Evkâf power 
is obliged to kneel down before the power of the people and will do so. 
The people are demonstrating their common excitement that the tyranny 
and the despotism of the Evkâf is exaggerated and that the sun of freedom 
will rise for us from its rumble. At the eve of the revolution this is what 
we perceive our task to be and we believe that the outcome of the 
revolution will be manifested in this way. With the people‟s vote the 
tyranny and despotism will surely come to an end.372  
 
Remzi Okan went a step beyond Necati Özkan by describing not only Mehmet 
Münir‟s Evkâf term, but also Musa İrfan‟s term between 1904 and 1925, as despotic and 
tyrannical. Remzi Okan frequently used such harsh comments in his editorials and the 
proximity to the election date encouraged such provocative language. The idea of a common 
front encompassing all Turkish Cypriots against the Evkâf administration is repeated in this 
article as well, but there is special reference to the opponents who are considered an exception 
and portrayed in a derogatory manner with the words “the community‟s dog”. 373  It is 
noteworthy that, like Necati Özkan, Remzi Okan too promised a brighter future to the 
supporters of the opposition, knowing that Münir Bey enjoyed the support of the colonial 
government and his dismissal was no easy task.  
Finally, on 14th October 1930, Ahmet Raşit published an article in Söz under the title 
“may God make you prosper” (Yolun açık olsun):  
Fellow citizens! Where are you going in such a hurry? Are you going to 
clean off a dust of fifty years? In that case may God prosper you. Go! 
Where you are going there is a miracle of salvation. Run. Don‟t be late. 
Don‟t wait even one minute. Suddenly gloom and darkness overwhelms 
you. Your head is spinning, you eyes are clouded and you‟re about to fall 
again off a deeper clift. Be careful. You won‟t find anyone to drag you 
out afterwards.There, in the darkness, you will lose yourself, your 
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honour, your glory and your offspring. When you came here three 
hundreed years ago you came as a lion. Think what happened afterwards. 
What state did they bring you into? Think and find the reason. Know well 
this disastrous circle that has captured you. You didn‟t search, you didn‟t 
ask, you didn‟t doubt even for a moment about your wealth that you 
sumbmitted in their hands. They fed on your happiness, your welfare, 
your tranquility and they poisoned you like a snake; know that they set 
you up an ambush. They will promise you very attractive presents that 
will open your appetite. Don‟t approach them! They are liars and bitter 
like the oleander of hell. When you taste them you may not feel that 
bitterness. But later all your property will be crushed and you will be 
alienated from humanity. Fellow citizen! Do not sacrifice yourself! Don‟t 
let the heritage that you will leave to your children be poisoned and 
chained. What you will leave to that pure, virgin generation should not be 
poverty and calamity. Know yourself. You are the son of the Turkish 
nation that has lived in freedom forever. Your spirit that is used to flying 
always up high should not descend even for one minute. […] It‟s obvious 
from your hurry. You‟re running to reach your sacred ideal as soon as 
possible. […] From now on a new life will begin for you, you will obtain 
the paradise that belongs to you, your paradise of happiness. Your nation 
will be saved, your existence will be saved, finally you will be saved. 
Stay close to Necati. Don‟t leave his back not even one second and you 
will be successful like you were fifty years ago. Go on! May god prosper 
you! All the wishes, of my heart, all my prayers are with you. Come on, 
fellow citizen, be ready for Necati‟s feast.374 
  
 The author, Ahmet Reşit, one of the most consistent supporters of Kemalist ideology 
in Cyprus, not only accused the Evkâf administration of deceiving the Turkish Cypriot people 
(sana pusu kurdular) but also went a step further by reminding his readers of the 
consequences of British administration. Although there was no direct reference to the colonial 
government, the author identified the Evkâf administration with British rule and in this way 
blamed both for the misfortunes of the community. It is interesting that Ahmet Raşit, like the 
Söz editor, only focused on the first electoral district and the election of Necati Özkan, not on 
the other two Kemalist candidates. Even if we take into consideration that Söz was published 
in Nicosia, one would expect a call for the election of all Kemalist candidates. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the defeat of Mehmet Münir was of utmost importance for the opposition, hence 
more emphasis was put on the first electoral district. Again, the defeat of Mehmet Münir was 
portrayed as the beginning of a new life for the Turkish Cypriot community. Such was the 
optimism of the Kemalist opposition on the eve of the elections.  
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An issue that caused discontent in conservative circles was the direct involvement of 
Turkish Consul Ali Asaf Bey in the elections in favour of the nationalist candidates. 
Necmeddin Eyüb accused the Consul of visiting his electoral district twice and meeting with 
the candidates of the opposition.375 The colonial government did not believe that there was 
direct evidence of the Consul‟s interference in local politics. Nevertheless, the Colonial 
Government suspected him of acting on his own, not according to orders from Ankara, in 
order to support the Turkish Cypriot nationalists.376 In any case, Hakikat maintained that the 
news of his removal from Cyprus on November, 17th 1930 “were received with satisfaction” 
in the island.377 
 
The election results and the aftermath 
  
 The elections were a triumph for Necati Özkan, who got 450 votes more than 
Mehmet Münir in Nicosia-Keryneia district. Mehmet Zekâ bey was elected as the only 
candidate in Famagusta-Larnaca district, while Eyüp Necmeddin was the only conservative 
candidate to be elected in Limassol-Paphos district, albeit with a margin of only 24 votes. The 
colonial government, as was to be expected, was not satisfied with the result and attributed 
Necati Özkan‟s victory to the attacks against the Evkâf delegate and the references to the issue 
of the administration of the Lycée.378 The Kemalist press rejoiced at the result. With an article 
on the 28th of October entitled “The People‟s victory, the manifestation of justice”, Mehmet 
Remzi focused on the defeat of the Evkâfçı party and the ramifications for the Turkish 
Cypriots:  
[…] We don‟t know what these yes men will say about this stance that 
brought this whirlwind to the people, [the yes men] who attempted to 
present as a rogue class those who protested for the wrong and crooked 
policies of the Evkâfçı and exhibited their concern for the disasters that 
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will arise from these policies. We only know that Söz and all its fellow 
thinkers fulfilled the duty they undertook towards the people in an honest 
way and the steady and undaunted vote of the people has proved that with 
this victory. […] From now on there‟s no turning back on the issue of 
whether the Evkâf delegate is a [state] officer or not. For with this result 
the people have categorically decided in that matter. Now the task that 
falls over the Evkâfçı and their accomplices is to respect the plebiscite 
and all of us as a common target to protect and defend the highest 
interests of the Turkish Cypriot community.379  
  
 It was obvious that the nationalist party gained much more than an election. The 
result proved that the Evkâf delegate and government policy were not invincible. The demand 
for the curtailing of Mehmet Münir‟s powers was expressed in a more urgent way that 
reflected the self-confidence of the nationalist front. At the same time, despite the personal 
attacks and the often harsh language used, the author appealed to the need for unity for the 
sake of the community. In the same edition of Söz, Ahmet Raşit wrote an enthusiastic article 
about the result:  
 
“Now we all feel the lightness and quiet of those that have been freed 
from heavy chains. What was this endless and inexhaustible torment and 
pain? In the name of the Evkâf the reign of the dead had dragged the 
living through misery and derogation. As if some zombies from centuries 
ago imposed themselves on our national and social structure and were 
leading us to an abyss of destruction and decline. And we all followed 
senselessly and without will this blind power like a dead body. Nobody 
had the power to open their mouth. An obscure network of spies against 
the conscience and the ideas, imposed itself against the mouths that 
wanted their rights like a fist. Are you civil servants? You shall not 
advance! Are you a tradesman? You must starve to death! If you are a 
teacher you must always keep your mouth shut! Being a competent 
professional is the biggest sin. Are you uttering the word “Turk”? There‟s 
no bigger crime than that. Speeches, criticism all this is a crime. […] 
Dear fellow citizen! Don‟t you see what you did with one strike? […] 
You will be able to discuss your problems without looking around, 
without feeling anxiety or grief. You will swear in your Turkishness and 
pronounce it. […] Your national pride will increase.380  
  
 The “old regime” is depicted in this article too as vicious and inhuman. Ahmet Raşit, 
however, refers to national pride that was humiliated and suppressed by the Evkâf 
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administration and the colonial government. In this way, the Evkâfçılar are portrayed not only 
as oppressors but also and most importantly as deniers of their Turkish identity. The readers 
are reassured that the victory of the Kemalist candidates will not only bring justice to the 
community, but also allow the Turkish Cypriots to claim their Turkishness (Türklük), which 
the government and its accomplices had allegedly suppressed.  
 Hakikat, the organ of the Evkâfçı, did not share Söz‟s enthusiasm about the result. In 
an article published on 28 October 1930, under the title “Elections”, the newspaper expressed 
its discontent with the defeat of Mehmet Münir and its objections to the good intentions of 
Necati Özkan and his partners:  
Every individual, group of part must face the result of the elections with 
good will and must respect the new members to render good services to 
the country. […] Many people believed that the only power which could 
support the Muslims in this island was the Evkâf power. As the result of 
this belief İrfan Bey had been the dominant leader of the Turkish policy 
in Cyprus for 15 years. After his death Münir Bey was considered to be a 
more suitable leader, as a lawyer, as our sole specialist in Finance, as a 
linguist and as an experienced man. Münir Bey, during the last five years, 
dealt with such great works that could only be accomplished in a long 
period. [...] Münir Bey did not succeed, this time, in having the majority 
of the votes on his side, owing to some reasons and to the propaganda 
made against him. It is a fact, however, that Islam in this country, which 
for many years lacked every organization and self-support, maintained its 
existence relying on the power of the Evkâf. Those who have set aside 
this power have, surely, undertaken a great responsibility. It is now for 
them to retain and strengthen the position of the Community. They may 
either succeed in doing so, or may drag the people into ruins in case they 
pursue a faulty or defective policy. Time will watch them. They must not 
forget that the time to come, which will be full of complaints, will ask 
them to render accounts for their deeds.381  
 
As was to be expected, Hakikat defended Münir Bey, attributed his defeat to 
propaganda and maintained that government policies did not harm the Turkish Cypriot 
community; on the contrary, they strengthened its position on the island. Furthermore, the 
article expressed the fear that Necati Özkan and his policies would harm the community. This 
was an indirect reference to the value that good relations with the government had for the 
community.  
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Replying to a comment by Söz that “there is a limit to loyalty and obedience” [to the 
Colonial government], Hakikat defended the community‟s loyalty to the Colonial 
Government:  
The Muslim community in this country, which is in minority and in the 
position of self-defense against powerful competitors has been able 
during the last fifty years to hold its position with the sympathy and 
support of the Government; and the most important factor which has 
secured this sympathy and support is the secure loyalty of the Moslem 
Community to the British Crown. The smallest action that will show that 
this loyalty will possibly be shaken, will, no doubt, put the community 
into a grave position. We may have some demands from the Government 
and these demands may totally or partly be accepted or refused but the 
loyalty of the Moslem Community to the British Crown will never be 
shaken. From this point of view the words “there is a limit to loyalty and 
obedience” quoted above from Söz are very dangerous.382  
   
 Hakikat saw the realization of its fears that the alliance with the government could be 
shaken. In this article, the newspaper repeats the permanent argument of the Evkâfçılar: the 
difficult position of the community and its struggle to secure its rights could only be secured 
through the demonstration of loyalty to the colonial government. The newspaper is thus 
referring to the Greek Cypriot community as a threat in order to justify the maintenance of 
good relations with the government.  
 Hakikat was in open debate with Söz and the two newspapers exchanged harsh 
words. When Söz maintained that the Evkâf should enjoy the independence of the 
Ecclesiastical institutions of the Orthodox Church, Hakikat published an article accusing Söz 
implying that the “Ecclesiastical organization is better than the Evkâf administration”. Hakikat 
used this argument in order to maintain the argument that “they [Söz] are not ashamed of 
attacking our religion and declaring that they consider it an insult to be called Moslems.” 
According to the newspaper:  
[…] the writer that denies the fact that he is a Moslem Turk deserves to 
be called by us a villain or national enemy. There is no doubt that these 
persons who pretend to be Reformers but who are nothing but money 
agents are well known to the Government. There is no seniority 
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whatsoever in their writings. They complain against the present Evkâf 
System but their object is to fill their own stomachs.383  
  
 It is obvious from this commentary that, just as the Kemalist commentators 
exaggerated in their articles that they were denied the right to call themselves Turks, the pro-
government commentator in this case complained that their opponents were denying and 
insulting their own faith. The author proceeded to a more serious accusation, that of personal 
interests that drove the anti-Evkâf party. As we have seen, control of the religious 
endowments by Mehmet Münir and his clique entailed financial benefits. Although the 
nationalists did not accuse the Evkâfçılar of maladministration and corruption, they implied 
that the latter used their power in order to protect their own interests. In an attempt to refute 
these accusations, the Evkâfçılar claimed that the main motivation of the nationalists was to 
secure access to the wealth of the Evkâf and that they used the Kemalist reforms as a pretext. 
These were serious allegations and, due to the intensity of the debate between the two parties, 
they were frequently expressed by both sides. If we attempt to look behind the ferocity of the 
electoral campaign and the often extreme language used in the press, we can conclude that the 
issues at stake were the administration of the religious institutions and the autonomy of the 
community.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The 1930 Legislative Council elections provided an opportunity for the anti-Evkâf 
party to test their influence and question the power of the Evkâfçılar. On the one hand, there 
was the omnipotent Mehmet Münir Bey, delegate of the Evkâf and supporter of British policy, 
who had extended his control over the community through a clientelist network. On the other 
hand, young and self-made entrepreneur Necati Özkan encompassed the anti-Evkâf power. 
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Although the members of the Legislative Council did not have significant powers, the 
opposition put great emphasis on the elections. The defeat of Mehmet Münir was considered 
an opportunity to amend government policies regarding the Turkish Cypriot community. The 
electoral campaign focused on governmental policy, with the Evkâfçılar supporting Mehmet 
Münir and the government, using as a pretext the need to protect the community with the help 
of the British. The nationalists pushing for greater independence for the community‟s 
institutions accused the Evkâfçilar of using their office in order to serve their own interests 
rather than the community‟s. The nationalists placed great emphasis on the elections despite 
the fact that the legislative council members could not influence or dictate government 
policies. The following year, the Legislative Council was abolished anyway, after the Greek 
Cypriot riots. Nevertheless, the confidence of the nationalist party and the certainty that the 
Kemalist revolution would prevail in Cyprus as it had done in Turkey allowed them to openly 
challenge the main Turkish Cypriot policy, that of loyalty to the government.  
 The Evkâfçılar appealed to the need for stability and security, presenting themselves 
as guardians of the community against Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. The preservation 
of the status quo was considered the only option the community had to safeguard its position 
in the island. The opposition was not only accused of being irresponsible or reckless, but also 
of serving the interests of the Greek Cypriots. Contrarily, the nationalists‟ discourse did not 
include any reference to the Greek Cypriots. It seems as if the nationalists‟ only concern was 
the British administration and its policy of strict control over the Turkish Cypriot community. 
At this stage, the nationalists were more concerned with the elimination of the anti-Kemalist 
party and the prevalence of nationalist ideas. Encouraged by the victory over the Evkâf 
delegate, the nationalist party, led by Necati Özkan, proceeded to their next move, the 
organization of the National Congress (Milli Kongre) in 1931, which formulated their 
demands in the most official way.  
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CHAPTER 7 – THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 1931, THE OCTOBER RIGHTS 
AND THE END OF POLITICAL AGITATION  
 One year after the electoral triumph of 1930, the nationalists gained enough 
confidence and power to proceed to their next step. The presence of two nationalist members 
in the Legislative Council soon proved insufficient for the implementation of the anti-Evkâf 
agenda. The Delegate of the Evkâf, Mehmet Münir Bey, despite his electoral defeat, was 
removed from neither that post nor from any of his other ones. In fact, he headed the Evkâf 
department and presided over the Turkish Cypriot School Committee until 1948. 384  The 
colonial government was not willing to break its alliance with the obedient Evkâçılar and side 
with the nationalist party. The former continued to control the Turkish Cypriot institutions 
and in return pledged allegiance to the government. The Colonial Government had a reason to 
tackle the rise of Turkish nationalism: by the end of the 1920s, parts of the Greek Cypriot elite 
had adopted an anti-Government and pro-Enosis rhetoric. The formation of a joint anti-
government front was not an easy task and could only temporarily satisfy contradictory 
political interests in both elites. The government though had every reason to fear a common 
anti-government alliance.  
 Necati Özkan and his supporters, on the other hand, encouraged by their success in 
the elections, tried to challenge the government‟s policies, but the existing framework did not 
provide enough opportunities for an overturning of the status quo. Given that the Legislative 
Council did not function as a parliament and hence did not allow for political parties, the 
Turkish Cypriot nationalists were unable to propagate their ideas in an official way that could 
convoke as many Turkish Cypriots as possible and thus work as a means of exerting pressure 
on the government. Under these circumstances, the second Turkish Cypriot National 
Congress (Milli Kongre) convened in 1931, under the leadership of Necati Özkan. This 
chapter will discuss the importance of the Congress for Turkish Cypriot nationalism, the 
political activity that led to the Congress and the decisions that were taken. The objections to 
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the congress by the Evkâfçılar will also be presented in order to highlight the principles of the 
conservative elite and their motives. The second part of the chapter will discuss the October 
1931 disturbances and the impact they had on Turkish Cypriot politics.  
 
The road to the National Congress 
 
 After the 1931 elections, the nationalist elite occupied two of the three Turkish 
Cypriot seats in the Legislative Council. The Greek Cypriots were represented with twelve 
members but this nine-vote majority was not enough for them to put forward their agenda due 
to the presence of six unelected British members. Until then, the Turkish Cypriot members 
belonged in most cases to the pro-British elite and, as a rule, voted with the colonial 
government. Now was the first time that the Colonial Government could not rely on the 
Turkish Cypriot members‟ votes.  
 Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zekâ emphasised the main issues that aggrieved the 
Turkish Cypriot community: the abolition of the Religious Courts and the office of the Mufti; 
their subordination to the office of the Evkâf; and the accumulation of all powers in the hands 
of the Evkâf delegate, Mehmet Münir. Seeing that the government had no intention of 
changing its policies, Necati Özkan focused on a more feasible target – a change of guard in 
the governing body of the Turkish Lycée in Nicosia.385 For the nationalist forces, the presence 
of an English headmaster in the only Turkish high school was symbolic of governmental 
control over Turkish Cypriot education. After the elections, Mehmet Münir, Necmedin Eyüb 
and two British members of the Lycée were replaced by Necati Özkan, Mehmet Zekâ, Μ. 
Behaeddin and Hüseyin Zihni Efendi.386 After their election, the new committee insisted on 
the appointment of a Turkish headmaster. The government did not deem it necessary to 
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succumb to the nationalists‟ pressure and used the Evkâf‟s funding of the school to force the 
committee to take a more conciliatory attitude.387 
 The issue of the Lycée‟s administration offered a first-class opportunity for the 
nationalists to assess their power and force the government to change its policies with regard 
to the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot institutions. The Greek Cypriots did not fail to notice 
this preference of the nationalists to escalate the dispute with the Colonial Government. When 
Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zekâ sent a memorial to the governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, asking – 
among other things – that a Turkish headmaster be appointed to the Lycée, the governor 
answered that he was unable to change his decisions. 388  The Greek Cypriot newspaper 
Eleftheria (Freedom) was quick to pick up the issue and accused the government of “carrying 
out a coup d‟état against Turkish education”. Söz reacted positively to this comment in the 
Greek Cypriot press. In an article under the title “Our Secondary Education and the Greek 
Press”, the newspaper welcomed Greek Cypriot support in the following words:  
 
It‟s impossible not to be pleased and grateful for this interest of 
Eleftheria. We shall never forget the value of this high interest and 
support that has been showed to us in such dangerous times. This support 
is by itself a friendly event and it will essentially warn both elements of 
the inevitabilities and necessities against the unfortunate destiny of the 
life under the foreign administration of Cyprus. In order for them [the 
Greek Cypriots] not to suffer tomorrow without any reason what we 
suffer today it is possible to embrace all actions and movements that will 
be applied to the Greek Cypriots.389  
 
 The author, Ahmet Raşit, went on, expressing the need for mutual support and 
cooperation of the two communities against the colonial government. Cooperation between 
the nationalist elites was not frequent and this was one of the few cases where the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot nationalists united against the government. In order to appease his readers, 
Ahmet Raşit added: “This is an expression of our need to follow a legitimate and necessary 
line of action, so as to search for solutions in order to protect our existence and save ourselves 
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from the attack of the government, we are not defying the government, nor are we falling into 
the Greek Cypriots‟ arms.” 390 
 Necati Özkan followed this line of action. Before the opening of the Legislative 
Council in Febrary 1931, he submitted a joint resolution with Legislative Council member 
Theofanis Theodotou, asking for the abolition of the posts of Director and Assistant Director 
of Education and proposing the creation of two new posts, a Greek and a Turkish Director of 
Education.391 A few days later, he joined Georghios Hadjipavlou, a Greek Cypriot lawyer and 
politician, in his campaign for the by-elections of 1931.392 Necati Özkan was received warmly 
by the Greek Cypriot crowd, whom he openly advised to vote for Hadjipavlou because “he 
belonged to the Greek popular party”.393  
 Sooner or later, this alliance transferred into the Legislative Council. The Legislative 
Council offered the nationalists another opportunity to oppose the government. As long as the 
Turkish Cypriot members voted obediently with the government, the Greek Cypriot petitions 
were rejected and the bills presented by the government were passed without the need to 
resort to an Order-in-Council. Necati Özkan realized that the Turkish Cypriot nationalists 
could join the Greek Cypriot Enosists in the Council, in order to secure a united front against 
the government. Indeed, on various occasions following his election, Necati Özkan voted with 
his Greek Cypriot colleagues, in this way blocking the government‟s work and forcing the 
Governor to resort to an Order-in-Council. 394  When a Customs Bill was blocked in the 
Council, the Governor reacted angrily, calling Necati Özkan the “thirteenth Greek”, “a man of 
straw, who had been influenced by the Turkish Consul, Asaf Bey, who “had succeeded in 
creating a small but active element of opposition to the loyal Turkish majority”.395  
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 What the Colonial Government failed to realize was that the Kemalist party was not 
just a minority, and that the unconditional loyalty of the community could no longer satisfy 
the needs of an increasingly politicized elite, which had been fascinated by the achievements 
of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and was not happy with the absolute dependency of the 
community on the Colonial Government. Their temporary alliance with the Greek Cypriot 
nationalists proved that the Turkish Cypriot nationalists‟ loyalty to the Government could not 
be taken for granted.  
 The emancipation of the Turkish Cypriot nationalists from the control of the Colonial 
Government was yet to be expressed in a more vivid way. However, that happened at the 
National Congress on May 1, 1931. A week before, Necati Özkan, who was one of the 
organizers of the congress, made an open call for the participation of the Turkish Cypriots: 
 To the honorable Turkish Cypriot people, 
 Dear honorable compatriots,  
  There‟s no need to deny that we live very delicate and extraordinary 
days. Today, ahead of us lie some quite urgent issues that concern 
drastically our community and are imminent to the great interest of our 
community. […] The time has long arrived to solve these [issues] 
according to the wishes and the needs of the people and to inform the 
Government of our wishes. The demonstration of inertia and lack of spirit 
in this matter means that our national rights have suffered a loss. Our 
poor people will be again affected by the great damage that will occur as 
a consequence. For this reason it is our national duty to meet and 
designate a line of conduct according to the commands of our religion 
and our national needs and find the solutions that will protect our national 
rights that are threatened every day. It is my strong belief that no one 
should be absent from this call of patriotism. I‟m sure that our honourable 
people will demonstrate this time as well the vigilance that they have 
always demonstrated in regard to the national issues. We shall therefore 
demonstrate the highest sensitivity in these matters that concern the 
people‟s existence. 
 Next Friday I‟m expecting that the representatives that will be elected 
from every village and neighbourhood will participate attentively in the 
National Congress that will meet in my house in Nicosia at 10 o clock 
and in this direction [I expect] all kinds of sacrifice from the people. […]  
 The issues that will be treated are the Islamic Evkâf, the Religious 
Tribunals, the Lycée, the Muftiship and other issues and I consider it 
necessary to add that all these issues are matters of life.396  
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 In this call, which was also published in the newspaper Masum Millet (Innocent 
Nation), Necati Özkan set out the main objectives of the National Congress: the need for the 
Turkish Cypriot community to organize itself against the dangers posed by government 
policies. The national congress is crucial to the Kemalist narrative. The Erzurum congress in 
1919 initiated the Turkish War of Independence and the Sivas Conference in 1920 defined the 
national aims of the Turkish nation under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Necati 
Özkan, an ardent Kemalist himself, was the rightful leader of the nationalist party after his 
triumph in the 1930 elections and hence led the campaign for the congress. In his manifesto, 
he referred to the national needs (milli ihtiyacat) that were under threat and needed to be 
protected. The use of the term „national‟ differentiated Necati Özkan from the Evkâfçılar, 
because the latter preferred to address the community using religious rather than political 
terms. Since the notion of a Turkish Cypriot nationalism had not evolved yet, with the use of 
the term “national”, Necati Özkan referred to Turkish nationalism and includes the Turkish 
Cypriots in the Turkish nation.397 The issues in question, though, are of a purely Turkish 
Cypriot nature and one can trace the beginning of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, as this 
evolved through the later stages of British rule against British colonialism on the one hand 
and Greek Cypriot nationalism on the other.  
 On May 1, 1931, representatives from 150 villages met in Necati Özkan‟s home. A 
committee was elected by the participants, with the responsibility to put forward the decisions 
adopted. Members of the committee were Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zekâ, members of the 
Legislative Council, lawyer Ahmet Sait, author of numerous letters against the Evkâf 
delegate, lawyers Fazıl Bey and Rifat Bey, publisher of the newspaper Masum Millet, lawyer 
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and Söz newspaper columnist Ahmet Raşit Bey and doctors Pertev Bey and Şevki Bey.398 The 
congress, which lasted for about six hours, took the following decisions.  
1. The Congress takes cognizance of its right to enjoy the same powers 
and privileges enjoyed by the other communities in connection with 
Secondary Education, which it asks most earnestly and fervently. It 
strongly requests and prays that the laws in force governing this matter 
may be fully respected, that the bodies constituted under the Law may 
carry out their duties and exercise their powers quite freely, that the 
sources of revenue to be utilized for the development of Secondary 
Education may be maintained as special funds for the Lycée, as 
heretofore, and that the Government may seriously consider and support 
the possibility of securing increased sources of revenue.  
 2. The Moslem people of Cyprus having very deeply felt the religious 
need for a Mufti and the great want of Spiritual Head, as in the case of 
other communities, the Congress revives the office of the Mufti, which 
existed for many centuries and which exists in all Moslem communities 
living in all parts of the world, as a post free from every effect and 
influence, to be held by a person to be elected by the community. It also 
considers it imperative that the privileges and rights which are enjoyed by 
other communities in this respect, and which were possessed by the 
Turkish community until 1928, when they were abolished contrary to its 
will and consent, should be acknowledges anew, that the cost of the 
organization of Muftiship should be defrayed from the Evkâf Treasury, 
which belongs to the community, that a law should be enacted prescribing 
the Mutfi‟s qualifications, duties and powers, and that the duties and 
powers which are at present being unlawfully carried out and exercised 
by the Delegates of Evkâf, one of whom in a non Moslem, should be 
included in his duties and powers.  
 3. The Turkish National Congress of Cyprus warns the Government of 
the necessity of maintaining the independence of the Sheri Court, which 
is a privilege and an acquired right of the Moslem community, supported 
by Treaties and of defraying their cost from Public Estimates, as before, 
and expects that the Government should take a course of action, showing 
respect, thereby, to the rights of the community. In case this proves 
impossible to be obtained, after strong representations, the Congress is 
convinced that it is justified to ask that the jurisdiction of these Courts, 
which are maintained unindependently and abnormally, which are not 
inspiring confidence to the community on account of their position, 
which are unable to protect and secure the regularity and perfectness of 
the family rights, which, as Courts, are found under the influence of the 
Evkâf Department, and which are entitled to exercise a very limited 
jurisdiction, should be transferred to Law Courts, to be exercised by the 
Turkish Judges attached to such Courts. The Congress insists on this, and 
considers it imperative that a Code should be published governing the 
cases to be tried in these Courts, whatever their form may be.  
 4. The Congress having taken into consideration the fact that the 
Islamic Evkâf are purely the properties of the community, and an 
institution dedicated by its ancestors for charitable and educational 
purposes, is convinced that the administration thereof is vested in the 
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community. Therefore, in the charitable, religious and educational 
interests of the community, it considers it most necessary and imperative 
that the Islamic Evkâf Institution should be relieved from is religious 
duties and be converted into a purely financial institution, that such 
religious duties should be transferred to the Mufti, who is the proper 
authority for the performance thereof, that the administration of the said 
institution should be entrusted to a Governing Body composed of six 
Turkish members to be elected by the Cyprus Turkish national Congress, 
once every three years, and of one British member to be appointed by the 
Government, that the said institution should be managed as a Bank and be 
governed by a law similar to that governing the Municipal Corporations, 
and that the Moslem Religious Properties Order in Council of 1928 
should be repealed. This Governing Body will hold office for three years, 
on the expiration of which it will be re-elected by the said Congress: 
Provided that in case the Congress cannot meet on account of any reason 
the said election will be made by the Central Committee of the Congress. 
[…] 
 6. The Congress, relying on the express right of the Community, and 
also on the satisfactory statement made by the Honourable Colonial 
Secretary in the Council during the Session of 1931 in connection with 
the right and freedom of the Turkish Community to elect a Mufti, does 
elect and declare Ahmed Said Effendi of Paphos, the Advocate, to be the 
Mufti and the Spiritual Head of the Turkish Community of Cyprus, and 
requests that the Government may recognize this election.”399  
 
 The elected committee was appointed for three years and its office would be extended 
for a year. Its duties were to negotiate with the government over all issues that affected the 
community. A few days later, Ahmed Said was elected president of the committee, lawyer 
Bahaettin Bey, deputy president, and lawyer Ahmed Raşit, secretary.400 For the nationalists 
the congress was the consolidation of the state of affairs that had been created with the 1930 
elections. The congress addressed all issues affecting the community, but used the 
participation of representatives from all parts of the island in order to emphasize its 
legitimacy. The most important decision, though, was the election of a Mufti, whose position 
had been abolished in 1930. The demand for the restoration of the Muftiship and the election 
of a Mufti by the people was related to the need for the emergence of a religious leader who 
would unite the community and act as rival to the Greek Cypriot archbishop. Yet the Mufti 
would serve not only as a religious leader but also as a political one.401 Hence, the demand for 
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a Mufti elected by the people could be described as a controversy, since the Kemalist reforms 
demanded that religion should be separate from politics and, in Turkey, the Mufti was 
appointed by the government. This controversy, too, was portrayed in the terminology of the 
declaration. It is interesting that the translator of the declaration in English, a government 
official, translates the term “The Turkish people of the island” (Cezire Türk Halkı) as “the 
Moslems of Cyprus”, respecting the colonial government‟s decision to refer to the two 
communities using religious rather than ethnic terms.  
 On the 6th of May, 1931, Ahmet Said issued a manifesto after his election, which was 
published in the nationalist press the following week.  
 With the help of God, and with the support of the people I have been 
elected at the Congress held on the 1st May, 1931, to be the Mufti of 
Cyprus. On this date a new era has been inaugurated in the life of the 
Turks of Cyprus. […] My guide in religious matters will be the Quran 
and the Hadis, and my principles in social and national life will be the 
principles of civilization which led the civilized world to the summit of 
prosperity. It will be my firm desire to improve and elevate the religious 
sentiments and the morals of the community. My only supporter in these 
important tasks is the continuous confidence and assistance of the people. 
The awakening and the self consciousness displayed by the people. The 
awakening and the self consciousness displayed by the people to my great 
satisfaction and pleasure, have actuated me to accept this difficult post. I 
am aware of the limits, extent and importance of this post, and I swear 
today in the name of everything which is sacred to me that I shall not 
abstain from making every sacrifice in this respect, even if it be at the 
cost of my life, and that I shall not cease, even for one moment, from 
trying to promote the general interests of the people. But, I must add that 
I expect that the people also should perform the duty that is incumbent on 
them, so that my efforts should be remunerative. All communities that 
fell under foreign rule succeeded in maintaining and defending their 
existence and honour only by making such sacrifices and by close 
cooperation. This is the way of salvation for us, too.402  
 
 Ahmet Said, who was a lawyer but also an expert in Islamic law, tried to emphasize 
the legitimacy of his election in his manifesto, pointing out the confidence of the people. It is 
also striking that one of Said‟s promises was to lead his people on the path of the civilized 
world. One cannot fail to see that the Mufti, elected by a Congress organized by Kemalists, 
adopted a rhetoric that was quite often repeated in Kemalist discourse: the need for progress 
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and modernization. Yet, by pledging to lead the Turkish Cypriots to “prosperity”, Ahmet Said 
addressed the community‟s material rather than spiritual needs. The election of a Mufti by the 
congress did not contradict the Kemalist principle of secularism (layıklık). It was an attempt 
to endow the Turkish Cypriots with a leader who would support the community‟s rights 
against the British and the Greek Cypriots.  
 The nationalist press, Söz and Masum Millet, commented enthusiastically on the 
National Congress and its decisions:403  
 There are not right and appropriate expressions to describe the 
national and general Turkish Cypriot Congress in its full sense. While the 
representatives from over a hundred and fifty villages of the island rushed 
to the centre surpassing long years with a tiny sign it was impossible not 
to notice the deep traces of the negative and harmful actions of those who 
played a destructive role over the existence and future of these 
[representatives] who pressed their spirit and conscience in this action.  
There‟s no doubt that a powerful and serious factor motivated the people 
and urged them to act from the Karpass peninsula to the city of Paphos as 
if caught in an electric current. What is this factor, this serious reason? 
Where does this power that excites the people spring from? 
In order to understand this it‟s necessary to draw and uncover the long 
and disastrous history of the Turkish people of the island. For half a 
century the destiny of this innocent people has been deceived and 
mistreated. Everyone benefitted from the weak structures of the 
Community and looked at the people from the angle of one‟s personal 
benefit. Some bad guides were busy caring for their own present and 
future and crushed the Community; the people entrusted them innocently 
their rights and they neglected them completely. The community was 
losing something from its rights, its existence, and its honour. No hope, 
no ambition was left. A black shadow covered everything. Everyone was 
feeling a pressure arising from a spiritual need. The current situation 
could not go on. Something had to be destroyed, to be overthrown. The 
power that broke the spirit of the community that knotted its throat had to 
be crushed.  
The people made the first attack and were successful. But it could not 
satisfy the people that much. The power that had been destroyed did not 
leave nothing to the people in the name of justice, in the name of its 
existence and honour. The people after the excitement and the joy of the 
first victory fully understood that there is a new need. Now [the 
community] has come to the point of starting again and recovering the 
national honour and the rights that were lost in the hands of those unfit 
and unpatriotic. For the aggressive power did not abandon its evil 
intentions of rendering the national movement fruitless and futile and 
confusing the situation. They were going around in the dark, hiding and 
attacked their victims like mischievous insects trying to paralyze the 
national structure with their murdering poison. The people sensed that 
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from far away and were waiting for a sign. The real meaning of the great 
motion and excited participation that was caused by the short invitation of 
Necati Bey, a devoted and people-friendly deputy reflect this sensitivity 
and this need.  
 There is no short cut in the people‟s search for their rights. This 
community had a Mufti for centuries. Nevertheless this post has now 
vanished forever. The Sheri Courts continued to upset our family life and 
to destruct our social structure. A stop had to be put to that. The Islamic 
Evkâf seemed like a terrible dagger piercing our hearts with our own 
money. It was necessary to save ourselves from this destruction and use it 
as a useful weapon for the Community. Our legal rights over our 
Secondary Education were harmed. It was an urgent need to reach the 
blessed day when an end would be put to that. In front of such serious 
needs for the life and the existence of all of us how was it possible and 
rightful for a Community to stay with their hands tied?  
 The national representatives fueled with a holy fire from the people 
overcame all obstacles and run to the capital defying the distance and all 
sacrifice; because the national task called. They came in order to draw up 
with their own hands the letter of salvation, to write themselves the 
National Pact. With a sincerity and calm that would make the most 
civilized, the most exalted nations blush and by defending the national 
rights they registered themselves in the most honoured pages in history  
 Our people have proved with this movement that they deserve the 
most exalted rights, the widest freedoms and the biggest honours. There‟s 
no excuse and no reason to deprive this honourable people from their 
rights that they defend with mutual support and power. The Turkish 
Cypriots are right to feel proud with this movement as much as they want. 
And we feel a deep pleasure with a belief that‟s coming from the depth of 
our hearts that we have reached national salvation.404  
 
  The nationalists considered the National Congress a continuation of the 1930 
Legislative Council elections. The inability of the nationalist deputies to put forward their 
agenda after their election justified the holding of a national Congress. The author praised the 
representatives and compared the decisions adopted by the congress to the National Pact 
(Misak-ı Milli), the manifesto issued by the Kemalists in 1920, based on the decisions of the 
Erzurum and Sivas congresses. The terms “national” (milli) and Turkish (Türk) are found in 
abundance, connecting the community with the Turks in mainland Turkey. By associating the 
Turkish Cypriot National Congress with the Turkish National Pact, the author not only linked 
the Congress to Kemalist Turkey; he presented the movement as an attempt at the rebirth of 
the community. The congress restored the community‟s honour and conservative opposition 
was portrayed again as a force that was causing the destruction of the community. One cannot 
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fail to notice the optimism of the author that the government was going to accept the decisions 
of the congress.  
  Details about the identity of the 150 representatives have been lost, due to a fire in 
Necati Özkan‟s house, which destroyed the relevant documents.405 Hence, it is difficult to 
determine the social status of the participants and also the election procedures. Due to the 
absence of detailed minutes, we cannot be sure about the unanimity of opinions. In an article 
about the discussions and the decisions taken, we read that a certain Yusuf Ziya maintained 
that the Mufti and the Fetva Eminiliği were the same, although he contradicted himself, 
expressing his discontent over the abolition of the office of the Mufti.406 The most important 
representatives of the Evkâfçılar were not invited or preferred to ignore the congress. While 
Turkish Cypriot historiography refers extensively to the articles of the Turkish Cypriot Press 
praising the congress, there is little reference to the opposition to the conference.407  
  Hakikat commented on the Congress in a rather ironic way:408  
 The world is full of wonders. According to a Reuters telegram from 
Paris dated 13th May, twenty persons, including an unemployed, an 
electrician, a waiter, and a pensioned railway man, submitted their names 
to the minister of interior as candidates for the presidency of the French 
Republic.   
This action which will create a surprise in every part of the world, as well 
as in Cyprus, is not the only example of this curious ambition. Ambition, 
which, sometimes becomes excessive in bigger places, is usually more 
limited in smaller countries. An example of this may be seen in the recent 
action of those who elected a so called Mufti at a time when this office is 
occupied by the Fetva Emini, who is recognized by the whole country 
and by the British Government, and also in the action of the Pretending 
Mufti, who has readily arrogated himself the Muftiship.  
Were the effect of this action to be confined only to ourselves, we could 
only laugh and shrug our shoulders at it, but, unfortunately it is reaching 
further and creating a disagreeable position. This is why we consider it 
not only curious but regrettable too. In fact, the Government notice dates 
15th May, which is reproduced in this issue of our paper, clearly shows to 
us how this action was taken by the Government. The Government is 
expressly telling us that will not recognize this election under no 
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circumstances, that any person who arrogates to himself the authority of a 
Mufti without being entitled to it will make himself liable to prosecution, 
that the sole authority entitled to issue fetvas is the Fetva Emini, that this 
action is inconsistent with the true interests of the Moslem Community, 
and that it may produce grave results.  
It is obvious that the question is too serious to be considered a joke. It 
seems to be capable of dragging the Moslem minority into the ditch, 
which has no other supporter in this Country than the Government. We 
therefore ask these men who are acting blindly: Where are you going 
gentlemen? Were the responsibility of your action to be confined only to 
you, you could do whatever you liked? But, unfortunately you are 
dragging into the ditch the whole community with you, and you have no 
right to do so. 
You must realize the gravity of the situation which you have created 
hiding yourselves under the cover of patriotism and seducing some 
people.  
It is not the first time that the Community is put into this difficult 
position. We still remember the trouble which was created by Vejih 
Effendi. 409  Those who had at that time thought that Vejih Effendi‟s 
movement was a national movement, and who had been so foolishly 
attracted to it as to drag his carriage and to follow him in big masses, are 
now laughing at it. But what did that comical action cost to the 
Community? Today‟s movement also may be the subject of a similar 
humour in the future? But, the community can no longer afford to sustain 
the damages of these foolish actions, which we denounce. 
 We express again the hope that the Government will judge the Moslem 
Community not by the actions of these people but by the traditional 
sentiments of the Community itself.410 
 
  Hakikat denounced the Congress as being contrary to the interests of the Turkish 
Cypriots. The newspaper questioned the legitimacy of the Congress by challenging the right 
of the nationalist deputies to organize it, on the grounds that they only represented a small 
part of the community and that the consequences for the community would be grave. The 
arguments and the rhetoric of the author are evident in the policy of the Evkâfçılar, who 
emphasised the importance of the community‟s loyalty to the government. The argument that 
the interests of the community were under threat because the nationalists elected a Mufti 
without consulting the government is groundless. It gave away, among other things, the 
irritation of the Evkâfçılar with the initiatives of their opponents. The author also attacked 
Necati Özkan without referring to him by name. It is striking, though, that the article asked 
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the Government to disregard the Congress and reject all decisions adopted in the Congress. It 
demonstrates the close ties of the Evkâfçılar wıth the government and their distrust of the 
opposition‟s practices, as well as the distance between the two sides.  
 The election of the Mufti was what provoked the greatest reaction from the 
Evkâfçılar. In another article, published three weeks after the Congress, Hakikat attacked the 
organizers for “committing a fallacy”. The author rejected the new Mufti, claiming that he 
was “not entitled to interfere with the administration”.411 When the elected Mufti visited the 
city of Kyreneia, a few weeks after his election, Hakikat pointed out the illegitimate nature of 
his election by “130 persons for 70,000 Moslems in the island”. The article went on, 
denigrating the importance of the visit because the Mufti “was accompanied by 29 bicycles 
and 6 motor cars and those who were on bicycles were mostly children and school boys”.412  
  The issue of the abolition of the office of the Mufti was not only controversial for the 
nationalists. The replacement of the Mufti with a Fetva Eminliği should have provoked a 
reaction from the Evkâfçılar, because it constituted a direct political intervention in the 
community‟s religious affairs. Yet the Evkâfçılar did not react to such a violation of Islamic 
practices. In fact, Islam did not seem to be the focus of their policies. In supporting the 
subordination of the Islamic institutions to the Colonial government, the Evkâfçılar protected 
the status quo and their ruling position.  
  Instead, the newspaper preferred to focus on the policy followed by the nationalists, 
stating that it was dangerous for the Turkish Cypriot community for yet another reason – the 
Greek Cypriots used it for their own benefit.  
A Moslem investigator, who judges cool mindedly the recent state of 
affairs in Cyprus, can easily understand that the way into which some 
persons are leading the Moslem Community is full of danger.  
It is a well known fact that the Greeks of Cyprus have been trying for the 
last 40 years, by various means, to secure the annexation of Cyprus to 
Greece. They are using every effort towards this end by their speeches in 
the Legislative Council, by their memorials and deputations and by 
employing permanent agents in London. There are also some persons in 
some unofficial and irresponsible circles in England, who are supporting 
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the idea owing to the pro Hellenic feelings inspired to them by the 
literature and history of ancient Greece that they studied at the university. 
All these, combined together are trying to exercise an influence on those 
who are against Enosis. The negative replies which are up until now 
given to various representations made in favour of union, always 
mentioned inter alia, the fact that the British Government would not 
sacrifice the Moslem Community of Cyprus, who were loyal to the 
crown.  
In fact the Moslem Community of Cyprus followed a correct policy of 
loyalty to the British Government and this policy came, more than once, 
to our relief, in most critical times. In recent years, however, some 
persons began to deviate from this traditional policy. These persons are 
being encouraged by Greeks, whose object is to separate us from the 
Government and to show that the Moslems are no longer loyal and 
worthy of protection. The blind pursuit of this policy will surely put into 
difficult position those who depend upon the loyalty of the Moslems of 
Cyprus in their opposition to Enosis, and will weaken their arguments; 
and no one can assure us that this will not result in the realization of the 
Union, which we consider fatal.  
All these are sufficient to show that the new politicians are letting down 
the Community by their wrong policy and are facilitating Enosis quite 
blindly. The danger is visible with all its terrors. We must beware of this 
danger and take care not to lose our favourable position. The false 
pretensions of the Greeks in our favour are sufficient to awaken us. They 
stuck out from the Public Estimates the items of the Sheri Courts and of 
the Mufti. They are fighting with all their strength against the payment of 
the compensation of the Vakif tithes and they are even attacking the 
payment of a few piastres to some Moslem institutes and families which 
is an obligation inherited from the Turkish administration. Is it then 
possible to believe that they are now acting bona fide? Their object is no 
other than to separate us from the Government, to spoil our creditability 
and to deprive us of defense and support. Politicians and responsible 
persons of the day! Wake up and open your eyes, and beware of danger! 
The perfect way for us is to maintain our traditional policy and to 
cooperate with the Government quite sensibly and smoothly”.413 
  
  The article encompasses the main line of arguments of the Evkâfçılar. According to 
this, the present and future of the Turkish Cypriot community lay only in the continuation of 
British administration of Cyprus. Any attempt to oppose British policy on the island was 
presented as harmful and dangerous for Turkish Cypriot interests. Hakikat, in this article, 
again played the patriotism card. Given that the nationalists presented themselves as the true 
patriots, the ones defending the rights of the community and accusing the Evkâfçılar of 
working for the government and for their own personal interests, Hakikat resorted to the 
“Greek threat”, accusing all those who condemned the government of serving the interests of 
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the Greek Cypriots. Referring to the “new politicians” as irresponsible and dangerous, the 
author implied that the Evkâfçılar were the only power capable of safeguarding the future of 
the Turkish Cypriots. The only prerequisite was loyalty to the British Crown. The interests of 
the Turkish Cypriots were thus attached to those of the colonial government. The hypothesis 
put forward assumed that, if the nationalists prevailed, the British would abandon the Turkish 
Cypriots and open the door for Enosis. Such a hypothesis appears rather implausible at a time 
when the Colonial government had to face Greek Cypriot activism for Enosis. The Evkâfçılar 
appeared to be generally satisfied with the policies of the government and gave the utmost 
importance to smooth cooperation between the community and the government. Contrary to 
the articles published in Söz and the manifestos of the “new politicians”, the article refers to 
the community as “Muslim” (Cemmat-ı İslamiye) and not as Turkish Cypriots or Turks of 
Cyprus (Kıbrıslı Türk and Kıbrıs Türkü), which is indicative of their perception of communal 
identity. By referring to the community as Muslim and not as Turkish, the author chooses not 
to identify with Turkish nationalism and certainly not with the nationalist politicians. 
  
The reaction of the colonial government and the aftermath  
 
As was to be expected, the British government did not legitimize the National Congress, 
ignored its decisions and did not recognize the elected Mufti. When the central committee of 
the Congress sent a telegram on the occastion of the King‟s birthday, Heniker Heaton, the 
acting Governor, made the following comments: “Up to the present no kind of recognition has 
been afforded to it [the Congress] by this Government, and there is no doubt that the aim of 
the Central Committee on sending this telegram to His Majesty was to obtain an 
acknowledgment implying official recognition of the Congress.” Heaton advised against the 
recognition of the Congress: “I‟m confident that your Lordship will concur that it is 
inadvisable that a few individuals in no way representative of the opinion of the large 
majority of their compatriots should arrogate to themselves the right to call themselves and 
act as a National Congress and that it is highly undesirable that any measure of 
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encouragement be given to them”.414 It seems that the government, influenced by Münir Bey, 
had adopted the opinion that only a small percentage of the Turkish Cypriots were represented 
in the Congress.  
  Necati Özkan had expressed earlier his dissatisfaction with the government‟s refusal 
to recognize the Congress, in an article published in Söz on the 21st of May: 
 
  [...] The government unfortunately didn‟t follow this rightful and rational 
road. They didn‟t accept and didn‟t listen to the representatives of the 
people. We exptectd from the government at least to show respect to the 
wishes and the appeal of the people. [...] This people, this handful of 
Turks, is not as insignificant and dishonourable as the Government 
thinks. We are the sons of a nation that founded a big Kingdom, more 
extensive and magnificent than that of the British. We never deserve 
insults. The Government unfortunately has misused the silence and the 
kindness of the Turkish people.415 
  
 Necati Özkan appealed to the government, referring to the community‟s honour, 
which derived from its origins. In order to achieve that, he reminded the Government that the 
Turkish Cypriots were part of the Turkish nation, but at the same time he also addressed the 
Evkâfçılar. Nevertheless, the colonial government failed to acknowledge the rising influence 
of the nationalists and preferred to depend on their allies, the Evkâfçılar, for the running of the 
Turkish Cypriot institutions. In fact, until the early 1930s, the Colonial Government did not 
need to take into consideration the opposition. With the help of Mehmet Munir, who had been 
knighted in 1931, the British managed to control the community. The fact that Mehmet Munir 
remained delegate of the Evkâf until 1948 proves that the government managed to handle the 
reactions of the opposition and was not tempted to change its policy. The Greek Cypriot 
revolt of October 1931 allowed to government to abolish the Legislative Council and curtail 
political liberties, thus making it easier to ignore the reactions of the anti-British party. The 
persistence of the Enosis movement in the 1930s and the improvement of relations between 
Britain and Turkey convinced the colonial government to attempt a rapprochement with the 
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Kemalists.416 This rapprochement, however, came late and took place within a completely 
different framework, under the autocratic rule that was imposed after the disturbances.  
 
The October 1931 Disturbances and the Impact on the Turkish Cypriot Community 
 The disturbances 417  that took place in October 1931 in Nicosia and other major 
Cypriot cities were instigated by prominent Greek Cypriot politicians and members of the 
clergy. The crowds that participated in the disturbances primarily consisted of young Greek 
Cypriots, many of whom were secondary school students. In other words, the October riots 
should be treated solely as a Greek Cypriot affair. Nevertheless, the Oktovriana, as the 
disturbances became known in Greek, had serious and long lasting consequences for both 
communities. I will examine the reaction of the Turkish Cypriot elite through publications of 
the nationalist and the pro-government press, in order to demonstrate the impact that the riots 
had on the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.  
 As we saw earlier, the reluctance of the Colonial government to intervene and limit 
both communities‟ nationalists‟ control over education led to a rise of nationalist sentiment 
among both communities‟ youth. As far as the Greek Cypriot elite are concerned, the end of 
Greek irredentism after the defeat of the Greek army by the Kemalist forces in Anatolia in 
1922, and the lack of political and financial support for the Enosis cause from Greek 
governments, did not deter them from demanding the unification of the island with Greece, 
through petitions, memoranda and dispatches to the British government in London. 
Nevertheless whenever the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council attempted to 
pass resolutions that would upset the status quo, the cooperation of the Turkish Cypriot elite 
with the Government ensured that the Turkish Cypriot members always voted with the 
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government-appointed members, in this way nullifying the Greek Cypriot majority. In the few 
cases where this tactic was not successful, the bills were passed by an Order-in-Council.  
 The high expectations regarding the British administration did not materialize and the 
pronouncement of Cyprus as Crown Colony in 1925 caused resentment amongst the Greek 
Cypriots. Ronald Storrs, who was appointed governor of Cyprus in 1926, was portrayed as 
philhellene, but he could not fulfill the maximalist demands of the Greek Cypriot elite. Greek 
Cypriot nationalism failed to capitalize on the anti-government stance of the Turkish Cypriot 
nationalists, although Necati Özkan had proven his determination to challenge his 
community‟s loyalty to the colonial government by voting with his Greek Cypriot 
counterparts in the Legislative Council. Despite the fact that the Cypriots were relieved from 
the annual Tribute in 1927,418 the excessive taxation and the bad economic conditions due to 
the world economic crisis of 1929 added to the discontent caused by the government‟s refusal 
to give in to the Greek Cypriot nationalists‟ demands.  
 The political mobilization of the nationalists produced two movements, the National 
Organization of Cyprus (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κύπροσ), formed in 1930, and the Cyprus 
National Radicalist Union (Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις Κύπροσ), formed in 1931.419 These 
were both right-wing movements whose main goal was to promote Enosis with Greece. At the 
same time, however, the working class of Cyprus, which comprised about 25,000420 people, 
saw that the recently founded Communist Party of Cyprus could represent them more 
effectively than the nationalist elites. It is worth noting that the working and the lower middle 
classes, regardless of ethnic origin, were indebted to wealthy Greek Cypriot merchants or to 
Evkâf delegate Münir Bey. In order to limit the dependency of the farmers on loan sharks, the 
government had approved the establishment of an Agricultural Bank in 1925. This caused an 
impressive rise in the number of co-operative societies from 46 in 1926 to 268 in 1928 and 
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326 in 1930.421 According to Georghallides, this rise was due to farmers‟ need to organize in 
co-operative societies in order to benefit from the bank.422 Nevertheless, the two Delegates of 
the Evkâf, İrfan Bey and A. E. Gallagher, blocked a loan from the bank that was to be 
distributed to Turkish Cypriot farmers through the Evkâf, on the grounds that the Turkish 
Cypriots lacked “initiative and organizing power”.423 
 The low wages and the dire conditions of the workers in the two major mines of the 
island caused strikes in 1927 and 1929. Undoubtedly, the Communist Party of Cyprus 
contributed to the organization of the strikes.424 Τhe increasing influence of the communist 
party is demonstrated in a confidential report of the Chief Commandant of Police in Cyprus to 
the Colonial Secretary about the increase in the number of registered communists between 
November 1930 and May 1931.425 The communists challenged the established pro-Enosis 
rhetoric and managed to provoke incidents in gatherings on the occasion of the Greek national 
day. They even managed to take down the Greek flag of the gymnasium in Limassol and 
replace it with the communist one.426 In the short period of time from the establishment of the 
communist party in 1926 until the ban on all political activity in 1931, it was one of the few 
voices against the nationalist elite‟s agitation for Enosis. The nationalist fervor that had held 
Greek Cypriot society for over 50 years did not allow the communist party to develop into an 
alternative power, able to question nationalist policies. The small size of Cypriot industry and 
the limited number of workers made the formation of working-class consciousness a difficult 
task. The influence of the Orthodox Church within the Greek Cypriot community was, and 
still is, considerable and the clergy‟s support for Enosis ensured that the Church had enough 
reason to fight communism.  
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 On the other hand, the communist party failed to attract enough support from the 
Turkish Cypriot community. According to Nazım Beratlı, this was due to the following 
reasons: the community was still in the process of replacing its religious identity with its 
Kemalist, secular one; and, since most of the members of the communist party were Greek 
Cypriots, educated in Greece, it was difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to identify with them.427 
To that we must add the stance of the nationalist press, which attacked Communism for being 
a tool in the hands of the Greek Cypriots.428  
 The conditions therefore were ripe for revolt. The passage of an Elementary 
Education Law and a customs bill that was passed with an Order-in-Council were the two 
events that provoked the reaction from the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative 
Council.429 The customs bill was related to the budget, which was a source of discontent for 
both communities because it was believed that the government imposed excessive taxes 
without taking any measures to reduce expenditure. When the government tried to cover a 
budget deficit with a customs tax, the Greek Cypriot members rejected it, while the three 
Turkish Cypriot members abstained. Hence, the bill was rejected and it was passed through an 
Order-in-Council, something that infuriated the Greek Cypriot members. The truth, though, is 
that the Greek Cypriot elite had become so radicalized that they could use any excuse to 
instigate unrest against the government. The role of the Greek consul in Nicosia is also quite 
important. Kyrou, a Greek diplomat of Cypriot origin, had actively supported the agitation 
against the government. 430  In the summer of 1931, the Greek Cypriot members of the 
Legislative Council met repeatedly, in order to decide on their next move. The riots were 
instigated by what seems to be an antagonism between the members of the council. On 
October 20, 1931, the Bishop of Kition and member of the council, Nikodimos Milonas, who 
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had resigned from the Legislative Council three days before, spoke at a rally in Limassol. 
When the news reached Nicosia, another rally was organized in front of the Commercial 
Club. After speeches were made by members of the council and other politicians, the public 
marched to the House of the Governor. There followed clashes with the police and the House 
of the Governor was burnt down. The clashes spread to other major cities, where the rioters 
attacked government buildings and caused damage to infrastructure. According to the official 
report, seven people died and thirty were injured. Thirty eight police officers were also 
injured during the disturbances.  
 For the colonial government, the disturbances were an unprecedented opportunity to 
confront the rising tide of both Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot 
politicians who were considered responsible for instigating the disturbances were deported or 
sentenced to house arrest. Using as a pretext the need to restore peace, the constitution was 
suspended and the Legislative Council was abolished. The governor took advantage of the 
extraordinary powers vested in him by the King and prohibited the flying of flags, restricted 
the ringing of church bells and undertook the direct nomination of the heads of the villages, 
the Muhtarlar and the village councils, the Azalar.431  
 While the government‟s decisions were aimed at confronting the Greek Cypriot 
movement for Enosis, the suspension of all political activity inevitably affected the Turkish 
Cypriot nationalist party too. The results of the 1930 elections, which had given the 
nationalists a straightforward precedence over the Evkâfçılar, stood practically void after the 
abolition of the Legislative Council. The Turkish Cypriot press of course commented 
extensively on the Greek Cypriot political activity, before and after the disturbances. The 
commentary varied according to each newspaper‟s political stance. In an article published in 
Söz on October 1, 1931, just three weeks before the disturbances, under the title “The 
Legislative Council”, we read the following: 
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The majority of the local Greek newspapers in the last weeks is 
publishing very harsh articles on the occasion of the opening of the 
Legislative Council and is calling their members to resign. If we consider 
that some of the Greek members of the Council are also newspaper 
owners we can understand that a lot of the opinions and comments 
published in the press are their point of view.432 If the Greek members 
decide to withdraw from the Council and this decision is implemented in 
the first session what is the task of our members in the Council? We 
know that the resignation of the Greek members is connected to the 
attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece and in this respect the issue for us 
becomes twice as difficult. But it‟s a pity that the stance of the 
government and the deprivation of our natural rights has offended us as 
much the Greeks and had prevented us from supporting the government 
in any possible way. The honourable Dr Shiels has not yet given an 
answer, positive or negative, to the letter that our representatives jointly 
sent him. 433  Contrary to the desires and requests of the people the 
Government insisted in appointing an English headmaster to the Lycée 
that hasn‟t been useful and on the contrary is responsible for a bad 
administration and a clear failure and has paralyzed our only Lycée. 
Although each community in this island has a spiritual leader that belongs 
to the community and is elected by it the Government has refused us this 
right and has not even answered to the appeals of the Turkish Congress 
that met for this purpose. The Government does not deem it necessary to 
care every day for our religious and educational institutions and does not 
want to accept the right of the people to inspect and participate in the 
administration of the property of the religious endowments of our 
forefathers. All these reasons alienate us from the Government and 
prevent us from supporting her in these serious times. On the other hand 
we also have grievances that are serious enough like the ones the Greeks 
present and we don‟t have any profit and benefit from hiding them. 
Nevertheless it is very difficult to support a Government that does not 
want to recognize even our most clear rights and acts as she wishes when 
she is informed of these grievances. At the time that we take such action 
we are witnessing a disrespectful behavior towards our community and 
we are the recipients of the rage and anger of the majority that is quite 
obvious. We are convinced that before the Legislative Council meets our 
Honourable Mufti, head of the National Congress, must be invited to the 
general assembly and must address all these issues by consulting them 
closely with the people. In such case the Turkish members that will 
proceed to the Council will better understand their task and will not allow 
some unpleasant acts to take place. If the Greeks withdraw from the 
Council and it is proven necessary that we withdraw too, at least the 
reasons of our departure will be a priori known and we shall not be 
exposed to accusations that we are carried away by the Greek course of 
events.434 
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 The columnist, most probably the chief editor Mehmet Remzi, seemed to have 
anticipated the resignation of the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council. Based 
on the news from the Greek Cypriots, the article attempted to remind the colonial government 
of the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were the responsible and trustworthy element that the 
British could rely on. But in exchange for the community‟s support, he recalled all of the open 
issues of the Turkish Cypriot community that the British had failed to solve. Comparison with 
the Greek Cypriot community was a common feature in the Turkish Cypriot press. The 
columnist expressed discontent that the Greek Cypriots had made themselves heard and 
obliged the government to pay attention to their issues, while the Turkish Cypriots‟ 
grievances passed unnoticed. It is also interesting that the columnist insisted on the issue of 
the elected Mufti, although the government had emphatically refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of the Congress and therefore the elected Mufti. Moreover, the columnist warned 
the Turkish Cypriot members of the Council not to support the Greek Cypriots‟ protests, 
because that would harm the community‟s interests.  
 A week after the disturbances, Söz published the following article under the title 
“Dangerous Activities and Outrageous Events”: 
 
 The difference of opinion between the Government and the Greeks had 
recently become quite noticeable and acute. The resignation of the 
Metropolitan of Kitium and the approval of this policy by the other Greek 
representatives made the position still worse, and fired the bomb of a riot. 
Undoubtedly, this was a dangerous attempt; but it was curious to see that 
it was encouraged by the whole Greek press, and the public was led to a 
perilous and frightful path. How the Greek intellectuals, who are capable 
of judging everything, fell into this dangerous position is a psychological 
question to be investigated. We both regret to see our Greek co-citizens in 
this path which is full of calamities and evils, and at the same time we are 
perturbed to see the insult made to his Excellency Sir Ronald Storrs, His 
Majesty‟s representative in Cyprus, and the cruelty done in burning down 
the Government House. The Turks of Cyprus who constitute a peaceful 
and loyal community in this country did not possess any power enabling 
them to intervene and to check the evil, but, have maintained their 
peaceful attitude all over the island. This attitude is sufficient to repudiate 
the accusations of some persons, who try to characterize us as being anti-
British. It is now well understood that we, the Turks of Cyprus, know 
well what we are doing, and on what sort of ground we are talking. We 
are very glad to see that the Government has seriously considered the 
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matter and has taken the necessary steps to restore the peace, which we 
fully appreciate and approve.435 
 This article was published on October 29, 1931, which was the eighth anniversary of 
the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. For this reason, the front page of the newspaper 
was dominated by photographs of the president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, and 
the prime minister, İsmet Paşa. 436  The text accompanying the photographs read: “Söz 
congratulates all our readers on the occasion of the National Holiday and wishes safety and 
prosperity to our great nation.” The aforementioned article is printed at the bottom of the page 
next to an article under the title “Today is the National day”. In this article, the columnist 
expressed his sorrow because the Turkish Cypriot youth were not able to celebrate the 
national day like their compatriots in Turkey, due to the curfew imposed by the government 
after the disturbances. Söz was a weekly newspaper and its previous edition, published on 
October 22, could not have included articles on the disturbances. The Turkish national day 
always made the first page of Söz, hence even the most serious and violent disturbances in 
modern Cypriot history were not important enough to make the headline. The fact that no 
Turkish Cypriots participated in the events was another reason. The columnist could not hide 
his satisfaction with the punishment of the Greek Cypriot politicians and repeated once again 
the claim that the Turkish Cypriots were the peaceful and reliable community. Unlike in the 
previous article, the newspaper avoided the expression of grievances or demands, because the 
disturbances had not yet cooled off. The columnist, though, took the opportunity to remind 
the government that the Turkish Cypriots were not anti-British.  
 Hakikat follows more or less the same line of argument as Söz: 
 
The actions taken by the government after the recent Greek outrages were 
met with great satisfaction in all Turkish circles. Those responsible will 
surely be punished for their blameful crimes. They did not even think that 
the properties which they destroyed belonged to the country, and that they 
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destroyed the wealth of the island. We are very distressed to learn that the 
damage done to the Government House exceeds 20,000 pounds and the 
personal losses of his Excellency are over 6,400 pounds. Certain Greek 
priests have been found to have participated in these bloody events, and 
the Metropolitans of Larnaca and Kyreneia and the exarch of 
Phaneromeni Church are amongst those who have been arrested. We 
knew that the Greek Church was striving for Union and spending money 
for this purpose, but no one could imagine that Greek priests would 
venture to defy the laws of the country and to disturb the peace of the 
island. It must be noted that the Turks have proved once more that their 
loyalty to the British Empire is unshakable. We thank his Excellency for 
the steps taken to restore the peace and to secure the safety of our lives 
and properties.437 
 At a time when the government was taking harsh measures against the Greek 
Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot press rushed to ensure that Turkish Cypriot interests would not 
be affected. Hakikat had demonstrated time and again its loyalty to the government and the 
Evkâfçılar. Once the issue of Greek Cypriot political activity was settled, the Evkâfçılar were 
only threatened by the rising popularity of the Kemalist party. And this was not going to be an 
easy task to handle without the help of the government. The measures against the Greek 
Cypriot nationalists were also a message to the Kemalist party. The ban on all political 
activities could have benefited the Evkâfçılar by limiting opportunities for political activism. 
Indeed, when it became known that the government had abolished the Legislative Council, 
Hakikat could not hide its satisfaction: 
The Cyprus Gazette and the Government Notice, issued after our 
leading article was written, notified the public that Letters Patent were 
approved under which the existence of the Legislative Council will 
cease and the power of making laws is granted to the governor. It is also 
notified that the Constitution of the island will be reviewed. 
Consequently, there is no legislative council, and no members of the 
Legislative Council exist for the present. This fact will produce good 
reforms in the Country, and will, no doubt, settle many disputes among 
the Turks. Because, it will give an end to the divisions created by 
elections and will settle the question of the Lycée, which was the source 
of many troubles, as the members of the council will now disappear.438 
 For the Evkâfçılar, the Greek Cypriot disturbances were a blessing in disguise. It gave 
the government the pretext to silence the Kemalist party through the abolition of the 
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Legislative Council. This also put an end to the presence of the Kemalist members in the 
School Boards and the municipal councils. It is no wonder that the newspaper rejoiced over 
the decision. After all, Münir Bey‟s control over the Evkâf and through that over the whole of 
the community was undisputed. The decision to abolish the Legislative Council “corrected” 
the 1930 election results and deprived the Kemalist members of all of the offices that they had 
been appointed to by virtue of their status as elected members of the Legislative Council. 
Thus, the Efkâfçılar hoped that they would continue to rule the community without any 
opposition. The members of the Legislative Council “disappeared”, but the absence of debate 
did not solve the issues facing the community. The Evkâfçılar shared the government‟s view 
that the Kemalist movement would lose momentum if it disappeared from the public space. 
They were both proven wrong because, like the implementation of harsh and undemocratic 
measures only temporarily slowed down Greek Cypriot political activity, the Kemalist 
movement too could not be stopped with prohibitions and bans on political activity. 
 Söz adopted a diametrically opposite view to the issue of autocratic government. In an 
article published on 19 November, under the title “Towards Autocracy”, the editor Mehmet 
Remzi expressed his disagreement in the following way: 
 
 In the telegraph that was sent by the Colonial Office to the local 
government, on the occasion of the ugly events that took place in Cyprus, 
there was a sign that a part of the powers and the privileges that were 
bestowed on the island are going to be taken back and that a new 
Constitution is being prepared that is suitable to the people. It is 
understood that the plan has been decided upon and it has become known 
that the Cyprus Legislative Council will be abolished. According to what 
has became known in the official announcement that has been published 
in relation to this issue, it is a measure that has been adopted under 
wearisome conditions and that it will be necessary to investigate again the 
future situation of Cyprus. As a consequence after the abolition of the 
Legislative Council the power to impose special laws on the country is 
given exclusively to the Governor. It is not known when the 
administrative plan that will be deemed suitable for Cyprus and the 
special constitution are going to be published. Nevertheless at some point 
it will be completed and will come into force. As the Cyprus constitution 
is being edited it is evident from the telegraph that has been published 
that the views and ideas of His Excellency the Governor have been taken 
into consideration by the Colonial Office. In that case, his Excellency the 
Governor will participate effectively and closely in the writing up of the 
Constitution. This decision of the Colonial Office can be justified given 
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that the Governor is someone who knows and has administered this 
country. Nevertheless the Turks of Cyprus who have demonstrated their 
loyalty to her Majesty the Queen and the Government from the first day 
of the English occupation of Cyprus until today and have proven this 
loyalty on every occasion have some quite important demands from the 
Government of Sir Ronald Storrs. Since we have expressed these 
demands to the local and the central Governments on various occasions 
verbally and in writing we do not consider it necessary to repeat them 
here. We would only like to remind that it is possible to grant to the 
Turkish Cypriots what they demand in order to secure their existence on 
this island and be able to live here. Therefore before the Cyprus 
Constitution is written it is necessary to research what the needs and the 
demands of the people consist of. While the investigating committee that 
will come to Cyprus examines the reasons that led to the disturbances, 
there is no doubt that, if they are kind enough to research the issues that 
we indicate they will do a favour to England and the honour of the 
Empire will grow. After [the committee] comprehend the reasons of the 
discontent and if these reasons are removed with good will, the 
Constitution will last long and will be useful.  
 As we obey and comply to orders that are included in the official 
announcement regarding the abolition of the Legislative Council we want 
to believe that the Colonial Office will take into consideration our quite 
humble desires and demands and that the Government will satisfy our 
needs that safeguard our life and property in this island and we shall live 
with this hope for the future.”439  
 
 In this rather misleadingly-titled editorial, Mehmet Remzi tried to get through to his 
readers the views of the nationalists without being subjected to the strict censorship laws that 
were imposed after the disturbances.440 Like all Cypriot newspapers, on the front page of its 
edition of 19th November, Söz published the Letters Patent that had been issued three days 
earlier, according to which the constitution was withdrawn. For the nationalists, Greek or 
Turkish Cypriot, this was a move towards autocracy, but the author avoided attacking the 
government directly. Instead, the author adopted a quite mild attitude towards the Governor, 
accepting the necessity of the measures taken. Since conditions were volatile and it was not 
clear whether the Legislative Council was going to be restored, Mehmet Remzi could only 
ask for the satisfaction of the community‟s demands. Both Söz and Hakikat newspapers 
recalled the constructive and cooperative attitude of the Turkish Cypriot community, but 
each with quite opposite objectives. The evkâfçılar wanted to preserve the status quo and 
                                                          
439Söz PIO, 19/11/1931, No. 514, p.1. 
440Panteli, A History of Cyprus, p. 134. 
186 
 
retain control of the community, while the nationalists invoked the community‟s loyalty in 
order to request that its autonomy be restored. The author, realizing that the nationalists were 
not in a position to express their demands in a more aggressive tone, guaranteed that they 
would comply with the new situation, but expressed the hope that the government would in 
exchange “safeguard the life and property” of the community.  
 The autocratic government that followed the October 1931 disturbances limited the 
political weight of the nationalists, but not the ideological impact of Kemalist ideas. The 
evkâfçılar retained control of the community and the nationalists had to wait until the 1940s 
to gain some political representation. For the moment, though, they invested all hope in the 
government, hoping that the Colonial Office would consider their demands. In the weeks 
following the Letters Patent, Söz devoted its front page to news from Turkey and Europe, 
while there was no editorial from Mehmet Remzi. The fear of censorship appeased the 
usually aggressive tone of the newspaper. On December 10, Mehmet Remzi published 
another moderate article that praised the government: 
  
 Those who get up in anger sit down with injury.441 
This is a Turkish proverb. The Greeks of Cyprus displayed their anger by 
rising against the Government and by burning down the Governor‟s 
House. According to them the reason is that the island was not ceded to 
Greece. Very often, angry people cannot think that they will not be able 
to deal with the man with whom they are angry. They cry and shout 
unconsciously, and when they receive a few blows as the punishment for 
their actions, then, they understand with whom they are dealing. Our 
compatriots acted with the same spirit. Naturally, the Government will 
shortly call upon them to compensate for the damage that they have done, 
and then they will realize the result of their anger. But the Government 
sustained both material and moral damages and in order to have these 
moral damages compensated as well, it abolished the legislative rights 
and privileges enjoyed by the country. The people of Cyprus who were 
living in a wide circle of liberty are now pressed in a narrow circle 
delimited by the new law.   
We are not writing these things to show that we are pleased with what has 
happened. Because we are also suffering from the moral penalties 
imposed by the Government. But nevertheless, we consider the actions 
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taken by the Government to be quite reasonable and justified. The fact 
which consoles us is that is has been understood that a “Question of 
Cyprus” does not exist. It has been declared by the Greek Government 
that such a question does not exist in its political program. On the other 
hand, the British Government, which had so far taken a position not quite 
clear, has found an opportunity to express its intentions.  
According to Italian papers, the Imperial Defense Committee 
recommended that a naval basis should be established in Cyprus similar 
to that in Gibraltar. Several places in the island will be fortified with 
guns, and the garrison in Egypt will partly be removed to Cyprus. There 
is no doubt that these new measures will decide the fate of the island, and 
will give an answer to the question of annexation, which was the source 
of many evils. This will be a blessing for the whole population of the 
island, and will stabilize the peace and the discipline of the country. The 
truth of the proverb quoted above is thus proved, which we hope will be a 
lesson for the new generation.442  
 Söz and its editor, Mehmet Remzi, had seldom felt the need to publish an editorial in 
praise of the colonial government. In this editorial, he did express the nationalists‟ discontent 
with the abolition of the Legislative Council and the other authoritarian measures, but could 
not avoid thanking the government for facing the Greek Cypriot riots because, according to 
his opinion, it put an end to the question of Enosis. I would argue that, in “reprimanding” the 
Greek Cypriot leadership for behaving irresponsibly, Mehmet Remzi also invited some 
criticism of the Turkish Cypriot nationalists‟ aggressive reactions to the government during 
the previous period. Of course, the Turkish Cypriot leadership‟s reactions never reached the 
extremes of the Greek Cypriot nationalists‟ reactions, but this temporary change of attitude 
can be attributed the atmosphere of appeasement caused by government restrictions. In a 
series of editorials under the title “White Flag”, Teslim Bayrağı, published in March 1932, 
Mehmet Remzi attempted an account of the struggle of the nationalists against the Evkâf 
policy and the Evkâf delegates. After praising Necati Bey for leading the nationalists to the 
electoral victory of 1930 and for properly representing the community, he concluded his 
editorial in a rather unexpected way:  
 
[…] While our communal issues were following a natural course 
within a regular organization the events of 21 October took place as a 
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work of bad luck, and unfortunately as a result the administrative and 
legislative responsibilities of the country unfortunately passed to the 
hands of the Government with the abolition of the Legislative Council. 
Under these circumstances it‟s unreasonable and impossible to 
continue with our struggle. Therefore, once we make sure that the 
local and the central governments have comprehended our issues and 
made sure that they will support the community in these issues we 
believe that we have to put an end to our struggle and turn over these 
affairs to the Government. […]443  
 
 It is not difficult to comprehend Mehmet Remzi‟s transformation. The preservation 
of good relations with the Colonial Government was the cornerstone of the evkâfçılar‟s 
policy for over thirty years, and the nationalists fought this submissive attitude time and 
again, especially after the emergence of Necati Özkan as their leader. Neverteless, the new 
situation – after the disturbances and the ban on all political activity – led the editor of Söz to 
adopt a more realistic stance. Necati Özkan replied to Mehmet Remzi in an article entitled 
“Our Struggle is legitimized, there is no Place for Despair”, which was published on April 4, 
1932. After returning the compliment to the editor, Necati Özkan categorically refused to 
surrender the nationalist battle and expressed his sadness for Mehmet Remzi‟s suggestions. 
He concluded in the following way: 
 
 […] The day we give up our struggle we will take responsibility 
for the fate that will meet us. And let there be no doubt that this 
responsibility is going to be heavy. Because, while the government 
decides on our behalf, it will be excused due to the fact that it is alien 
to out rightful wishes and the responsibility for any distorted activity 
will fall upon us for not enlightening the government. And then we 
will have lost the right to complain. Concluding I would like to say 
that giving up the protection of our rights is nothing but an 
unacceptable, lazy submission and no nation can surrender its fate. 
Taking power from these ideas I am saying that we are secure when 
we hold tight the flag of the struggle and when we do not this means 
the death of the community. And I, Mr. Remzi, am determined to hold 
this flag until the end.444 
 
 Necati Özkan‟s rhetoric was not altered by the government‟s measures. What is 
striking, though, is the personal attack against Mehmet Remzi. A similar dispute took place 
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between Mehmet Zekâ and the editor of Masum Millet, Con Rifat. After the abolition of the 
Legislative Council, Mehmet Zekâ, a lawyer and member for Famagusta-Larnaca district, 
was appointed by the government to the Advisory Council. When Zekâ went to England in 
early 1932, in order to sit exams and take his diploma as a barrister, Con Rifat accused him 
of “abandoning his duty”.445 When lawyer and frequent Söz columnist Ahmet Raşit decided 
to emigrate to Turkey for personal reasons in May 1932, it was as if the nationalist 
movement lost an indispensable member. 446  The nationalists‟ frustration with the 
government‟s decisions led to such disputes. The abolition of the Legislative Council 
deprived nationalist leaders of the ability to criticize the government and control the 
Evkâfçılar. Necati Özkan himself admitted that he could not fight the nationalist battle on his 
own.447  
 The 1931 distrurbances did not signify the end of the road for the nationalist battle. 
Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zekâ frequently published articles in Söz that attacked the Evkâf 
and government policy. Mehmet Remzi soon recovered his old militant style, although he 
did not always escape the censorship laws. As a matter of fact, the newspaper was suspended 
for a month in August 1937. In a report by the Press Officer, which was sent to the Colonial 
Secretary on June 29, 1938, we learn that the penalty was imposed for the “publication of an 
article on the subject of the attempts of young Muslims at that time to emigrate to Turkey 
without passports, and in open boots”. This article contained seditious references to Turkey 
as the “Fatherland” and was calculated to do great public mischief by suggesting that what 
was in fact a series of adolescent escapades was instead part of a widespread impulse to 
emigrate to Turkey, necessitated by the living conditions in Cyprus. It was considered that 
the article, which had been preceded by other objectionable articles in the same newspaper, 
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would be interpreted as a call to the Moslem population to place allegiance to Turkey before 
allegiance to the Government of Cyprus and Great Britain”. 448 
 Keeping in mind that Cyprus was under autocratic rule throughout the 1930s, one 
must approach the comments of the Press Officer cautiously, since it was that office that 
controlled and censored the press. In that sense, the newspaper‟s attitude towards the 
government and the Evkâf had not changed since it was first published in 1921. It never 
attempted to hide its nationalist, pro-Kemalist stance. It is striking, though, that the colonial 
government insisted on referring to the Turkish Cypriots as “the Moslem population”, even 
though sixteen years had passed since the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey and the 
institutionalization of Turkish nationalism. According to the Press Officer in the years 1937-
1938, Söz published extensively on Turkey, using “expressions such „our Atatürk‟ and „the 
homeland‟ or „Our Turkey‟”. This was the rule before the implementation of the censorship 
laws. The Press Officer was of the opinion that Söz have sought to encourage a spirit of 
Turkish nationalism, to represent Turkey as the only protector of Moslem Cypriots and to 
belittle the authority and goodwill of the British Administration in the island”.449  
 The autocratic measures that were adopted in 1931 gave the government an 
opportunity to close down Söz. The Colonial Secretary even asked the Police to obtain 
evidence regarding the funding of the newspaper by the Turkish Government. 450  In a 
confidential report by Evkâf Delegate Mehmet Münir Bey to the Colonial Officer, dated 24th 
May, 1928, the editor of Söz was described as a “miserable parasite, subsidized by the 
Turkish Consul”. 451  Mehmet Münir had every reason to attack Mehmet Remzi but his 
allegations were not proven. Nevertheless, even if they were true, they were not enough to 
explain Mehmet Remzi‟s attitude towards the end of the 1930s. I argue that sixteen years had 
passed since the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the consolidation of Turkish 
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nationalism in Anatolia, and the majority of the Turkish Cypriots had by then embraced the 
new ideology. By looking at the Turkish press of the time, we see that many Turkish 
Cypriots rushed to the port of Famagusta to welcome the Turkish warship Hamidiye,452 that 
the Turkish Cypriots lived a life that resembled life in the Turkish Republic from a social and 
political perspective453  and that the Turkish Cypriot schools were following the Turkish 
curriculum.454 By 1938, most Turkish Cypriots had adopted a Turkish-Kemalist identity. The 
rise in the number of schools, the implementation of the Turkish curriculum, the rise in the 
percentage of literacy and the consolidation of the Turkish Republic were all factors that 
precipitated the domination of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. As in Turkey, the Kemalist 
version of Turkish nationalism gradually replaced the Ottoman- Muslim identity in Cyprus. 
Undoubtedly, the colonial government saw the nationalist movement in Cyprus with 
suspicion and preferred to side with the Evkâfçılar despite the growing popularity of 
Kemalist ideas. Having said that, though, we should add that the British did not oppose the 
Kemalist reforms. In fact, the government facilitated the implementation of the language 
reform and had no reason to intervene in the issue of the dress code, the abolition of the fez 
or the headscarf. Of course, the autocratic rule that was imposed after 1931 restricted the use 
of national symbols for both communities. This, though, did not impede the consolidation of 
nationalism. The issue of the community‟s autonomy was of course a constant source of 
discontent for the nationalists until the end of British rule, but that was not the only reason 
behind Mehmet Remzi‟s rhetoric. As we have seen in chapter 3, Mehmet Remzi served as a 
teacher before he devoted himself to journalism. His previous professional identity infiltrated 
his writing style. Through his columns, Mehmet Remzi attempted to illuminate his readers, 
to lead them towards the light, like a teacher does with his students. The Turkish Cypriots 
were ignorant (cahil) and the Turkish Cypriot intellectual elite had undertaken the task of 
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their enlightenment. Since parts of the Turkish Cypriot population had not fully adopted 
Kemalist ideology, Mehmet Remzi considered his task incomplete. Just as Kemalist ideals 
were imposed by force in Republican Turkey, allowing little or no space to opposition, 
Turkish Cypriot nationalists felt that they had to make sure that that the ideological 
transformation of the Turkish Cypriot society was complete. Hence, publications referred to 
“a party in Cyprus working for the revival of the old religious system in Turkey”. According 
to the newspaper, that party “was centralized in the Evcâf office and supported by the British 
Government”.455 As soon as Greek Cypriot revolt was suppressed and its leaders were sent 
into exile, Enosis, the biggest threat to Turkish Cypriot interests, was, temporarily at least, 
out of the question. The ban on political activity frustrated the nationalists and therefore the 
only way to propagate their ideas was through the press. Having gained enough popularity, 
and inspired by the Greek Cypriots and their anti-government stance, Turkish Cypriot 
nationalists felt that loyalty to the Government was out of date. The frequent attacks against 
the government prove this point.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
  The National Congress was an attempt to express the political aspirations of the 
nationalist elite. Inspired by the principles of Kemalism and defining themselves as Turkish 
nationalists, they questioned the policy of the Evkâfçılar to ally with the government. The 
Congress addressed all issues related to the independence of the community from government 
control. The nationalists presented themselves as guardians of the Turkish Cypriot 
community‟ interests, accusing their opponents of siding with the government only in order to 
serve their own interests. Although the nationalists identified with Kemalist Turkey and the 
Evkâfçılar with an Islamic-Ottoman identity, neither side avoided the controversies. Despite 
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the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were a minority in a land administered by a Christian 
power, and felt the pressure of the Christian majority that aspired to unite the island with 
Greece, religion was not used as a unifying factor among the Turkish Cypriots. The nature of 
Turkish Cypriot Islam did not allow for religion to become a point of reference for Turkish 
Cypriots. This did not prevent the nationalists electing a Mufti, protesting the abolition of the 
post by the government, although this directly clashed with the Kemalist secular reforms. On 
the other side, the Evkâfçılar did not react to the government policy of intervening in the 
Islamic institutions, supporting British policy and disregarding all reactions as harmful for the 
community. This persistent support for the government can be attributed to the struggle of the 
Evkâfçılar to retain their privileged position in the community and the colonial government. 
The Greek Cypriot revolt in October 1931 and abolition of political bodies limited political 
activity, but the struggle of the nationalists to transform the community according to Kemalist 
principles continued.  
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CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS  
 This dissertation examined the Turkish Cypriot community between 1918 and 1931, 
with a view to exploring its nature as it transformed from a Muslim community to an ethnic 
minority. I argued that nationalism among Turkish Cypriots was consolidated during that 
period, due to a combination of factors. These were the consolidation of Turkish nationalism, 
the intensification of Greek Cypriot efforts to achieve Enosis of Cyprus with Greece and the 
intransigence of the British colonial government. I maintained that, although the Turkish 
Cypriots were influenced by the ideological debate that took place in the Ottoman Empire 
through the late 19th and early 20th centuries about the nature of Ottoman and Turkish 
nationalism, the emergence and consolidation of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was only 
possible after the institutionalization of nationalism in the Republic of Turkey. With the 
spread of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots acquired an important tool that 
helped them confront Greek Cypriot political activity. Finally, the policy of the colonial 
government to centralize the Muslim institutions, in an apparent attempt to control the 
community, precipitated the spread of Turkish nationalism, because what was described by 
the British as an attempt to regulate the finances of the community was actually perceived as a 
blatant intervention in the affairs of the community.  
 Furthermore, I demonstrated how this transition to modernity influenced the Turkish 
Cypriot elite. I argued that the traditional elite, which owed its power to its good relations 
with the colonial government, felt threatened by the emergence of a nationalist elite whose 
main aim was to secure the community‟s autonomy and the transformation of the Turkish 
Cypriots into a secular society in accordance with Kemalist principles. This debate between 
the traditional and the modern elite had an impact on the formation of Turkish Cypriot 
identity. I claimed that this debate should not be approached exclusively as an ideological 
debate between a traditionalist and a nationalist elite.456  
                                                          
456This point is going to be discussed further on in this chapter. 
195 
 
 In my examination of the transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community, I used 
articles from the local press extensively. I chose to focus on two newspapers, Söz and 
Hakikat, because they epitomized the division of the community and its elite in that period. I 
insisted on the importance of the press for two reasons. First, in this transitional period of 
Cypriot history, the press was the most successful vehicle for the dissemination of political 
ideas. Second, with the emergence of the nationalist elite, the press was used extensively by 
candidates during the electoral campaign or in order to win popular support for political 
events such as the National Congress of 1931. As Cypriot politics, too, entered modernity, the 
press became a public sphere of an increasingly politicized class. Due to the peculiarities of 
the Cypriot case, namely the prevalence of a nationalist rather than a class discourse as a 
result of the Greek Cypriot pro-Enosis movement, public discourse was for decades 
dominated by the ethnic conflict. This conflict overshadowed financial and social issues and 
made cooperation between the communities almost impossible.  
 I attempted to deconstruct the idea put forward by some Turkish Cypriot historians 
that the Turkish Cypriots were, already from the first steps of the Kemalist regime, ardent and 
militant supporters of secular reforms. Study of the extent of the popularity of Kemalist ideals 
among Turkish Cypriots in the 1920s is not possible, because very few members of that 
generation are alive and available to interview. This, however, is not the only reason. We 
have at our disposal memoirs of politicians like Necati Özkan, teachers like Hıfsiye Ziya 
Hacıbulgur457 and journalists like Beria Özoran, who seem to agree on one issue: how much 
they all supported the Kemalist cause. I argue that this determinist approach to Turkish 
Cypriot history is not limited to the 1920s. From 1878 to 1974, Turkish Cypriot history is 
dominated by the struggle for national survival. And this explains the inevitability of Kemalist 
nationalism for the Turkish Cypriot community. Faced with the danger of enslavement under 
the Greek Cypriots in case the latter succeeded in uniting Cyprus with Greece, the Turkish 
Cypriots were obliged to adopt the Kemalist reforms and comply with the model of the ideal 
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Turk: secular, patriotic, willing to sacrifice himself for the fatherland and Kemalist ideology. 
Even if there were an alternative, the Turkish Cypriots did not have the luxury of straying 
from the wider Turkish family. There were, though, more practical reasons for the adoption of 
the reforms. The Kemalist reforms were regarded as progressive and they satisfied the need of 
the community for modernization.  
 Despite the complaints of the nationalists, the Kemalist reforms were actually 
implemented in Cyprus rather quickly and effectively, probably even more effectively than in 
mainland Turkey. It seems, however, that any delay in their implementation was not due to 
reactions or to the colonial government‟s anti-Kemalist stance. In some cases, the reforms 
could not be absorbed that easily by the community. The language reform of 1928, for 
example, was implemented almost immediately. Yet three years later, we read in a dispatch of 
the Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary that: 
[…] the majority of Moslems in villages still find a difficulty in reading 
the new Turkish characters. In most, if not in every village, there are, 
however, one or two persons who can read the new characters. There is, 
therefore no great objection to Government notices and printed 
documents being written in the Roman characters, but I think that 
communications written by hand should continue to be sent in Arabic 
script or, as at present, in both […]458 
 
 This probably explains why pro-government and nationalist newspapers like Söz and 
Masum Millet continued to be published partly or wholly in Ottoman. The language reform 
was indeed implemented with the support of the government, but it was met with the 
disapproval of those directly affected, the religious scholars. In a petition that was sent to the 
government on April 21, 1930, Yusuf Ziyaeddin, an ex-teacher at a religious school 
(medrese), protested against the “removal of the Muslim letters from the schools” and the 
obligation on “the poor officials and Muslims to learn the Latin characters which do not 
properly suit [the Turkish] language”.459 In the same petition, the author protested against the 
abolition of the religious institutions and compared the Kemalist government to the Bolshevik 
regime, due to former‟s “abolition of religious institutions and national habits”.  
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 Even if Yusuf Ziyaeddin‟s allegations represented only a small part of the population, 
that of religious scholars, a part of the Turkish Cypriot population probably shared his 
thoughts and worries. Nevertheless, the dynamic of Kemalist ideology was such that it soon 
prevailed entirely in Cyprus, too, becoming an undisputed element of Turkish Cypriot 
identity. 
 The transition from Ottoman to Turkish identity limited the possibilities for 
kıbrıslılık, or Cypriotness, to flourish. As we have seen, the evolution of Greek nationalism in 
Cyprus into a force that excluded the Turkish Cypriot community from post-colonial Cyprus 
made the emergence of Cypriotness almost impossible. By applying Anderson‟s theory460, we 
can explain the transformation of the Cypriot Muslim to a Cypriot Turk and the Cypriot 
Christian to Cypriot Greek within forty years of the beginning of British rule, with the help of 
the press and nationalist education. While the Greek Cypriots had gone through this process 
earlier, it took less than ten years for a Muslim farmer from Limassol or Larnaca to become a 
Cypriot Turk before becoming a Cypriot. In other words, I argue, Cypriotness failed to evolve 
into a common identity that could encompass both communities. And this failure should not 
be attributed exclusively to the policy of divide-and-rule, as Cypriot historiography often 
claims. Cypriotness failed to evolve into a viable alternative to Greek and Turkish 
nationalisms because the nationalist elites did all they could to prevent this. The popularity of 
the Communist Party of Cyprus, with the participation of over two thousand Turkish Cypriots 
through the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO),461 could have created the conditions for 
setting aside Greek and Turkish national identity in favour of Cypriotness, but the anti-
communism of the elites and the autocratic measures of the government after 1931, which 
outlawed the Communist Party, obstructed the emergence of a class identity. The issue of 
Cypriotness, though, or rather of the hindrance of its emergence, is outside the scope of this 
research.  
                                                          
460Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
461Şevki Kıralp, “Akel ve Kıbrıslılık” in Mehmet Hasgüler and Murat Özkaleli (eds.), Kıbrıs‟ta Kimlik 
ve Değişim: Post Annan Sürecinde Ada (Istanbul: Alfa, 2012) p. 267. 
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 Despite occasional complaints, both communities managed to control their schools, 
appoint the teachers they chose and, most importantly, apply the curriculum that was 
approved by the ministries of education in Athens and Ankara. The debate about the 
administration of the Lycée, as we saw in chapter 5, did not focus on the quality of education. 
I argued that the nationalists sought to control the school in order to fully implement a 
nationalist curriculum. I maintained that the nationalists, driven by the principles of 
Kemalism, resisted the control of the community by the government, because such 
dependency on a Christian, Western power was against those anti-colonial, anti-imperialist 
principles.  
 In chapters 6 and 7, I examined the 1930 elections for the Legislative Council and the 
1931 National Congress that signified the first major victory of the nationalist elite over the 
Evkâfçılar. I attempted to show that the economic situation on the island at the end of the 
1920s combined with an increase in the popularity of Kemalist ideas and discontent with the 
colonial government, which offered two out of the three Turkish seats to the nationalist 
candidates and removed the Delegate of the Evkâf from the Council. The electoral campaign 
focused on issues regarding the independence of the community‟s institutions and the 
administration of the Turkish Lycée. The Turkish Cypriot press played an important role in 
the campaign. Söz actively supported the main nationalist candidate, Necati Özkan, by 
attacking the Evkâfçılar and promising its readership that the victory of the nationalists would 
restore the community‟s control over its institutions. On the contrary, Hakikat expressed the 
opinion that a nationalist victory would be harmful to the interests of the community, because 
it would threaten the good relations between the Turkish Cypriot elite and the colonial 
government. In fact, both parties used a similar dilemma to the electorate: if voters did not 
elect their candidates, the interests of the community would be at stake.  
 The National Congress that took place in 1931 further alienated the two elites. The 
nationalists, strengthened by the election results, attempted to capitalize on their victory by 
organizing a congress that vowed to represent the whole of the community. I argued that 
Necati Özkan, who hosted the Congress in his own home, knew that the government was not 
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going to acknowledge the Congress and its results. Yet the Congress had a wider significance 
for the nationalists: it resembled the congresses that had been organized by the Turkish 
nationalists in Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence, which expressed the 
demands of the Turkish nation. I maintain, thus, that the National Congress was an 
opportunity for the nationalists to demonstrate their newly acquired power. The Evkâfçılar 
were alarmed by this development and were quick to show their disapproval. Their reaction 
demonstrated their fear of losing the power that they had secured through smooth relations 
with the government. I argue that the core of the debate was political. It was a debate for the 
control of the community and the control of the community‟s institutions. The attack on the 
Muslim institutions and the decision of the colonial government to side with the Evkâfçılar 
drove the opposition towards an anticolonial nationalism.  
 In chapter 4, I compared the two prominent figures of Turkish Cypriot politics in that 
period, Mehmet Münir and Necati Özkan. The former, a lawyer and government official, rose 
to the position of the head of the Evkâf and, by virtue of this office, evolved through his 
control of almost all communal institutions into a leader of the Turkish Cypriots. The colonial 
government justified these appointments on the ground that Mehmet Münir was the only 
Turkish Cypriot who was capable of running the community‟s affairs. The truth is that 
Mehmet Münir managed to remain Delegate of the Evkâf for over two decades due to a 
clientelist network that was supported with funds from the Evkâf. Necati Özkan was a self-
made entrepreneur and ardent nationalist who challenged the dominance of Mehmet Münir 
and the Evkâf system. His election in the Legislative Council was the first major blow to 
Mehmet Münir‟s powers and a sign that the nationalists could not be ignored by the colonial 
government. The measures taken by the government after the 1931 disturbances put an end to 
all political activity and eliminated the nationalists‟ political power. This, however, did not 
signify the end of the nationalist struggle to transform the community along Kemalist 
principles.  
 Finally, Chapter 3 compared the two best-selling Turkish Cypriot newspapers, Söz 
and Hakikat. I attempted a portrayal of Remzi Okan, the editor of Söz, which was the main 
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newspaper that promoted Turkish nationalism. For over twenty years from when the 
newspaper was first published in 1921, he served the nationalist cause by pushing for the 
implementation of the Kemalist reforms and attacking the Evkâf administration at every 
opportunity. Remzi Okan, a former teacher, used the columns of his newspaper to enlighten 
his public. Hakikat, on the other side, voiced the opinion of the Evkâfçılar. The newspaper 
had a more moderate attitude towards its opponents, although it often engaged in debates with 
Söz about the latter‟s comments on the Evkâf. It supported the community‟s loyalty to the 
government, claiming that any attempt by the community to oppose the government would 
put its interests in danger. In all, I argue, the two newspapers, like the parties they supported, 
were not that different in essence.  
 To conclude, the national awakening of the Turkish Cypriots may have started at the 
same time as that of the Turks elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, but the formation of their 
ethnic identity was completed with the consolidation of Turkish nationalism in the Republic 
of Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite that emerged after 1920 challenged the 
traditional elite, but their objectives and aspirations in essence did not vary considerably. The 
gradual prevalence of Kemalism in Cyprus in the following decades solved the debate in 
favour of the nationalists. Political turmoil and ethnic conflict in the 1960s and the 1970s 
ended with the emancipation of the Turkish Cypriots. The debate between the secular and the 
religious character of Turkish Cypriot identity, however, re-emerged only recently, after a 
similar debate began in mainland Turkey.  
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